The expert monitoring mission for the Belarusian presidential elections* 2025 is carried out by the Human Rights Center “Viasna” and the Belarusian Helsinki Committee. The mission is aimed at evaluating the elections from the viewpoint of the Belarusian electoral legislation and international standards of free and democratic elections, as well as informing the Belarusian public and international community about the progress of the elections.
The seventh presidential elections in Belarus’s independent history are scheduled for January 26, 2025. These elections* occur against a backdrop of widespread political repression, systematic violations of fundamental democratic principles, and the institutionalized erosion of human rights. Below, we explain critical factors that define this process and affect its legitimacy.
The expert mission of observation during the presidential election 2025 is being carried out by the Human Right Center “Viasna” and the Belarusian Helsinki Committee. The campaign is aimed at evaluating the elections* from the viewpoint of the Belarusian electoral legislation and international standards of free and democratic elections, as well as informing the Belarusian public and international community about the progress of the elections and results of observation.
The term “elections*” in relation to the 2025 election campaign is used with an asterisk to emphasize the conventionality of this term, since any free and fair election campaign presupposes all conditions under which rights and freedoms are fully realized, including freedom of speech, freedom of peaceful meetings and associations, the right to participate in the governance of one’s state, freedom from discrimination, which are currently practically absent in Belarus.
On December 5, the National Assembly of Armenia passed a package of legislative amendments to the Electoral Code, the Law on Political Parties, and other relevant legal acts presented by the Ministry of Justice. This culminated a two-year process that included extensive discussions and proposals from state authorities, international organizations, civil society organizations (CSOs), and other stakeholders. These newly introduced changes will define the rules for the parliamentary elections expected in 2026.
Although the drafting process was highly inclusive, several changes were introduced in the final stages, immediately before the first and second readings. These changes deviated from the initial agreements and the draft’s original intent, as outlined in an earlier policy alert. In this piece, we will examine “the good,” “the bad,” and “the ugly” of the electoral changes and their policy implications.
Tigran Mughnetsian — PhD in political science and Master in public administration. He is a public policy researcher at Transparency International Armenia and senior lecturer at Yerevan Brusov State University of Languages and Social Sciences. He specializes in issues related to elections, public administration, regime change, party systems and party funding.
In violation of its OSCE commitments, Belarusian authorities failed to invite credible international observation organizations, such as ODIHR or OSCE PA, in a timely manner, deliberately obstructing independent oversight. Meanwhile, domestic election observation has been virtually eradicated, with organizations branded as “extremist” and liquidated, and their leaders imprisoned or exiled. Human Rights Center “Viasna” founder and Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Ales Bialiatski, along with Valiantsin Stefanovich and Uladzimir Labkovich, are among those serving sentences of up to 10 years.
Despite this, the expert election* 2025 observation mission, carried out by the Human Right Center “Viasna” and the Belarusian Helsinki Committee, conducted monitoring remotely, relying on publicly available data and reports from Belarusian voters.
The term “elections*” in relation to the 2024 and 2025 election campaigns is used with an asterisk to emphasize the conventionality of this term, since any free and fair election campaign presupposes all conditions under which rights and freedoms are fully realized, including freedom of speech, freedom of peaceful meetings and associations, the right to participate in the governance of one’s state, freedom from discrimination, which are currently practically absent in Belarus.
Context, analysis, and recommendations by Łukasz Kondraciuk, Stefanie Schiffer
Russia’s local elections in September 2024, concentrated on the so-called Single Voting Day, were marked by unprecedented restrictions on independent opposition, media, and election observers. To legitimize the elected politicians in the eyes of the Russian voters and international audiences, the Russian Central Election Commission invited multiple representatives of state election commissions to Moscow and St. Petersburg. All of them misused the authority of their institutions to lend legitimacy to these fraudulent elections.
Our research shows that the Kremlin increasingly targets election commissions from the Global South, strategically leveraging their participation to craft an image of broad international approval. By co-opting officials from these nations—often under the guise of technical exchanges or observer invitations—the Kremlin manipulates their credibility to validate undemocratic practices. These tactics undermine the integrity of these institutions and aim to shield Russia’s electoral malpractice from global scrutiny.
EPDE proposes several calls to action to discourage the continued participation of fake observers, to protect the integrity of the institutions they represent in the Russian public, and to hold individuals accountable for undermining democratic processes:
Our report and our fake observers database provide a valuable resource for journalists, researchers, and advocacy groups seeking to understand electoral disinformation tactics, networks of malign influence, and learn more about our recommendations for democratic safeguards.
Get in touch with Lukasz Kondraciuk, Head of Electoral Integrity at EPDE, via email: kondraciuk@european-exchange.org
EPDE member Civil Network OPORA has prepared its own expert vision of electoral process, which takes into account the results of previous professional discussions with official parties (Verkhovna Rada, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Central Election Commission). OPORA calls on the Parliament to hold substantive discussions in order to find systemic solutions, given the need to lay a critical amount of groundwork for the organization of postwar elections before the repeal of martial law. The success of preparation of legislative framework, prevention of Russian interference in the postwar elections, and integration into the European Union directly depend on a depoliticized high-quality discussion.
