EPDE member Civil Network OPORA published this updated and revised version of the “Roadmap for Ensuring Organization of Postwar Elections in Ukraine”.
This document is intended to draw the attention of Ukraine’s partners and stakeholders to the primary
steps for the preparation of the first postwar elections in Ukraine and the reform of the electoral
legislation in the foreseeable future.
The Roadmap is only a framework document; therefore, certain topics require broader and more meaningful coverage. Civil Network OPORA has prepared its own expert vision, incorporating the results of previous professional discussions with official parties (Central Election Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Verkhovna Rada, National Police, National Agency for Corruption Prevention, National Television and Radio Broadcasting Council, and others) to overcome challenges and fulfill European integration commitments existing as of May 2025. Given the need for a critical number of agreed-upon developments in the organization of post-war elections in advance, before the end of the legal regime of martial law, OPORA calls on the Parliament not to postpone substantive discussions aimed at finding systemic solutions. The preparation of the legislative framework, the prevention of Russian interference in the postwar elections, and EU integration directly depend on a depoliticized, high-quality discussion.
This is the second version of the Roadmap, updated based on discussions with a wide range
of stakeholders, which resulted in the refinement of key recommendations.
The second round of the presidential election was contested by two candidates with very diverse political positions in a highly polarized atmosphere. The organization of the technical aspects of the process was effective, but the release of deliberate misinformation and alarmist rumors of possible election fraud by the AUR party created tension, put pressure on the election administration and undermined public confidence in the process. The aggressive rhetoric of the AUR candidate towards the media and part of the electorate dominated the last days of the campaign.
The election administration followed the electoral calendar and efficiently organized the technical aspects of the elections. The fact that Central Electoral Bureau (CEB) meetings were not public reduced the transparency of the process. The very high number of online campaign complaints received by the CEB created a considerable workload, and in some cases, the filing of complaints indicated a coordinated effort to load the CEB’s agenda.
In the electoral campaign, the right to association was respected and candidates were able to organize their campaign activities generally without restrictions. The right to freedom of expression, although generally respected, was affected in several cases by decisions of electoral bureaus to remove unlabeled political advertising, even when it expressed the political views of journalists or ordinary citizens. Candidates presented the choices the citizens have to make differently: George Simion urged them to choose between the system and the anti-system, and Nicușor Dan between the pro-EU, pro-Western orientation and alignment with the Russian Federation’s policy. Both candidates took part in a televised debate; George Simion’s non-participation in the ensuing debates limited voters’ access to information about his political program. Alarmist rumors and speculation increased in the run-off campaign; the authorities published denials of several intentional misinformation by the AUR to maintain calm and restore confidence in the electoral process. Regrettably, the campaign was marked by verbal violence and discriminatory attacks.
In the second round of elections, several online monitoring initiatives warned of coordinated inauthentic content. As for the online campaign, Expert Forum monitored more than 1,000 public Facebook groups, identifying 194 pages with potentially coordinated behavior. EFOR also identified a network of inauthentic accounts promoted with the hashtag #ankaversace on Tik Tok, which was only partially removed by the platform. A disinformation campaign via Telegram aimed at swaying the vote in favor of a candidate was labeled by the MFA as Russian interference. Monitoring by a civic group, detailed in the Cheile Împărăției report, confirmed the existence of well-organized networks operating with significant influence capacity, on a hub-and-spoke model, with several dozen key accounts and thousands of satellite accounts.
The first round of the presidential elections recorded the highest costs for a presidential election: income of 172 million lei and expenses of 165 lei, and the overall limits for income and expenditure remain very high. Positively, the PEA published datasets with income and expenditure for the second round on 16 and 17 May on the finantarepartide.ro portal. Nicușor Dan has declared income of 40.4 million lei and expenditure of 31.5 million lei as of 16 May, much of the income originating from loans. George Simion has so far not declared any income or expenditure for the second round. Although the candidate would still have had time to declare these funds, the failure to do so significantly reduced the transparency of the electoral process and goes against the spirit of the law. The fact that the identity of several Facebook accounts that are not attributable to a candidate, which promoted negative campaigning prior to the first round, has not been identified so far, despite complaints lodged to the PEA, is a limitation of the transparency and integrity of the process.
