The Promo-LEX Observation Mission for the regional elections in ATU Gagauzia has launched its first report on the elections of 15 November 2026 for the Office of Governor (Bashkan) and for the People’s Assembly. The report covers the period of 3 July – 13 October 2026, preceding the start of the electoral campaign. It analyses the socio-political context of the elections, the nomination and registration of candidates, the activity of the electoral bodies, the conduct of potential competitors, election financing, the use of administrative resources, and the involvement of third parties or coordinated inauthentic behaviour.

Faced, after a long time, with a challenger that makes the outcome of the election uncertain, the ruling majority has kept the whole of society in a state of nervousness and uncertainty regarding the calling of elections. During that time, a further deterioration of electoral conditions was recorded, along with a deepening of inequality on all fronts – this is one of the main assessments presented in the report of the CRTA Election Observation Mission, “Campaign Before the Paperwork,” which covers the period from March to the beginning of September this year, and which was presented today at a press conference in Belgrade.

The report includes an analysis of the legal and institutional framework for holding elections, media monitoring findings, an overview of the field activities of political actors, and other relevant topics.

Three phenomena stand out as hallmarks of the observed period – growing polarisation, the threat of violence, and an even cruder erasure of the boundary between the state and the ruling party. The campaign began well before the elections were called.

“The observation findings show that in a number of key areas there has been an almost complete merging of the state and the ruling political party,” said Raša Nedeljkov, Head of CRTA Election Observation Mission.

State and public resources have been harnessed more than ever for the party’s needs; state officials are engaging in party promotion, and there are indications that budget funds intended for regular party work are being illegally and improperly used to finance campaign activities even before the elections were called.

In just the last four months of this year alone, more than 1,200 field activities by senior state officials were recorded, and almost a fifth of the recorded cases contain elements of the abuse of public resources.

In the same period, observers registered 85 politically motivated physical or verbal conflicts. It was also stated at the conference that it is concerning that, from the highest state positions, citizens are being intimidated with messages claiming that the other side is planning to incite chaos and violence.

The report also points to an alarming abuse of the security apparatus, reflected in the fact that the phones of 14 members of the student movement and the Green-Left Front were infected with the Pegasus and NoviSpy spyware.

Inequality between the ruling party and other political actors has intensified simultaneously on several levels: financial, media, legal, institutional… Serbia will not enter the upcoming elections with a completed audit of the voter register either. The Regulatory Body for Electronic Media (REM) has not made a single decision in 22 months, while on the media scene there has been a sale of United Group’s media division, further expansion of Telekom Serbia in the cable-operator market, the takeover of SBB, the sale of local TV channels, the establishment of new local news portals, and other processes of media-power concentration within a bloc close to the government.

Monitoring of RTS’s Dnevnik 2 (the public broadcaster’s main news program) showed that 96 percent of the time devoted to political actors went to the ruling majority. President Aleksandar Vučić alone took up half of that time, making him the most represented figure on Dnevnik 2. Positive coverage of President Vučić was as much as 11 times longer than in 2022.

At the press conference, it was announced that CRTA will observe all phases of the electoral process, up to and including the announcement of election results, including election day, during which CRTA observers will be deployed across the country, at a random and representative sample of 500 polling stations.

On 3 September, Civil Network OPORA held its first international workshop on voter registers. Civil society representatives from Ukraine, Kenya, Serbia, Moldova, Armenia, and Georgia discussed the main causes of inaccuracies in voter registers, the risks they pose to voters’ rights and electoral integrity, mechanisms for verifying and updating voter data, and opportunities to strengthen cooperation between election management bodies and civil society.
The document provides an analytical summary of the discussion and a draft set of recommendations, which will inform subsequent workshops.

The European Platform for Democratic Elections has identified 29 current or former representatives of Election Management Bodies (EMB) who have participated in “fake” (politically biased) election observation activities in the OSCE region between March 2024 and October 2025. In elections lacking genuine competition, independent scrutiny, or basic democratic safeguards, they praised procedures, endorsed official results, or made statements that host authorities used to present the process as internationally recognized.

The involvement of EMB representatives in fake election observation is a more visible and increasingly systematic trend and undermines trust in those institutions that stand for the rules-based and transparent conduct of elections. EMB representatives were presented as “international observers” or “electoral experts,” although their visits were brief, no public methodology was available, and their conclusions went beyond what their limited activities could support.

