The International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED) has released a comprehensive assessment of the pre-election environment ahead of Georgia’s pivotal 2024 parliamentary elections. This report highlights significant developments and challenges that shape the electoral process in Georgia.

Key findings

1. EU Membership Candidate Status:
   • The elections will be conducted under the status of an EU membership candidate country. Free, fair, and competitive elections are crucial in meeting one of the nine recommendations from the European Commission for Georgia to advance on the path to European integration.
2. Legislative Changes:
   • Significant amendments to electoral legislation include the elimination of gender quotas and the introduction of a fully proportional system for electing MPs. However, these changes have not fully incorporated recommendations from the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR, as set out in the EU recommendations​​.
   • In May 2024, the parliamentary majority introduced the institution of Delegates. Under these changes, a political party can nominate a candidate as a delegate for one of the 30 defined districts outlined in the election code. If elected, the nominated member becomes the delegate of that district, provided their party receives the highest number of votes in that specific district. ISFED views this amendment as contradictory to the fundamental principle of a fully proportional system outlined in Georgia’s Constitution, which envisages a single multi-mandate electoral district. 
   • The composition of Georgia’s Central Election Commission (CEC) has seen multiple changes recently. In March 2024, the responsibility to select and present candidates for the CEC chairperson and non-party members shifted from the President to the Speaker of the Parliament, eliminating the opposition-appointed deputy chairperson role, contrary to recommendations from the Venice Commission, OSCE/ODIHR, and local election observers.
   • In 2023, the responsibility for monitoring political party finance was transferred from the State Audit Office to the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB). However, the institutional independence of the ACB is questionable, primarily because its head is appointed by Prime Minister for a term of six years instead of a qualified majority vote in parliament.
3. Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence:
   • The controversial adoption of the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence in May 2024, despite significant opposition from local and international bodies, threatens the existence of domestic election observation organizations. This law, viewed as a tool to stifle civil society and media, has already led to U.S. sanctions against key Georgian officials​.
4. Technological Innovations:
   • The introduction of electronic voting technologies is a notable development. While these technologies promise to enhance the electoral process, their successful implementation depends on robust political will and readiness for such a transition​.
5. Political Party Dynamics:
   • The political landscape is marked by fragmentation and new alliances, with significant internal shifts within major parties like the United National Movement. The high electoral threshold has prompted discussions of forming political unions, indicating a fluid and dynamic pre-election period​.
6. Anti-Western Sentiment and increased polarization:
   • A rise in anti-Western and Euroskeptic messaging has been observed, with the ruling party challenging Georgia’s traditionally pro-European stance. This shift has introduced new tensions and uncertainties within the political landscape​.
   • Social media in Georgia is also highly polarized. Alongside the election campaign, various actors, including anonymous networks linked to the Government, are utilizing social media platforms for the spread of discrediting content. Russia’s potential intervention in the election campaign using anonymous networks poses a significant challenge. There have already been signs indicating such interference.

ISFED plans to deploy up to 1.400 observers across Georgia on election day to ensure thorough coverage. ISFED’s monitoring methodology adheres strictly to the Declaration of Global Principles for Nonpartisan Election Observation and Monitoring by Citizen Organizations, as well as the Code of Conduct to which ISFED is a signatory.

About ISFED: The International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED) is a leading Georgian civil society organization dedicated to ensuring free and fair elections through comprehensive monitoring and advocacy. With support from international partners, ISFED strives to uphold democratic standards and promote political pluralism in Georgia.

Today, 11 July 2024, Promo-LEX presented its report entitled “Implementation of Strategic Plans of the Central Electoral Commission and the Centre for Continuous Electoral Training” (Annual assessment: 2023 and Summing-up report: 2020 – 2023). The report presents an analysis of the development priorities and activities scheduled by CEC and CICDE for the monitored period.

CEC and CICDE’s 2023 achievements

In 2023 CEC committed to achieve 44 tasks related to 20 strategic activities. According to the Promo-LEX assessment, the electoral authority managed to achieve only 36% (16 out of 44) of all planned tasks, while 34% (15 out of 44) were partially achieved and 30% (13 out of 44) remained unachieved. The main achievements include amended regulatory framework, funding supervision and control for political parties and pre-election campaigns, renewed technical equipment to be used by electoral bodies, and election-related training of judges, prosecutors and journalists. However, CEC was challenged by publishing data on the funding of political parties and pre-election campaigns, the functioning of the financial control system and the creation of a voter profile.