The number of observers accredited by Vot Corect in the country and abroad increased after the first round to 1276. They submitted information from around 1,850 polling stations during the three days of observation through the Vote Monitor app. After the first round, voters submitted over 3,500 complaints about the electoral process via the votcorect.ro portal, most of them related to voters who posted their stamped ballot papers online in violation of the law.
The CEB has adopted numerous decisions regarding complaints about online political advertising. Meta has challenged some of the CEB decisions at the Bucharest Court of Appeal, but these have been rejected and some are currently under appeal. Rădăuțiul Civic and Expert Forum have submitted a request to the Bucharest Court of Appeal to demand that the CEB allow the observation of voting with a special ballot box.
Election day was generally orderly, despite some attempts to disrupt the process and manipulate voters. The opening and voting procedures were positively assessed in more than 98% of observed polling stations. During voting, observers reported cases of voter influence, including pressure and vote buying. Vote counting was positively assessed in 95.7% of polling stations. Observers reported no attempts to compromise the fairness of the results, with one exception, but noted a number of procedural omissions.
Romanian EPDE member Expert Forum EFOR observed the presidential election as part of the Vot Corect Coalition. Read their findings and conclusions of the first round of the 2025 rerun of the presidential election below.
The presidential election offered voters a variety of choices and fundamental rights were generally respected. The election administration organized efficiently the technical aspects of the process and election day was orderly, without significant incidents. The fact that the decision to annul the November elections was insufficiently explained to the voters, combined with the lack of a full account of the failed election and the measures that should have been taken to ensure the integrity of the process negatively affected public confidence in the process and cast doubt on the state institutions’ resilience against hybrid attacks. The elections were held against a backdrop of distrust in the ruling political parties and polarization brought on by the annulled election.
The election legislation is generally adequate for organising democratic elections; however, changes by government emergency ordinance 1/2025 were adopted non-transparently, in violation of procedures and far too soon before the elections. Moreover, some of the amendments, including those related to the marking of political advertisements, changes in the composition of election commissions and shorter hours for some polling stations abroad affected stakeholders’ rights. The elections were organized taking into account several decisions of the Constitutional Court and recommendations of the Venice Commission related to the 2024 electoral process, which were not, however, transposed into law for greater clarity.
The election administration respected the election calendar and took the necessary measures for the good conduct of the elections, but the election commission composition clearly favoured two of the candidates, while in most commissions eight others were not represented at all. Election commission sessions are not public at any level, which reduced transparency.
A total of 17,988,031 voters were registered on the permanent lists in the country; the voter register also includes 1,016,350 voters residing abroad. The electronic verification of voter identity and marking in real time those who have voted through the SIMPV allows the identification of multiple voting attempts. Voters who cannot reach polling stations can opt for postal voting, if abroad, or for mobile voting in the country.
Out of 25 nominees, the Central Election Bureau registered 12 candidates and rejected 13; 11 candidates remained on the ballot after one withdrew. The high number of supporting signatures required to file a candidacy limits access to the electoral competition, and the lack of visibility of the signature collection campaigns, combined with the non-transparent verification process, raised questions about their veracity. The signature verification process could not be observed, and although the BEC regulated the methodology in a decision, the regulation is not part of the law and does not have an effect on future elections. Although the Constitutional Court issued several rulings after the 2024 annulled election, the law has not been amended to clearly define eligibility criteria and standards related to observing constitutional principles. The short deadlines for vetting, unclear legislation, lack of investigative tools in case of suspicions and the very long timeframes for the resolution of criminal cases reduce the efficiency of this system, which needs significant reform to increase public confidence.
During the campaign the right to free speech and freedom of association were generally respected and candidates were able to organize their campaign and deliver their message to voters without restrictions. Restrictive outdoor campaigning regulations, which reduce campaign visibility, prompted several candidates to start campaigning during support signature collection in order to be able to use large billboards and banners, which are banned during the campaign. Most of the campaign was conducted online and the overall tone of the campaign was rather aggressive and dominated by attacks between candidates. Several candidates took on a conservative and nationalist rhetoric, partly continuing the narratives launched by Călin Georgescu in 2024. The presidential debates added vitality to the campaign and attracted public interest. The CEB and the Ilfov county election commission noted the illegality of an extensive campaign carried out by the AUR party in violation of personal data protection regulations.