EPDE documented EMB-linked participants in Russia’s 2024 presidential and regional elections, Azerbaijan’s 2024 snap parliamentary election, the 2025 Belarusian presidential election, and Georgia’s 2025 local elections.

The practice is now becoming more organized and internationally networked. Rather than relying solely on invitations to specific elections, the Kremlin, its ideological allies, and affiliated organizations are developing structures to recruit, convene, and deploy foreign officials on an ongoing basis. The clearest indication of this development was an international conference held in Moscow on April 14 and 15, 2026. According to the organizers, it brought together more than 150 participants from 60 countries. The conference led to the creation of the “International Association of Independent Electoral Experts”, or the “International Association of Independent Political and Electoral Experts”, abbreviated IAIEE or IAPEE. The Association presents itself as an alternative platform for international electoral expertise. Its stated approach prioritizes state sovereignty, national interests, political traditions, and opposition to alleged foreign interference. Several individuals involved in the Association or its reported leadership have previously participated in fake observation missions, suggesting that the Association may be formalizing networks that previously operated through ad hoc invitations.

This report is based on EPDE’s Fake Observers Database and additional open-source research. The accompanying list includes individuals with a documented current or former link to an EMB who meet EPDE’s methodology for identifying fake observers. Even without a formal mandate, host authorities and state-aligned media may use the individual’s title and affiliation to create the impression that a foreign electoral institution has endorsed the election. Inclusion on EPDE’s list does not, by itself, show that the relevant institution approved the visit or endorsed the individual’s statements. When authorization, financing, or the capacity in which a person participated cannot be established, this is treated as a limitation of the available evidence.

Professional cooperation among EMBs can strengthen electoral administration. However, in the absence of clear rules on authorization, transparency, and accountability, the same networks can confer systemic credibility on elections that do not meet democratic standards.

The domestic election monitor alliance “Independent Observer”, which includes EPDE member Helsinki Citizens’ Committee – Vanadzor, published a report on the preliminary assessment of its observation mission. The observation mission is conducted with the financial support of the European Union, the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation (GMF TF), Sweden, and the Democracy Development Foundation. 

The elections of the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia were held on June 7, 2026. 17 parties and 2 alliances of parties were nominated for the elections. One of the nominated parties subsequently withdrew its candidacy. Currently, recounts are underway, and the final results have not been summarized by the publishing date of the preliminary assessment. Nevertheless, the preliminary results suggest that the “Civil Contract” party, the “Strong Armenia” and “Armenia” alliances, and the “Prosperous Armenia” party will receive mandates in the National Assembly. The recounts, which are also being observed by the mission, are being carried out properly. Aside from correcting obvious data entry errors, they are deciding the validity or invalidity of individual ballots, without recording any cases of falsification of voting results. The invalidation of the voting results in 3 polling stations and the scheduling of re-voting continue to remain in the focus of the “Independent Observer”. 

The Armenian original document is available here.

Ukrainian EPDE member Civil Network OPORA conducted a nationwide survey of Ukraine’s adult population to explore the issues around the State Voter Register and the ways to update it.

The study demonstrates the significant impact of the war on migration patterns and highlights citizens’ demand for the protection of their voting rights. It is critical to be prepared for the first post-war elections by comprehensively updating the State Voter Register, and by creating appropriate and non-discriminatory conditions for the exercise of the active voting rights of citizens residing outside their place of registration, both in the country, and abroad.

The matter has also taken on particular significance in the context of the European Commission’s Ukraine 2025 Report within the EU Enlargement policy published on November 4, 2025. As regards the functioning of democratic institutions (subsection 2.1.1. Democracy), the key recommendations in the document highlight the need “auditing and updating the State voter register”.

The full study is available here.

EPDE member Transparency International Action-Corruption Center (TIAC), as part of the Akanates Observation Mission, published a reference note on the observation of the voting day of the parliamentary elections of the Republic of Armenia held on June 7, 2026.

Within the framework of the mission, 712 observers were engaged, monitoring the voting process across the entire territory of Armenia. A total of 520 observers followed the full-day voting process in 260 polling stations. The observation was carried out using a random sampling methodology, which enables the assessment of the quality of election-day processes through statistical methods. Although the observation covered only a small proportion of polling stations nationwide 13%, he sample-based methodology allows for drawing conclusions about the electoral process at the national level.