The full report is accessible on OPORA’s website.
The International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (thereafter ISFED) believes
that during Georgia’s 2024 parliamentary elections, four of the five core principles of
democratic elections – universal, free, equal, and secret vote, were violated.
The combination of fundamental violations observed by ISFED during the pre-election
period and on election day of the 2024 parliamentary elections, affected the free
expression of voters’ will; As a result, the election outcome cannot be considered a true
reflection of the will of Georgian voters.
All this was the result of the extensive abuse of administrative resources, involvement
of state agencies in favor of the ruling party, changes to the rules for composition and
decision-making in the Central Election Commission (CEC), flaws in the composition of
Precinct Election Commissions (PECs) and changing the timelines for allocating the
functions to PEC members before election day. Additionally, on election day, the rights
of observers were restricted, which was reflected in denying their access to polling
stations, systematically expelling them from polling stations, and harassing them
verbally and physically.
Georgia’s October 2024 parliamentary elections, which saw the ruling Georgian Dream party secure a fourth term, have sparked widespread domestic and international non-recognition due to credible allegations of systemic electoral fraud. With opposition parties boycotting parliament and protests erupting in Tbilisi and other main cities, the country faces a deepening legitimacy crisis. Observers report sophisticated manipulation tactics that altered the election outcome, undermining the will of a pro-European electorate. The European Parliament has responded by demanding a re-run of the elections under international supervision, EU sanctions against Georgia’s Prime Minister and top officials, and a shift in government policies to align with the country’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations. These developments mark a critical juncture for Georgia’s democratic future.
Mariam Chikhladze is an independent international consultant specializing in democratic elections, civil society development, and parliamentary and political party strengthening. She has extensive experience with USAID’s governance programs in Georgia, managing the parliamentary support portfolios. She has also contributed to UNDP’s key legislative strengthening project. Previously, Mariam worked with the International Republican Institute (IRI) on programs in Georgia and Armenia and on behalf of the Alliance of Democracies Foundation, facilitated the political parties’ pledge for election integrity in the 2020 parliamentary elections in Georgia. Earlier in her career, she managed the grassroots empowerment program of the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) in four regions of Georgia. Mariam Chikhladze holds a Master’s in Public Policy Analysis from the Bush School of Public Service and Government at Texas A&M University, awarded through the Fulbright Graduate Student Program. She also completed the Edmund Muskie Professional Fellowship at the Hudson Institute, in Washington, DC.
The 2024 constitutional referendum and presidential elections conducted in Moldova represented important milestones for the country’s democratic development and consolidating its resilience in front of aggressive outside interference.
In this policy alert, Petru Culeac examines the election outcomes, the key challenges encountered, and the urgent reforms needed to secure the integrity of the 2025 parliamentary elections. With Moldova’s democracy under increasing pressure from socio-economic disparities and hybrid threats, the author also outlines actionable recommendations for the EU to bolster the country’s democratic resilience in a tense regional security climate.
Petru Culeac is the co-founder and Executive Director of the Moldova Development Institute, a newly established organization dedicated to improving the social, political, and economic landscape in Moldova. With over 15 years of experience in Moldova’s non-pro!it sector, Petru has an in-depth understanding of the country’s context and its development agenda as well as extensive organizational management experience. Until 2023, Petru served as Executive Director of Soros Foundation Moldova, a renowned non-pro!it foundation, part of the Open Society Foundations network, recognized as a key civil society actor in the Republic of Moldova. Under Petru’s leadership, the foundation expanded its portfolio and successfully implemented numerous technical assistance projects, including for Moldovan authorities in areas such as anti-corruption, justice reform, elections, and education, as well as emergency response projects at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Previously, Petru worked in areas of democracy promotion, free and fair elections, local development, citizen engagement, and youth activism, successfully cooperating with local and international organizations, such as USAID, Chemonics, East Europe Foundation, and IFC. Petru’s academic background includes degrees in Business Management, and European and International Studies from institutions in Moldova, France, and the United States.
The Vot Corect Coalition published the monitoring report of the December 1 parliamentary elections.
The coalition consists of the Expert Forum, the Center for Civic Resources, Civica, the Center for the Study of Democracy, Radautiul Civic and the Electoral Observatory. Code for Romania ensures the development of the Vote Monitor smartphone application, with which we collect data on election day. In the Republic of Moldova, Vot Corect collaborated with Promo-LEX.
The election was effectively organized and voters’ fundamental rights were generally respected. However, the electoral competition was fundamentally affected by the results of the first round of the presidential elections. The process took place in a context of numerous disinformation or negative campaigns, which had a negative impact on the outcome of the parliamentary elections. The overlap of the elections and the decision of the Constitutional Court to recount the votes from the presidential elections distracted the public from the parliamentary elections and affected public confidence in the electoral process.