As for CICDE, in 2023 the institution committed to achieve 40 tasks related to 16 strategic activities. Promo-LEX estimated that CICDE achieved 88% (35 out of 40) of all planned tasks, while 7% (3 out of 40) were partially achieved and 5% (2 out of 40) remained unachieved. CICDE’s main achievements include diversified partnerships and attracted external funds, as well as promotion of electoral education in schools and universities. However, CICDE had some challenges in having the training courses accredited and retaining experienced trainers.

Degree of CEC and CICDE’s entire strategic plan implementation (2020-2023)

In 2020-2023, CEC obtained the following results: 42% (39 out of 94) of all planned tasks were achieved, while 36% (34 out of 94) were partially achieved and 22% (21 out of 94) remained unachieved. CEC’s main achievements included optimized work processes and established sanctions for violating party funding rules. During the same period, CICDE achieved 91% (62 out of 68) of all planned tasks, while 8% (5 out of 68) were partially achieved and 1% (1 out of 68) remained unachieved. CICDE’s main achievements included electoral education integrated in schools and universities and an improved remote learning platform.

“As for CEC’s activity, certain challenges were identified that prevented the implementation of the Strategic Plan. Here we should mention that the elections were organized and carried out under new provisions, companies were identified that could develop software applications, and the implementation of some activities within the Strategic Plan was not within the institution’s competence. CEC’s results are moderate, despite the considerable effort that has been made. Thus, 44% of the tasks were taken and included in the new Strategic Plan 2024-2027. CICDE also faced certain challenges, among them the amended electoral legislation and the limited availability of experienced trainers. CICDE obtained very good results, having achieved 91% of the proposed tasks”, stated Mariana Dobrovolschi, electoral analyst, Promo-LEX.

Recommendations

Having monitored how CEC and CICDE’s 2020-2023 activities were implemented, Promo-LEX Association formulated several recommendations, such as:

• Include major activities of strategic value in Strategic Plans;
• Monitor on a regular basis the implementation of activities and assess the results achieved;
• Adjust annual Strategic Plans;
• Maintain constant collaboration with public authorities, civil society organizations and development partners;
• Continue efforts to accomplish unachieved and partially achieved tasks.

“This report concludes the effort to monitor the Strategic Plans of the Central Electoral Commission and the Centre for Continuous Electoral Training for 2020-2023. The Central Election Commission and the Centre for Continuous Electoral Training have already approved strategic programs for the next period of 2024-2027. In this regard as well, our recommendations focus on the way to formulate tasks, objectives, activities and indicators, as well as on the way to implement them”, said Mihaela Duca-Anghelici, head of the analysis and research team, Promo-LEX.

The summary report “Implementation of Strategic Plans of the Central Electoral Commission and the Centre for Continuous Electoral Training” (Annual assessment: 2023 and Summing-up report: 2020 – 2023) can be accessed in English, Russian, Romanian here.

EPDE identified 178 fake observers invited by the Russian authorities, including many Western politicians and elected officials, to give international legitimacy to the “presidential elections.”

On 15-17 March 2024, Russia held “presidential elections”, in which four people allegedly competed for the Russian presidential post, including none from the democratic opposition, which is outlawed in the country in violation of democratic norms and standards.  

What makes it even worse and even more detached from democratic standards is that Russia decided not to invite any OSCE (the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) observers to monitor the “elections,” in violation of the Istanbul Document 1999, according to which OSCE participating states committed themselves to invite observers from the ODIHR (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights) and OSCE PA, in addition to other OSCE participating states. 

In an attempt to provide a degree of international legitimacy to the “presidential election” held both in Russia and illegally in occupied Ukrainian territories, Moscow invited 1115 “international observers and experts” from 129 countries.

Our analysis of Russian and other media reports, as well as social networks such as Facebook, X/Twitter, and Telegram, allowed us to identify 178 foreign “observers” and “experts” invited by the Russian authorities to give international legitimacy to the 2024 “presidential elections” both in Russia and on Russia-occupied Ukrainian territories.

This list is part of our ongoing research and is not exhaustive. As we continue our work, additional fake observers will be added to our database at fakeobservers.org.

As Hungary takes over the EU’s rotating presidency, most prominent Hungarian election-related organisations: Unhack Democracy, 20k, Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (HCLU), Hungarian Helsinki Committee, Mérték Media Monitor and Political Capital took a look at how Hungarian civil society has been facing up to Orban’s electoral autocracy in light of the recent EP/local elections.