The Akanates Observation Mission was established in August 2018. Its founding members are the Transparency International Anti-Corruption Center and the Law Development and Protection Foundation. The mission aims to contribute to the conduct of free and fair elections in accordance with the legislation of the Republic of Armenia and international standards, as well as to promote the integrity of electoral processes and public oversight thereof.

The 2026 parliamentary election observation mission is implemented with the financial support of the European Union, the Transatlantic Foundation of the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF TF), the Embassy of Norway, the National Endowment for Democracy, the European Endowment for Democracy, and the Democracy Development Fund. The content of this document is the responsibility of the Akanates Observation Initiative and does not necessarily reflect the views of the donors.

• A recent report by EPDE member Expert Forum (EFOR) analyzes political party financing in 2025, against the backdrop of the Permanent Electoral Authority’s announcement of a broader reform of legislation governing political parties, election campaigns, and the institution’s operations. Although 2025 did not reach the exceptional level of 2024, when campaign reimbursements and subsidies exceeded one billion lei, revenues remained high compared to previous years, totaling 323 million lei for parties and 381 million lei for national minority organizations. The report does not aim to analyze campaign contributions in detail, as these are addressed separately in monitoring reports during campaigns; however, it emphasizes that regular and campaign financing cannot be completely separated, since parties use a significant portion of the funds obtained for party activities for activities with electoral impact.
• The financing of political parties in Romania remains dominated by subsidies (including massive campaign reimbursements) and loans—one of the major changes over the past two election cycles. The lines between party financing and campaign financing are blurred. Some of the main problems remain the high level of subsidies and unclear mechanisms for allocating funds, the lack of overall limits for donors, the opacity of funding sources—especially in campaigns—and inconsistent reporting.
• The lack of resources at the Permanent Electoral Authority (AEP) limits its oversight capacity. The authorities’ limited ability to effectively verify the origin of funds, including through inter-institutional collaboration, limits the transparency of the process. Furthermore, collaboration with institutions such as the National Audiovisual Council (CNA) remains limited, which could provide a more robust picture of how funds are spent on media and propaganda. A reform should eliminate political influence and strengthen the independence of oversight actions. Sanctions remain limited and are not dissuasive. Funding for political parties appears to be less ideological and more focused on securing political influence. The fact that Social Democrat Party (PSD) donors contributed to the Alliance for the Union of Romanians party’s (AUR) revenues in 2025 or that National Liberal Party (PNL) members donated to the PSD supports this conclusion. As in previous years, we identified possible cases of donors whose donations or loans do not match the data in their asset declarations or the financial information reported to the Ministry of Finance.
• A reform of political financing should reduce the risks of buying political influence, limit the concentration of resources within narrow networks, and ensure a better balance between public funding, genuine political competition, and transparency toward voters. It should be noted that, following the cancellation of the 2024 elections, policymakers have not taken any significant measures to improve the legal framework on political financing that would limit the emergence of major risks to the integrity of the electoral process in the future. Nor has the legislation on declarations of assets and interests been amended, which means that we will likely no longer be able to conduct such analyses in the coming years.

An English long summary of the report is available on the website of Expert Forum (EFOR).

Monitoring Report: April–May 2026

Authors: Mădălina Voinea (Digital Programs Coordinator, Expert Forum), Vlad Adamescu (Co-Chair, Center for Democracy and Good Governance), Monirul Hassan (Independent Researcher, Computer Science)

In a period of political crisis, Romanian TikTok feeds have become an information battlefield. The researchers analysed 23,599 viral political videos from the beginning of the year. Of these, in the period 1 April – 11 May 2026 alone, the monitored videos generated 101.9 million views, 829,000 shares, and 68,400 comments. 52% of comments were identical messages. Of the 267,799 followers of the accounts that produced this content, 53.1% were empty accounts with no videos posted. Are we talking about real people, concerned citizens, patriots? Our data suggests the continuous presence of amplification networks that artificially keep the conversation at peak levels precisely at the moments when the public is most vulnerable. We ask ourselves in this context how we can determine who came first — the inauthentic accounts or the genuine supporters? More importantly, who is accountable in a democracy for the manipulation of information reaching citizens?