The transparency of the electoral process was reduced by the fact that the meetings of the Central Electoral Bureau (BEC) were not public. Its decisions (decizii/hotărâri) were generally published in due time, but, regrettably, the minutes of the meetings remained secret, and their publication was explicitly prohibited. Some of the decisions issued by the BEC, including the one related to the interpretation of the phrase parliamentary party, were contested, including by Vot Correct. The electoral administration generally managed the electoral process effectively.
The number of candidates increased compared to the previous elections. More than 50 lists were rejected by various constituency commissions because the candidates did not follow the administrative procedures or did not ensure the presence of both sexes on the candidate lists, as the law requires. The absence of some of the parties, including currently parliamentary ones, on the ballots in certain constituencies, as a result of the rejection of the candidacies, created confusion among some voters. The number of women on the lists increased compared to the previous elections, but few were placed in eligible positions. Data published by BEC about candidates is limited. The support signature verification process could not be observed, which limits transparency. The collection of signatures in electronic format was limited and only a few parties used this option. The lists of some parties, such as Noua Romania (for the out of country constituency), were rejected due to irregularities regarding the collected signatures. The integrity of the signature collection process remains in question, especially in the context where some competitors did not have any kind of visible signature collection campaign.
The overlapping of the two electoral campaigns and the results of the first round of voting significantly limited the visibility of the campaign for the parliamentary elections. This lacked visibility, and the conduct of the presidential elections confiscated the relevance of the debates for the parliamentary ones. Online campaigning continued to be intense and numerous cases where electoral propaganda was not declared as such were identified. The methods of outdoor promotion are very limited, which affects the voters’ right to information, and numerous violations of the legislation regarding the use of the electoral boards have been noted. Numerous actions to continue the electoral campaign were observed on the voting days and before the elections, including by candidates or their supporters with visibility, a fact that affected the integrity of the organization of the election day.
The transparency of campaign financing was reduced by the intermittent publication of data by the Permanent Electoral Authority (AEP), a fact criticized also in the case of the presidential elections. The lack of consistency in the publication of data denotes a lack of institutional transparency and limits the public’s understanding of how the electoral process was financed. Revenues of 250 million lei and expenses of 210 million lei were recorded, most of the funds (40%) being allocated for online promotion services. In addition to the officially declared expenses, indirect promotion through third parties was observed, such as Facebook pages close to parties that define themselves as publications. A small part of the parties’ contributions come from subsidies, i.e. 6.9 million lei, which indicates that they preferred to declare private funds that they can get reimbursed if they get 3% of the votes. It is unclear what the parties spend the subsidies on, which have reached a historic high this year, if they do not invest in political promotion in the middle of the election year. Between August and October, the parties spent 71 million lei on media and propaganda, which represents a third of the total campaign costs for the parliamentary elections. In fact, campaign costs are much higher than those formally declared for a campaign month, and political parties spend high sums of money in the months before the campaign on less transparent rules.
Election days were conducted in an orderly and calm manner, with few incidents reported by observers, and the turnout was 52.50%. The process was assessed positively by Vot Corect observers in almost 97% of the polling stations observed during the opening and voting and almost 95% of the polling stations observed during the vote counting. Observers reported a tense atmosphere during voting in 4.8% of cases and crowding in 15%. The polling station commissions did not understand well where voters can vote according to their domicile and residence in a worrying percentage of approximately 14%. When counting the votes, polling station commission presidents had difficulties filling in the protocols in 19.2% of the observed sections; in 14% the counting took place in a tense atmosphere. In a few cases observers were unjustifiably removed from polling stations, and some polling station commission took the abusive decision to allow observation only during voting and not during the counting of votes. The opening procedure was observed by Vot Corect in 183 precincts, the voting in 737, and the counting of votes in 204. Due to the fact that in some cases the observers did not answer all the questions on the forms, the statistical data do not always refer to the total number of sections observed.
The elections held on November 24 were competitive, and fundamental rights were generally respected. However, scheduling elections over three consecutive weeks failed to adequately separate the presidential elections from the parliamentary ones, leading to mutual influence between the two campaigns and creating significant organizational challenges. While electoral authorities generally managed the technical aspects of the process efficiently, the complexity caused by overlapping electoral periods proved difficult to handle. The electoral legislation lacked coherence in several stages of the process, and the insufficient regulation of certain situations further highlighted the urgent need for an Electoral Code. The results were surprising even for most high-profile political actors expected to reach the second round, as the visibility of candidate Călin Georgescu in the mainstream electoral landscape was very low. His campaign heavily relied on what was considered inauthentic promotion on TikTok and lacked proper funding, raising questions about its credibility.