“The Sovereignty Law has had the greatest impact on organisations working directly on or around elections. It has enforced a culture of fear within civil society and the media, diverted already limited resources and attention, stifled cooperation and imposed a level of self-censorship”.

Read more

This matters because the country already falls well short of the requirements for free and transparent elections that should be standard within the EU – as Hungary’s most prominent Hungarian election-related organisations including 20k, Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (HCLU), Hungarian Helsinki Committee, Mérték Media Monitor, Political Capital and Unhack Democracy have already concluded
The joint report into the EU parliament and local elections found the dominance of the ruling party in public advertising, media, and social media was striking.

👉 More analysis in the report

• 20k www.20k.hu
• Magyar Helsinki Bizottság – Hungarian Helsinki Committee www.helsinki.hu
• Mérték Médiaelemző Műhely – Mérték Media Monitor www.mertek.eu
• Political Capital www.politicalcapital.hu
• Társaság a Szabadságjogokért – Hungarian Civil Liberties Union  www.tasz.hu
• Unhack Democracy www.unhackdemocracy.eu

Promo-LEX published its report on “Political party funding in Moldova. Retrospective 2023” based on civic monitoring findings on the funding of political parties through their 2023 activities.

2023 was marked by the entry into force of new legal provisions pertaining to political party funding. The most important changes concerned the prohibition for political parties to organize charitable (philanthropic) or sponsorship activities; the lowering of the cash donations ceiling to one average salary per economy; and the elimination of the limit of 3 average salaries per economy for donations made by citizens with income earned abroad, etc.

For the first time in Moldova, a political party has been outlawed after the Constitutional Court declared the Shor party unconstitutional, which led to its removal from the state register of political parties.

The monitoring revealed that the resources and efforts of investigative authorities have been activated in an unprecedented manner for Moldova to check the financing of political parties and preelection campaigns. Thus, a number of criminal cases were started against political parties for submitting fake financial reports, as well as for knowingly accepting funding from an organized crime group.

Political party income reporting

Promo-LEX found that the SSI “Control Financiar” information system, which is the main tool used for financial reporting, had operated with faults. This had a negative impact on the submission of financial reports, in the prescribed timelines and format, both for the first quarter and annual reporting.

For 2023, 75% political parties submitted annual financial reports. Respectively, 92% submitted reports for the first quarter and 87% – for the second quarter. The reporting deadlines are July 15 for the first quarter, January 15 for the second quarter and March 31 for annual reports.

In the reporting period, only 34 out of the 61 registered political parties reported revenues totaling MDL 54.9 million. Another 22 parties reported “zero” income. The highest revenues were reported by PAS (41%), PSRM (18%), PSDE (9%), PCRM (7%), PN and PPPDA (6% each).

Promo-LEX found an increase in political party dependence on public funding sources – 84%, which is 2 p.p. more than in 2022. Income originating from state budget appropriations was reported by 23 political parties, totaling MDL 45.7 million. The largest share went to PAS (41%), PSRM (22%), PSDE (11%), PN and PPPDA (7% each). In the case of 10 parties, this was the only source of income. For comparison, in the European Union, the ratio of public and private sources in party revenues is 65% to 35% (in the newer democracies in Eastern Europe) and 55% to 45% (in consolidated democracies).

“The Republic of Moldova has far exceeded the EU average. This is a worrying trend in a context where most political parties seem to make no effort to attract financial support from citizens. We believe that political parties need to work more to involve and politically empower citizens, which will also help diversify the sources of funding for party activities. In this regard, the possibility should be considered to revise how state budget funds are provided depending on the amount of income obtained by parties from private sources”, said Mariana Focșa, finance analyst, Promo-LEX.

Income obtained from financial donations was reported by 18 parties, totaling MDL 4.8 million. According to the declared sources of income, 90% donations originated from salaries, 5% – from pensions, 3% – from unemployed people, and 1% – from scholarships and social benefits. In this context, only 19% of the total donations made by individuals exceeded the amount of 3 average monthly salaries per economy, to be verified by CEC.

Promo-LEX estimations of unreported expenditures by political parties

Promo-LEX identified several categories of expenditures in which the Association’s estimates are different – in some cases significantly – from the information reported to CEC. As a reminder, in the civic monitoring process, Promo-LEX estimates the parties’ expenditures on political promotion activities and compares them to those reported to CEC.

In 2023, the Association observed more than 2,500 political promotion activities organized by 24 parties, as well as 38 political activities carried out by the ex-PSPS/Ilan Shor’s Team. These included the distribution of political information materials, parties’ statutory activities and national travels. Most were reported for PAS, PSRM, ex-PPȘ/Ilan Shor’s Team and PR and CUB.