Beyond platform obligations, responding to information pollution requires action at the societal level. In this report, the authors propose three complementary directions:

1. the regulation of online political advertising, within which we should explicitly include a ban on the use of inauthentic content campaigns by marketing companies contracted by Romanian political parties. Such a regulation may be accompanied by a Code of Conduct for parties in the online environment.
2. Strengthening civil strategic communication capacity through the establishment of a Romanian STRATCOM. This does not entail replicating models from France, Sweden, Norway or Moldova, but rather the creation, first and foremost, of studies on the Romanian information space, consumption habits, and vulnerabilities, together with experts from universities and civil society in the Romanian information space.
3. A clear distinction between legitimate forms of user coordination in the online environment, for example, coordinated citizen campaigns supporting a politician, information campaigns, organic political expression campaigns, and coordinated inauthentic campaigns.

44 political parties submitted information on their 2025 annual revenues and expenditures to the Anti-Corruption Bureau, although only 25 of them reported financial turnover. Twenty-one political associations reported no revenues during the reporting period, while 19 reported no expenditures.

EPDE member ISFED presents an analysis of the finances of Georgia’s political parties in 2025.

– The total revenues of political parties in 2025 amounted to approximately GEL 49 million. Georgian Dream received more revenue (GEL 26.5 million) than all other political parties combined (GEL 22.5 million).

– A total of GEL 8.9 million was allocated from the state budget to finance six political parties, of which 68% was allocated to the Georgian Dream. By the end of the year, the number of parties receiving state funding had further decreased.

– In 2025, 21 political parties received donations. The total amount of donations exceeded GEL 27 million. 67% of donations were received by Georgian Dream.

– Total cash-based expenditures of political parties in 2025 exceeded GEL 46 million. Of this amount, GEL 23.8 million (52%) was spent by the Georgian Dream.

– The majority of expenditures were allocated to advertising (GEL 13.9 million), remuneration (GEL 5.4 million), rent (GEL 4.3 million), and capital expenditures (GEL 9.4 million). Significant expenditure categories also included consulting, notary, interpretation, and translation services (GEL 2.8 million), as well as office expenses (GEL 1.9 million).

Data from monitoring carried out by the Promo-LEX Association from 2018 to the present has
demonstrated not only that hate speech is a frequent phenomenon in the Republic of Moldova,
but also that the process of prevention and combating it has required legislative changes, and
after 2022 requires the streamlining of the reporting – documentation – sanctioning cycle.

As we highlighted in the latest hate speech monitoring report, this type of speech is increasingly
being used in combination with manipulative messages and disinformation generated by both
real people and algorithms. In the period between the 2024 presidential elections and the start
of the election campaign for the 2025 parliamentary elections (September 2024 – August 2025),
a process of normalisation of hate speech took place, and the autumn 2025 election campaign
began in a public and online space already steeped in hate, intolerance and misinformation.

Data from monitoring carried out by the Promo-LEX Association since 2018 shows that the
authorities’ response to hate speech is insufficient compared to the number of cases identified by
civil society. Despite the actions taken by the General Police Inspectorate (GPI), the Audiovisual
Council (AC) and other institutions, the number of complaints is declining. This is why research
into public perceptions of hate speech during last autumn’s parliamentary elections provides an
important basis for analysing and evaluating the actions taken and those planned to prevent and
combat hate speech both during and outside election periods.

This analysis was carried out based on data from the sociological study ‘Citizens’
perceptions of the quality of elections and the functioning of democratic processes in the
Republic of Moldova’.

The report is also available in Romanian and Russian.

This study by the Promo-LEX Association provides a broad picture of electoral processes, the functioning of democratic institutions and respect for human rights, including in the Transnistrian region.

The results of the study reveal that citizens’ interest in socio-political life is variable: 33.9% of respondents declare themselves quite interested, and 19.9% ​​very interested, while 23.1% are not very interested and 8.6% not at all interested. Another 20.9% have a neutral position. At the same time, perceptions regarding the direction of the country’s development and the ability of citizens to influence public decisions remain divided, with a significant part considering that their influence is limited. About 90% of respondents claim that they had the opportunity to choose freely, which indicates a generally positive perception of the electoral process.

For future elections, citizens believe that more measures should be taken to ensure their fairness. Specifically: combating voter corruption (47.9%), protecting elections from foreign influences (34.4%), and combating disinformation in electoral campaigns (33.7%).

Perceptions regarding the free and fair nature of the elections are divided (almost 43% — to a very large extent/to a large extent, and over 51% — to a small extent/to a very small extent), and the data show that a significant number of respondents (59.9%) believe that there were at least some irregularities or violations of electoral legislation. These are perceived to have occurred both at the national level and in the polling stations in the diaspora. Respondents also assessed differently the way in which the authorities handled these situations.