The transparency of the electoral process was diminished by the Central Electoral Bureau’s decision to hold its meetings behind closed doors. While decisions and rulings were generally published promptly, it is regrettable that the minutes of these meetings remained confidential. Key information was primarily shared with the public through press releases. Several restrictive legal interpretations made by the bureau were contested, including by Vote Correct. In one instance, the Central Electoral Bureaus for the presidential and parliamentary elections interpreted the same legal procedures differently for each election. A restrictive decision by the bureau regarding the extension of voting hours on Saturday and Sunday was overturned in court on Friday—after overseas voting had already begun. This unprecedented situation resulted in voting rules being changed mid-process, further complicating the elections.
The arbitrary rejection of a candidacy by the Constitutional Court, citing reasons seemingly applicable to other candidates who remained in the race, and without allowing the rejected candidate to present her arguments, negatively impacted the inclusiveness of the candidate registration process and set a dangerous precedent. Additionally, public trust in the process was diminished by the widespread perception that this action aimed to favor another candidate with a similar electoral message. Concerns were also raised about the authenticity of signature collections for certain candidates who neither organized visible campaigns to gather these signatures nor appeared to have significant public support. Vote Corect could not observe the verification process for signatures at the Central Electoral Bureau (BEC) because it was not public, reducing transparency.
The overlap of the two electoral campaigns significantly limited the visibility of the parliamentary election campaign. Similarly, the presidential campaign lacked dynamism, with few meaningful debates. Controversies regarding the integrity of several candidates overshadowed discussions about candidates’ policies. Online promotion was heavily used, with unmarked propaganda actions—mainly on TikTok—becoming a notable feature. Public institutions failed to effectively counter campaigns that appeared to breach election and campaign financing laws. A lack of visible street-level campaigning during the official period, contrasted with significant expenditures on promotion outside this timeframe, reduced the effectiveness of campaign messaging and favored ruling parties. Excessively restrictive rules on street advertising (e.g., billboards) were noted, alongside numerous violations of campaign laws. Cases of continued campaigning on the Saturday before and even on election day were reported. Authorities were slow to act in instances where high-profile public figures continued campaigning, though private individuals faced sanctions for social media posts expressing political preferences, raising concerns about voter intimidation and unjustified interventions.
Campaign financing transparency was hindered by the Permanent Electoral Authority’s (AEP) failure to publish updates on candidates’ revenues and expenditures after November 8, without explanation. Data eventually published on November 25 revealed that one candidate, Călin Georgescu, reported neither income nor expenses, which appears implausible and raises questions about the accuracy of the declaration. The AEP was urged to conduct an urgent investigation, and ANCOM was called upon to investigate the TikTok campaign linked to Georgescu in collaboration with the European Commission. The persistent use of public subsidies for media and propaganda gave an advantage to parties benefiting from state funds well before the campaign officially began. Additionally, undeclared campaign financing was identified, including cases of Facebook Ads run by pages affiliated with political parties and indirect promotion of candidates through influencers, podcasts, or artists, with unclear contractual arrangements for these services.
Election days proceeded in an orderly and generally calm atmosphere, with voter turnout at 52.55%. Vot Corect observers positively evaluated the process in 97% of polling stations during opening and voting, and in 95% during the vote count. However, observers reported crowding in 22% of polling stations visited, tension in 4%, and the presence of unauthorized individuals in 5%. Although intentional falsification of results was observed in only two cases during the vote count, the process took place in a tense atmosphere in 14% of observed polling stations, and polling station presidents encountered difficulties completing protocols in 11% of cases. Numerous calls to the election day call center revealed that some voters in Bucharest were improperly denied the right to vote in the local referendum due to residency restrictions.
Following election day, Expert Forum filed a complaint requesting that the AEP investigate the campaign financing of Călin Georgescu and provide citizens with the necessary information to do the same. Shortly after, the website www.expertforum.ro suffered DDoS (distributed denial-of-service) attacks, a serious incident that raised additional concerns.
The general conditions and the actual procedure of the formation of territorial election commissions (TECs), which are an important mechanism of the electoral process, demonstrate the state dirigisme of all electoral processes with the imitation of the active participation of civil society, which gives the current executive power full control over the formed commissions.
The formation of territorial election commissions takes place in the conditions when among the two main actors of civil society – political parties and other public associations – there are no organizations that could show independent initiative. The “labor collectives” inherited from the Soviet times are not political subjects, and the electoral processes on their behalf are organized by administrative methods. Citizens, who have the right to participate in the formation of territorial election commissions, are intimidated by the general atmosphere of terror; those who have been active in previous election cycles are subjected to preventive repression.
The possibilities of public control, independent observation of the process of formation of the territorial election commissions are not only reduced to zero, but they are persecuted activity.
In favor of the administrative-command management of the whole process is also the general rush: 1,725 people were allegedly nominated by parties, public associations, labor collectives and citizens in just one week in the number necessary to form virtually all commissions with the maximum number of members.
At the same time, the informing of citizens about the possibility of nomination, as in the previous campaign of 2024, was minimal, which allows us to conclude that the authorities were not interested in the active participation of voters in the formation of territorial election commissions and predetermined decisions on their composition.