Online campaigning, especially on Tik Tok, continued to be contaminated by coordinated inauthentic behavior, which was noted by several electoral competitors. Expert Forum social media monitoring identified a significant increase in coordinated, politically motivated content, disguised as organic content and generated by networks of inauthentic accounts. In the absence of regulatory mechanisms adapted for digital content, third-party campaign financing continues to have a significant impact. Expert Forum identified two strategies to promote inauthentic content, both predominantly found on TikTok. In addition to internal inauthentic behavior, the campaign was also affected by foreign interference attempts associated with Russian Federation interests. On election day, the National Cyber Security Directorate (DNSC) reported that numerous websites of public interest had been the target of cyber-attacks claimed by a pro-Russian group; all affected websites were functional during the same day.
Competitors did not have equitable access to resources, with the Romania Forward coalition candidate enjoying a visible financial advantage. Limits on income and expenditure are high and this presidential election campaign was the most expensive so far. Political financing relies primarily on public resources, subsidies and reimbursements from public funds, which reduces the parties’ independence from the state. The campaign was mostly financed by loans and private funding declared by the parties, and spending most prominently included costs for online and media promotion. Campaign finance transparency remains limited even if revenues and expenditures are disclosed during the campaign, as the donors are not disclosed. Pre-campaigning is not effectively regulated. Although the PEA initiated more checks during the campaign, staff shortage limits the institution’s ability to act at short notice. Auditing financial sources beyond the submitted reports is limited and not within AEP’s attributions, which significantly limits transparency and allows illegally obtained funds to be reimbursed from public money.
The legal framework allows stakeholders to file complaints and appeals, and the deadlines for both the election administration and the courts are mostly reasonable. BEC decisions can be appealed to the High Court or the Court of Appeal, but the election law does not define the procedures for appealing decisions to the courts, with certain exceptions, contrary to international standards. Although Vot Corect has not observed the resolution of complaints in a systematic manner, we consider that in general the deadlines given by the courts were short, at least for appeals related to BEC decisions. The BEC received a significant number of complaints related to online political advertising; of more than 1,700 decisions, few were challenged, and were upheld by the court in most cases. Some of the BEC decisions were criticized, including for considering criteria beyond the legal definitions and for unfair penalties. Since January, almost 150 cases related to the annulment or suspension of the Constitutional Court decision to annul the November election were registered with the courts, eventually finding one judge to decide in favour of the petitioner, even though Constitutional Court decisions are final and binding. While the right of petitioners to lodge complaints is essential and should not be limited, such rulings undermine the integrity and credibility of the process and the appeal mechanisms.
Election day was generally calm and orderly. Opening and voting were assessed positively in the overwhelming majority of observed polling stations, but observers also noted cases where the mobile ballot box procedures were not respected and cases where voters residing in another locality were not allowed to vote. Although several procedural omissions were observed during the vote count, observers also assessed the counting generally positively and noted that in almost all observed polling stations results were correctly recorded. Voting abroad was efficiently organized with multiple options for exercising the right to vote.
Vot Corect is a civil society coalition formed by Expert Forum, the Civic Resource Centre, Civica, the Center for the Study of Democracy, the Civic Rădăuți Association, the Electoral Observatory, the Federation of Law Students’ Associations of Romania and Code for Romania. For election observation in the Republic of Moldova we cooperate with the Promo-Lex Association.
What can we observe in the case of the 2025 presidential elections in Romania?
The era of fake news is history. Not that we should no longer be concerned about fake news, which is a matter of content; combating it remains important. But the stakes in the 2025 campaign have become the ability to flood the digital space with oceans of information, memes, and videos about one’s own candidate, plus negative propaganda about opponents, much more so than in the past.
In other words, it is about exploiting platform algorithms, to the limit or beyond the provisions of Romanian law, which are restrictive but outdated, lacking effective enforcement mechanisms. Because it is one thing to put false or manipulativ narratives in the virtual space, but whose source can be identified – and another to create from scratch tens of thousands of supporters who do not exist, i.e. accounts based on bot networks, which fill the public conversation with duplicate posts and comments, giving the impression of popularity and mobilisation.