At the same time, most respondents are aware of election monitoring by non-governmental organizations and believe that it contributes to reducing violations and increasing the transparency of the electoral process.

The sociological study data also shows that, in the parliamentary elections of September 28, 2025, 24.3% of respondents declare that they did not vote, and over 75% did. Among the reasons for non-participation are lack of interest (19.3%), distrust in politicians/parties (12.9%), electoral apathy (10.1%) and other personal circumstances, including reasons such as work schedule (1.4%), religious reasons (1.3%) or family responsibilities (0.9%).

Mass media and social networks were important sources of information during the electoral campaign. “The results show that social networks are one of the main sources of information: 37% of respondents use them often, and 18% – very often. At the same time, 25% do not use them at all, and approximately 20% – rarely. Television remains, however, an important source of information. Approximately 45% of respondents stated that they get information often or very often from television. However, approximately 25–26% mentioned that they do not get information from this source at all, and others use it rarely. In the case of news sites, the use is more fragmented: 33% of respondents do not use them at all, 25% access them rarely, while 30% use them often and 18% very often”, mentioned Veronica Ateș, Executive Director, Ateș Research Group.

Regarding human rights in the Transnistrian region, the collected responses indicate predominantly negative or moderate perceptions regarding their respect (62.3% — not at all/to a small extent/to some extent). Approximately half of the respondents believe that the authorities of the Republic of Moldova do not make sufficient efforts to protect the rights of people in the region. At the same time, responsibility is attributed to several actors, including the constitutional authorities (31.2%) and the de facto administration in Tiraspol (33.7%).

“The citizens of the Republic of Moldova are sending a clear message: the settlement process must begin with respect for human rights and the withdrawal of foreign military forces. These are the two pillars on which society wants any solution to be built. Half of the population of the Republic of Moldova believes that the Government is not doing enough to protect the rights of citizens on the left bank of the Nistru River. This is a matter of credibility and concrete action. Citizens demand more – not just declarations, but visible results,” said Vadim Vieru, Program Director (Human Rights), Promo-LEX.

Perceptions of governance indicate a variable level of trust in institutions. The top three institutions in which citizens trust are: the church (52.5%), the local government (46.2%), and the Presidency (34.1%). At the opposite end are political parties, the prosecutor’s office, and the courts. Non-governmental organizations are in the middle of the list of citizens’ trust (24.3%). The data also show that interest in the work of the Parliament is moderate, and a significant part of the respondents consider that the topics discussed in the Parliament are only slightly or not at all close to the real problems of citizens (66.8%). Also, the assessment of the relationship between the parliamentary majority and the opposition indicates critical perceptions regarding the level of cooperation and political dialogue.

Regarding priorities for the coming years, respondents specifically indicated: increasing salaries and pensions (72.1%), developing the economy (61.4%), and combating corruption (56.1%). Resolving the Transnistrian conflict, integration into the European Union, and administrative-territorial reform are at the bottom of the ranking, which shows the need for broader communication of the reforms and government priorities regarding them.

The presentation of the results of the sociological study can be accessed in Romanian and English.

The sociological study “Citizens’ Perceptions on the Quality of Elections and the Functioning of Democratic Processes in the Republic of Moldova” is developed within the project “Democracy in Action: Strengthening Electoral Integrity, Political Accountability and Civic Participation”, implemented by the Promo-LEX Association, with the support of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Sweden.

The protection of personal data in the electoral process in the Republic of Moldova remains a vulnerable area, according to a report by EPDE member Promo-LEX Association. The report highlights risks that could affect both election integrity and citizens’ rights, particularly in the context of the 2024–2025 electoral cycles and ongoing alignment with European standards.

The study examines the practices of parliamentary political parties, the Central Electoral Commission (CEC), and the National Center for Personal Data Protection (Centrul Naţional pentru Protecţia Datelor cu Caracter Personal al Republica Moldova – CNPDCP). It identifies documented cases of large-scale data misuse, including transfers abroad and the use of digital tools to collect personal data, while noting that institutions are insufficiently prepared to prevent such risks.

Significant shortcomings were found among political parties, including weak legal compliance, poor understanding of data protection principles, and problematic practices such as unclear privacy policies and informal data storage. While the CEC has taken steps to improve data security, it has not conducted required impact assessments. The NCPDP, meanwhile, is described as largely reactive, with limited proactive oversight and slow case handling.