Thus, Promo-LEX estimated unreported expenditures of at least MDL 20.3 million by 24 parties and the formation lacking a legal status, ex-PPȘ/Ilan Shor’s Team. Of these, almost MDL 17 million (82%) were estimated for the ex-PPȘ and its affiliates – ȘANSĂ and PR. Most estimated expenses were made for political promotion events (46%), press and promotional materials (20%) and the renting/maintenance of premises (18%).

During the report presentation, Promo-LEX made several recommendations to state institutions and political parties.

“A specific recommendation to the Parliament concerns the retrospective legal and impact assessment of the new legal framework relevant to the funding of political parties and preelection campaigns. Our advice is to regulate political and electoral funding by third parties. The Central Electoral Commission is advised to systematically publish information on started proceedings as a result of its political party funding supervision and control activities with a view to increasing transparency, as well as to extend the criteria for checking donations made to political parties beyond those exceeding 3 average salaries per economy”, said Mihaela Duca-Angelici, head of the analysis and research team, Promo-LEX.

The full report on “Political party funding in Moldova: Retrospective 2023” (in Romanian) is available here.

EPDE member The Political Accountability Foundation published its final conclusions and recommendations from monitoring the 2023 parliamentary elections.

The report covers key aspects of the electoral process, including:

• Legal environment and the impact of early 2023 electoral law changes
• Election campaign dynamics, particularly the misuse of public resources and political advertising on social media
• Voting day procedures and preparations

Priority Recommendations:

The report offers several key recommendations that should be implemented in the coming months.

• Avoid legislative changes to electoral law within six months of elections, as required by the Constitutional Tribunal.
• Implement automatic seat distribution corrections for Sejm elections, with the National Electoral Commission announcing seat allocations before each election.
• Abolish the 24-hour limit on voting result transmissions by precinct commissions abroad.
• Reduce the maximum number of inhabitants per permanent voting district from 4000 to 3000.
• Develop an electronic certificate standard for trustees and social observers in collaboration with political parties and NGOs.
• Mandate comprehensive training for all electoral commission members, regardless of their role.
• Digitize the submission process for election committee financial statements and attached documents.

Download the conclusions and full set of recommendations below (in English). For the entire report (in Polish), follow this link.

The “Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections” campaign, run by EPDE members Belarusian Helsinki Committee and Viasna Human Rights Center, analyzed the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly (ABPA).

Initially, the ABPA was a quasi-civic meeting organized by the executive vertical, practiced every 5 years (usually) before presidential elections to demonstrate “nationwide” support for A. Lukashenka. It was stated that the ABPA is a form of realization by the citizens of Belarus of their right to directly participate in the conduct of government affairs. Against the background of the political crisis that began in 2020 before the presidential elections, and is still ongoing, at the constitutional referendum in 2022 provisions for the ABPA were included in the Constitution. The ABPA was proclaimed “the highest representative body of the people’s government”, while a bicameral parliament (“National Assembly”) was also preserved. Thus, currently in Belarus there are two central bodies of state power of a representative nature, and in the rhetoric of the authorities, the ABPA is still declared either as a form of direct participation of citizens in resolving public issues, or as a model of representative participation (“people’s government”).

Although the ABPA is postulated as the highest representative body of people’s government, the method of its formation is far from democratic representation: in fact, only 15% of the composition is directly elected by the people (president, deputies of the House of Representatives of the National Assembly and the Minsk City Council of Deputies), and another 29% of the ABPA composition is elected indirectly (by local councils elected by the people). The presence of 3 categories of delegates selected to the ABPA according to different procedures, which are not clearly stated in the law, are not transparent and are held behind closed doors in the absence of observers, hinders recognition of the ABPA’s real representational nature and the right to participate in the conduct of public affairs as being exercised by all citizens of Belarus directly or through representation in the ABPA.

Georgia is scheduled to hold much-anticipated parliamentary elections on October 26, 2024. This time around 90 percent of Georgian citizens will vote in polling stations using electronic means: special voter verification equipment will be used to check voter identity; voters will fill in paper ballots and feed the ballot into optical ballot scanners. The author – Tamara Sartania – provides insights into the experience of using voting technologies in Georgia, legal framework, public information campaigns, and opinions of observer organizations.