Only minimal information is available to the public, both about the opportunities for nomination to the territorial election commissions and about the meetings of the bodies forming the commissions, as well as their results: the process of holding meetings remained non-transparent and non-competitive. The lists of names of members of the commissions have still not been published.
The four largest public associations (BRSM, Belaya Rus, Union of Women, Union of Veterans, Fund for Peace), which have legislatively established special relations with the state since 2023, and the trade unions, which are members of the FPB, remain the main source of the clerks, ensuring the conduct of elections* at the level of territorial election commissions (in addition to four political parties remaining after re-registration, all of which support the course of the current government). The percentage of “acceptability” of candidates from these pro-government parties and public associations imitating civil society, which together make up 63% of the composition of all commissions, tends to 100%.
Thus, given the general atmosphere of intimidation, the lack of effective information and the extremely tight deadlines, it can be said that active citizens did not really have the opportunity to nominate their representatives to the TECs. The goal of the TEC formation phase was rather the opposite: to conduct it as quickly and quietly as possible.
The expert elections*2025 monitoring mission was organized by the Belarusian Helsinki Committee and the Viasna Human Rights Center as part of the “Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections” campaign. The mission collects and analyzes information about the election campaign based on open sources and messages from voters from Belarus.
The October 26, 2024, parliamentary election in Georgia displayed multiple, well-documented irregularities identified by three independent domestic election observation missions—ISFED, MyVote, and GYLA—whose combined 3,500+ observers reported widespread, systematic violations that cast serious doubt on the election’s legitimacy. The observer coalition published a detailed analysis of their findings, which reveal a consistent pattern of manipulation that suggests the election was rigged to favor the ruling party.
Our latest report reveals how representatives from both democratic and autocratic states helped Aliyev’s regime create an image of international and domestic legitimacy around Azerbaijan’s fraudulent 2024 snap parliamentary election.
On September 1, 2024, the New Azerbaijan Party, led by President Ilham Aliyev, claimed a narrow victory in Azerbaijan’s snap parliamentary election. Although voting day itself was peaceful, the election process was far from democratic. Civil society and independent journalists faced harassment, forced emigration, and arrests throughout the campaign, while both international and domestic observers reported widespread electoral manipulation.
To create the illusion of credible international oversight, the Aliyev regime invited several hundred international observers to the election. Fewer than half of these observers met international standards for election monitoring. The others, despite clear evidence of widespread electoral manipulation, publicly endorsed the election as meeting “high standards,” lending unwarranted legitimacy to a fraudulent practice.
Key findings:
– 107 fake observers identified: Our report lists 107 individuals, including elected or appointed representatives from democratic countries who falsely validated the electoral process
– Election Commissioners as fake observers: We observed an unprecedented increase in involving election administration members in fraudulent observation efforts. We identified officials from Central Election Commissions (CEC) from ten internationally recognized states lending legitimacy to Azerbaijan’s sham elections.
– Trend of Collusion with Autocrats: This troubling trend of CEC representatives as “fake observers” extends beyond Azerbaijan. Our preliminary findings indicate similar patterns in Russia’s 2024 “Single Voting Day” (report forthcoming), highlighting an urgent need to rework the code of conduct of election commissions worldwide to prevent the discrediting of the institutions they represent.
In the context of fake observers coming to legitimize elections in Azerbaijan, EPDE proposes several calls to action to discourage the participation of fake observers, increase transparency, and hold individuals and organizations accountable for undermining democratic processes and discrediting the integrity of the democratic institutions and democratic governments they represent:
1. EPDE calls on international organizations, political parties, and media outlets to regularly check EPDE’s list of fake observers at fakeobservers.org. Our database aims to deter participation by those who, for whatever reason or gain – blackmail, financial, or pure naivety – legitimize undemocratic elections.
2. EPDE calls on key democratic institutions, such as the European Union, U.S. Congress, or the Council of Europe, to publicly denounce and condemn participation in fake observation missions as harmful to global democratic standards. EPDE calls on democratic governments and international organizations to strengthen the diplomatic and political pressure on Azerbaijan to ensure they only invite credible and impartial election observers from organizations complying with international standards of election observation, such as OSCE/ ODIHR, OSCE PA, or the PACE.
3. The EU and other democratic countries should impose targeted sanctions or legal measures against third-country nationals participating in fake observation missions. Such measures could include travel bans, asset freezes, or bans on representing their countries in bilateral and multilateral engagements. This includes exclusion from conferences, academic exchanges, and any form of international cooperation based in the EU or other democratic na- tions.
4. EPDE encourages media outlets globally to raise awareness and educate citizens about the dangers of fake election observation and the role certain individuals play in legitimizing fraudulent elections abroad to reduce their credibility and discourage others from par- ticipating.
5. EPDE urges election monitoring bodies and domestic election commissions globally to adopt stricter transparency measures. These should include publishing a complete, detailed list of all observers, their affiliations, and their observation experience to simplify the identification and discreditation of election observers.