Overall, the study points to a gap between the scale of risks and institutional preparedness. Although the legal framework is being aligned with EU standards, implementation remains weak.

Promo-LEX recommends strengthening institutional capacities, improving transparency, conducting impact assessments, and focusing on prevention. Political parties are urged to adopt clear data protection rules and appoint data protection officers, while closer cooperation between the CEC and CNPDCP is also advised. Parliament is called on to clarify legislation and enhance oversight mechanisms.

The report is also available in Romanian.

EPDE member Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly Vanadzor and International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR) issued a new policy brief analysing the growing threat of foreign influence operations in Armenia and outlining measures to strengthen democratic resilience ahead of the June 2026 parliamentary elections and beyond. It argues that while immediate electoral safeguards are necessary, Armenia must adopt a long-term, institutional approach to counter an increasingly complex and systemic challenge.

Foreign influence operations in Armenia—primarily driven by Russia—have evolved beyond disinformation into multi-layered strategies including illicit political financing, cyberattacks, economic coercion, and the manipulation of electoral processes. These activities are aimed not only at shaping public opinion but at preserving long-term geopolitical influence over the country.

As Armenia expands cooperation with Western partners, it faces intensified interference efforts that exploit structural vulnerabilities, including economic dependencies, energy reliance, and institutional gaps. Elections provide a particularly fertile environment for such operations, but the threat itself is continuous and adaptive.

While Armenia has an existing legal and regulatory framework relevant to countering interference, enforcement remains inconsistent and under-resourced. At the same time, current mechanisms are not fully equipped to address covert, coordinated, and cross-border forms of influence that often operate below traditional legal thresholds.

This brief emphasises that effective responses should focus on strengthening institutional capacity, enhancing political finance transparency, improving interagency coordination, and fostering structured cooperation with civil society and international partners—while safeguarding democratic freedoms and avoiding disproportionate restrictions on civic space.

Authors provide recommendations to the Government of Armenia, to Armenian Civil Society, and to the European Union and International Partners in this sense.

The Global Network for Domestic Election Monitors (GNDEM) is proud to release the first ever “Report on the Global State of Nonpartisan Citizen Election Observers’ Rights.” This study, conducted in partnership with the National Democratic Institute (NDI), draws on the experiences and lessons shared by nonpartisan citizen election monitoring groups worldwide. This research is the first study to document and highlight the global status of nonpartisan citizen observer rights, along with the lessons learned and the concerted efforts needed to ensure that the rights of citizen observers are respected, protected, and promoted.

While ad hoc efforts have previously been made to track enabling conditions for nonpartisan citizen observation and violations of citizen observer rights, there has not yet been comprehensive research on the topic until now. The report looks at five broad areas affecting the ability of citizen observers to monitor elections: 1) legal recognition as well as legal barriers; 2) procedural and operational barriers; 3) violence, intimidation and coercion against citizen observers; 4) freedom of movement, information and expression; and 5) freedom of association. The findings of this report were drawn from a structured survey with 66 organizations from 53 countries participating, covering every region in the world, and supplemented by 11 key informant interviews of observation experts, civil society leaders and human rights defenders.

Unfortunately this report comes at challenging times and confirms that nonpartisan citizen election observers are facing new and more extreme efforts to derail their work than ever before. Findings from the report reveal that election monitoring organizations are experiencing heightened levels of violence, intimidation and harassment, often sponsored by the state – including the recent arrest and detention of GNDEM’s chair. The survey also investigates how accreditation procedures have been used across the globe to undermine the rights of nonpartisan citizen observers.

The mission and dedication of nonpartisan citizen election observers – increasingly recognized as ‘specialized human rights defenders’ – will continue despite growing threats. Elections fundamentally belong to citizens and therefore citizens have the right to observe their own election. Citizen observation serves to engage people in democratic life; to make electoral processes more transparent; and to hold not just election management bodies, but candidates and parties accountable. GNDEM hopes that this report is only the first of what will become a series of periodic assessments to identify the trends and tactics used to limit the rights of citizen observers as well as offering insights on how citizen observers (and their allies) can protect and expand their rights.

The elections of municipal bodies in Georgia were held on 4 October 2025 amid a boycott by a significant portion of the major opposition political parties.