The new normal that Ukraine has been forced into after Russia’s full-scale invasion on the 24th of February 2022 raises questions for the Ukrainian government, politicians, experts, and society about whether democratic elections are possible in Ukraine while the active phase of the war is ongoing. This also raises questions about the legitimacy of Ukrainian elected authorities when elections are not likely for years to come. In Part I of this series of Ukraine Policy Alerts, the author delves into the legal perspective to explain why conducting elections in Ukraine remains impossible amid the ongoing full-scale war.

In the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the political system has fronted ‘militant democracy,’ compelling authorities to protect Ukraine’s democratic regime and strengthen its defenses. While Part I of the Ukraine Policy Alert “Ukrainian authorities’ legitimacy when elections are impossible” examined the limitations imposed by a full-scale war on the conduct of elections in Ukraine, as well as the legal legitimacy of representative bodies that cannot be re-elected, Part II attempts to answer the question of how to maintain a su!icient level of trust in the authorities in a situation where elections are impossible. Unlike legal legitimacy, political legitimacy is not determined by the Constitution, but by the ever-changing political reality. The latter remains the main problem for the Ukrainian authorities, growing with each passing year without elections.

To legitimize the election process, Russia’s Central Election Commission announced the invitation of a proud number of 1115 “international observers” from 129 countries. EPDE identified around 150 of fake observers and “experts”, among them rather unknown European local politicians and activists representing or affiliated with far-right parties or movements.

“International non-recognition of elections: The case of the Presidential elections in the Russian Federation in 2024” by Alex Shlyk

The expert election* 2024 observation mission was organized by the Belarusian Helsinki Committee and the Viasna Human Rights Center as part of the “Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections” campaign. The mission collects and analyzes information about the election campaign based on open sources and messages from voters from Belarus.*The term “elections*” in relation to the 2024 election campaign is used with an asterisk by the “Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections” campaign to emphasize the perfunctory nature of this term, since any free and fair election campaign presupposes, first of all, conditions where rights and freedoms are fully realized, which is currently practically absent in Belarus.

The expert election* 2024 observation mission was organized by the Belarusian Helsinki Committee and the Viasna Human Rights Center as part of the “Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections” campaign. The mission collects and analyzes information about the election campaign based on open sources and messages from voters from Belarus.*The term “elections*” in relation to the 2024 election campaign is used with an asterisk by the “Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections” campaign to emphasize the perfunctory nature of this term, since any free and fair election campaign presupposes, first of all, conditions where rights and freedoms are fully realized, which is currently practically absent in Belarus.

The expert election* 2024 observation mission was organized by the Belarusian Helsinki Committee and the Viasna Human Rights Center as part of the “Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections” campaign. The mission collects and analyzes information about the election campaign based on open sources and messages from voters from Belarus.*The term “elections*” in relation to the 2024 election campaign is used with an asterisk by the “Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections” campaign to emphasize the perfunctory nature of this term, since any free and fair election campaign presupposes, first of all, conditions where rights and freedoms are fully realized, which is currently practically absent in Belarus.

EMDS observed that the pre-election campaign lacked genuine competition among political forces, diminishing the political engagement in the country and denying voters a real choice among diverse political perspectives, which is essential for a free and fair election.

This document contains both the report on the first Follow-up on Recommendations’ Implementation Conference (FURIC) 2023 and the concluding document on enhancing synergies between international and domestic election observers.

Election Monitoring and Democracy Studies Center (EMDS) issued an interim report on the results of observation on the Pre-Election Campaign in the Early Presidential Election which are taking place on 7 February 2024

As Georgia prepares for its upcoming parliamentary elections on October 26, 2024, significant changes are underway. This election marks a historic shift to a fully proportional electoral system, with all 150 members of parliament set to be elected in a single nationwide constituency under a 5% threshold. A notable feature is the widespread adoption of electronic voting technologies at most polling stations, a first for country-wide elections. However, amidst these advancements, questions linger over the mandate of key members in the election administration, creating a deadlock in the parliamentary process.Independent international consultant Tamara Sartania provides insight into electoral system, election administration, electronic voting technologies, undecided voters and heated rhetoric.

The expert election* 2024 observation mission was organized by the Belarusian Helsinki Committee and the Viasna Human Rights Center as part of the “Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections” campaign. The mission collects and analyzes information about the election campaign based on open sources and messages from voters from Belarus.*The term “elections*” in relation to the 2024 election campaign is used with an asterisk by the “Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections” campaign to emphasize the perfunctory nature of this term, since any free and fair election campaign presupposes, first of all, conditions where rights and freedoms are fully realized, which is currently practically absent in Belarus.