6. Additionally, EPDE calls on institutions and national and regional parliaments to establish and implement laws and clear ethical guidelines for individuals, particularly elected officials, participating in election observation missions. These guidelines should emphasize impartiality and non-alignment with authoritarian regimes. EPDE stresses that violating these guidelines should lead to exclusion from future international democratic election observation missions.
7. Finally, EPDE calls on democratic countries and institutions to introduce career and financial disincentives for individuals participating in these activities, such as barring them from holding positions in publicly funded democratic organizations, NGOs, or international bodies.
Our report and our fake observers database provide a valuable resource for journalists, researchers, and advocacy groups seeking to understand electoral disinformation tactics, networks of malign influence, and learn more about our recommendations for democratic safeguards.
Get in touch with Lukasz Kondraciuk, Head of Electoral Integrity at EPDE, via email: kondraciuk@european-exchange.org
The next, seventh, presidential elections* in Belarus have been scheduled by the House of Representatives for January 26, 2025, amid a deep human rights crisis caused by repression following peaceful protests against fraud in the 2020 presidential elections. This repression persists and even intensifies to this day: the authorities continue to arbitrarily persecute candidates, members of campaign teams and initiative groups, observers, activists and simply concerned citizens who have supported the nomination of independent candidates with their signatures. The discriminatory rhetoric of the authorities, who have declared people who do not share pro-government narratives as “enemies”, persists and intensifies.
By suddenly calling elections* six months before the expected date and leaving 95 days for the entire procedure, the authorities once again instrumentalized electoral procedures, adjusting the election date to political objectives, thereby violating electoral legislation from the point of view of equality of opportunity for candidates and the principle of election predictability stipulated by international electoral standards.
Conducting a free and open election campaign is impossible in a situation of ongoing political terror: the list of political prisoners is updated weekly and there are consistently more than 1,300 people in it. The information space has been entirely purged; nearly all independent media outlets have been forced out of the country, and the distribution of their materials from abroad is severely hindered by politically motivated misuse of anti-extremist legislation. The “state ideology” serves the cult of authoritarian rule of A. Lukashenka. There is no recognition of the importance of political pluralism in the public field.
The incredible pressure on civil society organizations, especially human rights organizations, and their widespread liquidation exclude civilian control over the conduct of elections. There is no independent civilian monitoring of the elections within the country; at the moment, only the politically biased international election observers are invited.
In such conditions, it can be ascertained that it is impossible for citizens to exercise their electoral rights freely.
The expert elections*2025 monitoring mission was organized by the Belarusian Helsinki Committee and the Viasna Human Rights Center as part of the “Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections” campaign. The mission collects and analyzes information about the election campaign based on open sources and messages from voters from Belarus.
On November 3, 2024, the day of the Presidential Elections (second round of elections) the Promo-LEX Observation Mission (OM) deployed short-term observers (STOs) to 614 polling stations, selected based on a sample provided by a sociological firm. Furthermore, a static observer was assigned to each of the 30 polling stations designated for voters from the Transnistrian region.
Particular attention was given to polling stations abroad, with 90 static observers deployed to monitor these locations.
In addition to the static observers, the Promo-LEX Observation Mission deployed 89 mobile teams to monitor the electoral process in polling stations not covered by the sample. These mobile teams also assessed accessibility to the polling stations, including those where voters from the Transnistrian region cast their ballots.
After processing all alert reports submitted by observers, the Promo-LEX Observation Mission identified a total of 791 incidents during the election day.
As Georgia gears up for its parliamentary elections on October 26, 2024, opposition parties are consolidating their efforts into coalitions with the objective of displacing the ruling party. These coalitions are fueled by concerns that the current government is jeopardizing the nation’s European Union integration by enacting anti-democratic laws and promoting anti-Western sentiments.
This election presents a pivotal chance for the opposition leading to the formation of four significant electoral alliances. They are framing the elections as a referendum on the critical choice between aligning with Europe or falling under Russian influence.
In light of the “Georgian Dream” government’s controversial adoption of the Transparency of Foreign Influence Law, which has faced widespread public and international backlash, the opposition has united around the imperative to protect Georgia’s European path. President Salome Zurabishvili has introduced the “Georgian Charter,” a comprehensive reform agenda aimed at accelerating EU integration, binding signatory parties to implement democratic reforms within a year of the elections.
While there is broad agreement on the reform agenda, analysts remain cautious about the opposition’s genuine commitment due to their history of fragmentation. Each coalition/Party – Unity Coalition, Coalition for Change, Coalition Strong Georgia, and For Georgia – brings distinct strengths and challenges, with varying strategies for EU alignment and democratic reforms.
Ultimately, these elections will serve as a critical litmus test for the opposition’s ability to forge a successful governing coalition and fulfill their mandate for EU integration, potentially reshaping Georgia’s political landscape and its future direction toward Europe.