Georgian EPDE member ISFED (International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy) analysed the distribution of official election campaign revenues and expenditures for the 2025 municipal elections. The analysis is based on final financial reports submitted to the Anti-Corruption Bureau by political parties participating in the elections and covers the period from 5 August to 15 October 2025.

• During the official election campaign period, the seven political parties collectively received GEL 16,473,270 in accrued revenue, of which 57% (GEL 9,380,507) was attributable to a single party – Georgian Dream. Among other parties, only Lelo demonstrated a competitive level of income, receiving GEL 6,578,052.
• Approximately 80% (GEL 1,525,066) of the funds allocated to political parties through state budget financing accrued to Georgian Dream, while the remaining 20% (GEL 391,028) was distributed between only two political associations – the Alliance of Patriots of Georgia and Girchi – further exacerbating financial inequality.
• Georgian Dream demonstrated a markedly dominant presence in outdoor advertising, spending GEL 3,660,596 during the official campaign period – more than 80% of total outdoor advertising expenditures by all political parties.
• Georgian Dream, which enjoyed a dominant advantage in free airtime, incurred no expenses for paid television advertising. In contrast, Lelo, which lost access to free airtime under legislative amendments introduced by Georgian Dream in 2021, allocated the majority of its advertising budget – 58% – to television advertising.

On September 28, 2025, Moldova conducted parliamentary elections amid one of the most aggressive foreign interference efforts to date. Despite Russian-orchestrated vote-buying networks, cyberattacks, and disinformation at an unprecedented level, the pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) retained its parliamentary majority, and the electoral process remained credible, according to international observers, including the OSCE/ODIHR. This outcome presents both a strategic success story and a cautionary case study: defensive democracies can prevail, but at the expense of legal gray zones, controversial exclusions, and unresolved legitimacy tensions that require urgent attention.

In this policy alert, Petru Culeac explains the context, analyses the candidates, threat landscape, and multi-layered defense strategy against the hybrid threats, and provides recommendations for a resilient defensive democracy for Moldova.

Georgia is scheduled to hold nationwide municipal elections on October 4, 2025. These elections mark the first electoral test since the disputed 2024 parliamentary elections and come at a time of heightened political polarization, ongoing anti-government protests, and considerable democratic backsliding. The ruling Georgian Dream party has significantly altered the legal framework governing elections, as well as the right to assembly and free speech. These changes, made unilaterally and with limited consultation, have raised concerns over fairness, transparency, and political pluralism.

Tamara Sartania provides an overview of Georgia’s 2025 municipal elections, covering changes in the legal framework, election administration, new voting technologies, the shrinking civic space and legal crackdowns, as well as challenges in the political and media landscape.

The Promo-LEX Association has presented today Report no. 4 of the Observation Mission for the parliamentary elections of 28 September, covering the period from 11 September to 24 September 2025. The report contains observations and findings regarding the end of the electoral campaign, the behaviour of competitors, and the transparency of campaign financing.

The full report is available in Romanian here.

The Mission is financially supported by Sweden, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the European Union, the French Embassy, and the Council of Europe, under the aegis of the Civic Coalition for Free and Fair Elections.

The opinions expressed in the public press releases of the Promo-LEX OM belong to the authors and do not necessarily reflect the point of view of financiers or partners. The content hereof may be subject to editorial revisions.

For more information:
Dumitrița Ciuvaga
Communication Officer
Promo-LEX Association
Tel: +373 68 800 827

Between September 1 and 23, the networks monitored in the Republic of Moldova generated 9,882 videos, which accumulated 93.1 million views on the TikTok platform. We are talking about a huge flow of mass-distributed content: over 204,000 shares and 1.5 million likes. In a country with only 2.3 million citizens, these figures indicate a propaganda machine operating at full capacity, flooding the digital space of Moldovans 24/7.

A recurring technique we have noticed is that of flooding the information flow on a certain topic in order to cover up any other type of discourse. This often means that volume replaces the complexity or quality of the messages/videos created. The messages are repetitive, designed to fix the same narratives and conspiracies in the minds of the public, but that does not make them any less effective.

In the Republic of Moldova, however, we observe a distinctive element: a much higher proportion of content generated with artificial intelligence, compared to what we monitored in Romania. Between September 1 and 23, we monitored 93 accounts specializing in producing manipulative AI content, directed almost exclusively against Maia Sandu and the Action and Solidarity Party (PAS), accounts that we also discussed in a separate investigation.