More information and the report is available here
What can we observe in the case of the 2025 presidential elections in Romania?
Online election campaigns in Romania have entered a new era, dominated by an industry of political promotion through inauthentic networks. Although TikTok prohibits official political advertising, in practice we are witnessing an explosion of disguised, coordinated content favorable to certain candidates, created with the aim of simulating popular support and influencing public perception. This practice not only unbalances the electoral competition, but also calls into question the integrity of the democratic process.
More information and the report is available here
Romanian EPDE member Expert Forum (EFOR) published a report on the modification of the composition of the electoral commissions.
The way electoral commissions are setup has changed constantly in recent years. But not always through laws discussed in Parliament long before the election date, but through emergency ordinances or articles crammed into a long list of amendments. This is despite the fact that one of the basic principles of legislative stability, defined by the Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice on Electoral Matters, is that the fundamental elements of electoral law, including the composition of electoral commissions, should not be modified less than a year after the elections.
More information and the report is available here (Romanian only).
One of the critical questions surrounding Romania’s political, social, and democratic crisis
is: what happened on TikTok? Why is it impossible to conduct thorough research, and
how we could use the retention order issued by the European Commission requiring
TikTok to preserve data related to the Romanian elections?
To address this, we must consider multiple perspectives, beginning with the current
challenges researchers face in accessing social media data and the role of regulators,
such as the European Commission and national Digital Services Coordinators (DSCs), in
enforcing the Digital Services Act (DSA). This section is an attempt to shed some light
into this complicated situation. In brief, this is what we advocate for and why:
Ahead of the 2024 parliamentary elections, the Georgian Dream party reached the maximum level of its years-long consolidation of power as manifested through the complete capture of state institutions. All types of administrative resources – coercive, regulatory, institutional, financial, and media – were used for the elections to ensure the ruling party’s victory. During the parliamentary elections, four of the five fundamental principles of democratic elections – universal suffrage, free voting, equality, and secrecy of vote – were essentially violated. The combination of fundamental violations identified during the pre-election period and on Election Day, the use of systematic and organized schemes of voter intimidation, pressure, threats, and vote buying, affected the expression of the free will of the voters and, consequently, the election results cannot be considered as a true expression of the will of the Georgian voters.
The International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED) monitored the election period with the financial support of the European Union, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the British Government, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). The views expressed in the document are those of ISFED only and may not necessarily reflect the views of any donor organization.
A stolen election, a stolen future—Georgia stands at a crossroads. In the face of political betrayal, violent repression, and shattered democratic aspirations, a defiant resistance has emerged. From the streets of Tbilisi to international political platforms, the fight for free and fair elections is intensifying. The vast majority of Georgians demand new elections. Will the voices of the people prevail against authoritarian rule, or is Georgia on the brink of losing its European future?
This article delves into the roots of Georgia’s uprising, examining the fraudulent elections that sparked nationwide protests, the government’s crackdown on dissent, and the broader implications of abandoning EU integration path. It explores the growing demand for new elections, the international response, and the leadership vacuum within the opposition. Through a detailed analysis of political dynamics, public sentiment, and external pressures, this piece unpacks Georgia’s ongoing struggle for democracy.
Mariam Chikhladze is an independent international consultant specializing in democratic elections, civil society development, and parliamentary and political party strengthening. She has extensive experience with USAID’s governance programs in Georgia, managing the parliamentary support portfolios. She has also contributed to UNDP’s key legislative strengthening project. Previously, Mariam worked with the International Republican Institute (IRI) on programs in Georgia and Armenia and on behalf of the Alliance of Democracies Foundation, facilitated the political parties’ pledge for election integrity in the 2020 parliamentary elections in Georgia. Earlier in her career, she managed the grassroots empowerment program of the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) in four regions of Georgia. Mariam Chikhladze holds a Master’s in Public Policy Analysis from the Bush School of Public Service and Government at Texas A&M University, awarded through the Fulbright Graduate Student Program. She also completed the Edmund Muskie Professional Fellowship at the Hudson Institute, in Washington, DC.