Mariam Chikhladze is an independent international consultant specializing in democratic elections, civil society development, and parliamentary and political party strengthening. She has extensive experience with USAID’s governance programs in Georgia, managing the parliamentary support portfolios. She has also contributed to UNDP’s key legislative strengthening project. Previously, Mariam worked with the International Republican Institute (IRI) on programs in Georgia and Armenia and on behalf of the Alliance of Democracies Foundation, facilitated the political parties’ pledge for election integrity in the 2020 parliamentary elections in Georgia. Earlier in her career, she managed the grassroots empowerment program of the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) in four regions of Georgia. Mariam Chikhladze holds a Master’s in Public Policy Analysis from the Bush School of Public Service and Government at Texas A&M University, awarded through the Fulbright Graduate Student Program. She also completed the Edmund Muskie Professional Fellowship at the Hudson Institute, in Washington, DC.
On August 20, 2024, Georgian Dream (GD), the ruling party of Georgia, announced an anti-democratic, anti-liberal agenda for the upcoming October 26 elections. The party aims to secure a constitutional majority to pursue four key initiatives: banning political opposition, cracking down on “gay propaganda,” revising the governance system, and enhancing the Georgian Orthodox Church’s role in the constitution.
GD plans to outlaw major opposition parties accusing them of destabilizing the government. This message seems intended to intensify political polarization in Georgian society. Additionally, GD has adopted alarmingly anti-liberal legislation to restrict LGBTQ+ freedoms and rights and is pushing for constitutional amendment to enshrine so-called “traditional family values”.
The party also proposes revising the governance system to address hypothetical scenarios of territorial restoration, a proposal that appears politically unfeasible and aimed at stoking nationalist sentiments. Furthermore, GD seeks to elevate the Orthodox Church’s constitutional status, but this proposal has met resistance from the Church, due to concerns about losing power.
GD’s campaign frames the election as a choice between stability and chaos, traditional values and moral decay, and sovereignty versus external dependence. GD’s campaign rhetoric deepens polarization domestically, alienates Georgia’s allies, and undermines the country’s progress on its path to EU integration.
Mariam Chikhladze is an independent international consultant specializing in democratic elections, civil society development, and parliamentary and political party strengthening. She has extensive experience with USAID’s governance programs in Georgia, managing the parliamentary support portfolios. She has also contributed to UNDP’s key legislative strengthening project. Previously, Mariam worked with the International Republican Institute (IRI) on programs in Georgia and Armenia and on behalf of the Alliance of Democracies Foundation, facilitated the political parties’ pledge for election integrity in the 2020 parliamentary elections in Georgia. Earlier in her career, she managed the grassroots empowerment program of the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) in four regions of Georgia. Mariam Chikhladze holds a Master’s in Public Policy Analysis from the Bush School of Public Service and Government at Texas A&M University, awarded through the Fulbright Graduate Student Program. She also completed the Edmund Muskie Professional Fellowship at the Hudson Institute, in Washington, DC.
On October 20, 2024, the day of the Presidential Elections and the Republican Constitutional Referendum, the Promo-LEX Observation Mission (OM) deployed short-term observers (STOs) to 614 polling stations, selected based on a sample provided by a sociological firm. Furthermore, a static observer was assigned to each of the 30 polling stations designated for voters from the Transnistrian region.
Particular attention was given to polling stations abroad, with 91 static observers deployed to monitor these locations.
In addition to the static observers, the Promo-LEX Observation Mission deployed 89 mobile teams to monitor the electoral process in polling stations not covered by the sample. These mobile teams also assessed accessibility to the polling stations, including those where voters from the Transnistrian region cast their ballots.
After processing all alert reports submitted by observers, the Promo-LEX Observation Mission identified a total of 778 incidents during the election day.
Promo-LEX Association presented today the fourth report of the Observation Mission (OM) of the Presidential Elections and the Republican Constitutional Referendum from 20 October, covering the findings in the period 1 October – 15 October. The report mainly reflects the last two weeks of the electoral campaign, the legal framework relevant to the electoral process, the performance of electoral competitors, as well as the work of electoral bodies in preparation for the 20 October elections.
Legal framework. In the observation process, OM noted concerns regarding the application of legal rules on passive and active electoral corruption. However, based on the announcement by the authorities of more than 100 minutes reports on passive electoral bribery, OM finds that there is no information on the initiation of criminal proceedings, including for electoral corruption. Promo-LEX recommends that the prosecution body takes all the necessary steps to eradicate the phenomenon of electoral corruption as a whole and not only in part.
Promo-LEX has also laid down several legal arguments showing that the electoral activity of PB Victorie (Victory) cannot be disguised under paid service and volunteer contracts, as allegedly claimed.
Performance of electoral competitors. During the monitored period, Promo-LEX observers identified 1,799 activities carried out by candidates and referendum participants, with a significant number of events organized by PAS and Maia Sandu (615 activities), while other candidates – Alexandr Stoianoglo (PSRM) and Renato Usatii (PN) – reported 329 and 223 activities, respectively. Electoral campaigning activities included distribution of information materials, meetings with voters and electoral debates.