The expert monitoring mission for the Belarusian presidential elections* 2025 is carried out by the Human Rights Center “Viasna” and the Belarusian Helsinki Committee. The mission is aimed at evaluating the elections from the viewpoint of the Belarusian electoral legislation and international standards of free and democratic elections, as well as informing the Belarusian public and international community about the progress of the elections.
The seventh presidential elections in Belarus’s independent history are scheduled for January 26, 2025. These elections* occur against a backdrop of widespread political repression, systematic violations of fundamental democratic principles, and the institutionalized erosion of human rights. Below, we explain critical factors that define this process and affect its legitimacy.
The expert mission of observation during the presidential election 2025 is being carried out by the Human Right Center “Viasna” and the Belarusian Helsinki Committee. The campaign is aimed at evaluating the elections* from the viewpoint of the Belarusian electoral legislation and international standards of free and democratic elections, as well as informing the Belarusian public and international community about the progress of the elections and results of observation.
The term “elections*” in relation to the 2025 election campaign is used with an asterisk to emphasize the conventionality of this term, since any free and fair election campaign presupposes all conditions under which rights and freedoms are fully realized, including freedom of speech, freedom of peaceful meetings and associations, the right to participate in the governance of one’s state, freedom from discrimination, which are currently practically absent in Belarus.
On December 5, the National Assembly of Armenia passed a package of legislative amendments to the Electoral Code, the Law on Political Parties, and other relevant legal acts presented by the Ministry of Justice. This culminated a two-year process that included extensive discussions and proposals from state authorities, international organizations, civil society organizations (CSOs), and other stakeholders. These newly introduced changes will define the rules for the parliamentary elections expected in 2026.
Although the drafting process was highly inclusive, several changes were introduced in the final stages, immediately before the first and second readings. These changes deviated from the initial agreements and the draft’s original intent, as outlined in an earlier policy alert. In this piece, we will examine “the good,” “the bad,” and “the ugly” of the electoral changes and their policy implications.
Tigran Mughnetsian — PhD in political science and Master in public administration. He is a public policy researcher at Transparency International Armenia and senior lecturer at Yerevan Brusov State University of Languages and Social Sciences. He specializes in issues related to elections, public administration, regime change, party systems and party funding.
In violation of its OSCE commitments, Belarusian authorities failed to invite credible international observation organizations, such as ODIHR or OSCE PA, in a timely manner, deliberately obstructing independent oversight. Meanwhile, domestic election observation has been virtually eradicated, with organizations branded as “extremist” and liquidated, and their leaders imprisoned or exiled. Human Rights Center “Viasna” founder and Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Ales Bialiatski, along with Valiantsin Stefanovich and Uladzimir Labkovich, are among those serving sentences of up to 10 years.
Despite this, the expert election* 2025 observation mission, carried out by the Human Right Center “Viasna” and the Belarusian Helsinki Committee, conducted monitoring remotely, relying on publicly available data and reports from Belarusian voters.
The term “elections*” in relation to the 2024 and 2025 election campaigns is used with an asterisk to emphasize the conventionality of this term, since any free and fair election campaign presupposes all conditions under which rights and freedoms are fully realized, including freedom of speech, freedom of peaceful meetings and associations, the right to participate in the governance of one’s state, freedom from discrimination, which are currently practically absent in Belarus.
Context, analysis, and recommendations by Łukasz Kondraciuk, Stefanie Schiffer
Russia’s local elections in September 2024, concentrated on the so-called Single Voting Day, were marked by unprecedented restrictions on independent opposition, media, and election observers. To legitimize the elected politicians in the eyes of the Russian voters and international audiences, the Russian Central Election Commission invited multiple representatives of state election commissions to Moscow and St. Petersburg. All of them misused the authority of their institutions to lend legitimacy to these fraudulent elections.
Our research shows that the Kremlin increasingly targets election commissions from the Global South, strategically leveraging their participation to craft an image of broad international approval. By co-opting officials from these nations—often under the guise of technical exchanges or observer invitations—the Kremlin manipulates their credibility to validate undemocratic practices. These tactics undermine the integrity of these institutions and aim to shield Russia’s electoral malpractice from global scrutiny.