As regards electoral advertising, Promo-LEX reported 5,073 cases of various forms of advertising, the most common being printed materials (30%) and sponsored advertising (24%).
As for the activities carried out by PR/PB Victorie (Victory), it should be recalled that only PR is registered as a referendum participant. However, it was found that the organizers of the electoral events belong to all the component parties of PB Victorie (Victory), and the promotional materials used (bags, t-shirts, LED billboards with the inscription ‘Victorie’) come mainly from PB Victorie (Victory). Thus, the electoral promotion of the referendum is de facto carried out by the same bloc whose registration was refused by the CEC.
Misuse of administrative resources was found in 114 cases, most of them related to the Action and Solidarity Party (PAS) and Maia Sandu (105 cases). Several public officials were involved in the campaign activities, in particular by the Action and Solidarity Party (PAS). Prime Minister Dorin Recean held meetings with voters, where he discussed European integration projects and encouraged support for Maia Sandu. Several ministers were also involved in the electoral campaign, distributing promotional materials in support of Maia Sandu and the ‚YES’ option in the referendum.
Also, cases of using state institutions to accumulate electoral capital, involvement of civil servants in electoral activities during working hours, as well as crediting candidates for public works carried out with public funds were observed.
Involvement of religious denominations in electoral campaigns. Promo-LEX reported 5 other cases in which members of religious denominations were involved in electoral campaigning activities, supporting candidates and using the image of religious buildings in electoral promotional materials. As a reminder, church involvement in electoral processes is forbidden.
Activities with potential for corruption. During the monitored period a number of activities was identified, including the offering of money and goods to influence voting. In several cases PB Victorie (Victory) is involved, which organized events announcing certain benefits for Moldovan citizens living in Russia, as well as electoral meetings with rewards. Victoria Furtună has also been involved in cases of coordinated electoral meetings, which raise suspicions that voters were paid to participate in them.
Electoral competitors’ revenues and expenditures: Between 20 September and 13 October, the total revenues reported by the 11 presidential competitors amounted to approximately 27.8 million MDL, which came mostly from donations from individuals and transfers from party accounts. As for expenditures, they amounted to about 24.7 million MDL, most of which were spent on advertising and promotional materials.
Expenditures estimated by Promo-LEX. The civic monitoring of electoral campaign financing was conducted from 20 September to 13 October 2024 by estimating the expenditures of electoral competitors and comparing them with the amounts declared to the Central Electoral Commission (CEC). Estimates for unreported expenditures include rewards for volunteers and campaigners, promotional materials, social media advertising and event organization. In the presidential elections, unreported expenditures amounted to at least 4,066,387 MDL, the majority of which were related to promotional materials (81%). For the referendum, unreported expenditures of 4,675,512 MDL were estimated, with a similar focus on promotional materials (64%) and social media advertising (16%).
Hate speech and incitement to discrimination. Between 23 September and 6 October 2024, 23 cases of hate speech were identified, 19 of them in an electoral context. These occurred predominantly via mobile apps and at public events, most often based on criteria such as ‘sexual orientation/gender identity’ and ‚health’.
The Observation Mission is financially supported by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the European Union and the German Marshall Fund of the USA, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the International Organization of Francophonie, and Soros Foundation Moldova. The Observation Mission is carried out under the aegis of the Civic Coalition for Free and Fair Elections.
On October 20, 2024, Moldova will not only hold its presidential elections and a Constitutional Referendum but will also face a critical test of its resilience against hybrid threats. With the Kremlin opposing Moldova’s EU accession goals, the election period is vulnerable to disinformation, propaganda, and covert provocations.
In this second Moldova Policy Alert, Petru Culeac examines the challenges posed by foreign interference, including the impact of Russian-funded media, and explores how recent legislative and institutional reforms aim to safeguard Moldova’s democratic integrity.
Petru Culeac is the co-founder and Executive Director of the Moldova Development Institute, a newly established organization dedicated to improving the social, political, and economic landscape in Moldova. With over 15 years of experience in Moldova’s non-pro!it sector, Petru has an in-depth understanding of the country’s context and its development agenda as well as extensive organizational management experience. Until 2023, Petru served as Executive Director of Soros Foundation Moldova, a renowned non-pro!it foundation, part of the Open Society Foundations network, recognized as a key civil society actor in the Republic of Moldova. Under Petru’s leadership, the foundation expanded its portfolio and successfully implemented numerous technical assistance projects, including for Moldovan authorities in areas such as anti-corruption, justice reform, elections, and education, as well as emergency response projects at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Previously, Petru worked in areas of democracy promotion, free and fair elections, local development, citizen engagement, and youth activism, successfully cooperating with local and international organizations, such as USAID, Chemonics, East Europe Foundation, and IFC. Petru’s academic background includes degrees in Business Management, and European and International Studies from institutions in Moldova, France, and the United States.
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