EPDE proposes several calls to action to discourage the continued participation of fake observers, to protect the integrity of the institutions they represent in the Russian public, and to hold individuals accountable for undermining democratic processes:
Our report and our fake observers database provide a valuable resource for journalists, researchers, and advocacy groups seeking to understand electoral disinformation tactics, networks of malign influence, and learn more about our recommendations for democratic safeguards.
Get in touch with Lukasz Kondraciuk, Head of Electoral Integrity at EPDE, via email: kondraciuk@european-exchange.org
EPDE member Civil Network OPORA has prepared its own expert vision of electoral process, which takes into account the results of previous professional discussions with official parties (Verkhovna Rada, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Central Election Commission). OPORA calls on the Parliament to hold substantive discussions in order to find systemic solutions, given the need to lay a critical amount of groundwork for the organization of postwar elections before the repeal of martial law. The success of preparation of legislative framework, prevention of Russian interference in the postwar elections, and integration into the European Union directly depend on a depoliticized high-quality discussion.
The full report is accessible on OPORA’s website.
The expert election* 2025 observation mission was organized by the Belarusian Helsinki Committee and the Viasna Human Rights Center as part of the “Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections” campaign. The mission collects and analyzes information about the election campaign based on open sources and messages from voters from Belarus.
CONCLUSIONS
*The term “elections*” in relation to the 2024 and 2025 election campaigns is used with an asterisk to emphasize the conventionality of this term, since any free and fair election campaign presupposes all conditions under which rights and freedoms are fully realized, including freedom of speech, freedom of peaceful meetings and associations, the right to participate in the governance of one’s state, freedom from discrimination, which are currently practically absent in Belarus.
The International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (thereafter ISFED) believes
that during Georgia’s 2024 parliamentary elections, four of the five core principles of
democratic elections – universal, free, equal, and secret vote, were violated.
The combination of fundamental violations observed by ISFED during the pre-election
period and on election day of the 2024 parliamentary elections, affected the free
expression of voters’ will; As a result, the election outcome cannot be considered a true
reflection of the will of Georgian voters.
All this was the result of the extensive abuse of administrative resources, involvement
of state agencies in favor of the ruling party, changes to the rules for composition and
decision-making in the Central Election Commission (CEC), flaws in the composition of
Precinct Election Commissions (PECs) and changing the timelines for allocating the
functions to PEC members before election day. Additionally, on election day, the rights
of observers were restricted, which was reflected in denying their access to polling
stations, systematically expelling them from polling stations, and harassing them
verbally and physically.
Georgia’s October 2024 parliamentary elections, which saw the ruling Georgian Dream party secure a fourth term, have sparked widespread domestic and international non-recognition due to credible allegations of systemic electoral fraud. With opposition parties boycotting parliament and protests erupting in Tbilisi and other main cities, the country faces a deepening legitimacy crisis. Observers report sophisticated manipulation tactics that altered the election outcome, undermining the will of a pro-European electorate. The European Parliament has responded by demanding a re-run of the elections under international supervision, EU sanctions against Georgia’s Prime Minister and top officials, and a shift in government policies to align with the country’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations. These developments mark a critical juncture for Georgia’s democratic future.
Mariam Chikhladze is an independent international consultant specializing in democratic elections, civil society development, and parliamentary and political party strengthening. She has extensive experience with USAID’s governance programs in Georgia, managing the parliamentary support portfolios. She has also contributed to UNDP’s key legislative strengthening project. Previously, Mariam worked with the International Republican Institute (IRI) on programs in Georgia and Armenia and on behalf of the Alliance of Democracies Foundation, facilitated the political parties’ pledge for election integrity in the 2020 parliamentary elections in Georgia. Earlier in her career, she managed the grassroots empowerment program of the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) in four regions of Georgia. Mariam Chikhladze holds a Master’s in Public Policy Analysis from the Bush School of Public Service and Government at Texas A&M University, awarded through the Fulbright Graduate Student Program. She also completed the Edmund Muskie Professional Fellowship at the Hudson Institute, in Washington, DC.
The 2024 constitutional referendum and presidential elections conducted in Moldova represented important milestones for the country’s democratic development and consolidating its resilience in front of aggressive outside interference.
In this policy alert, Petru Culeac examines the election outcomes, the key challenges encountered, and the urgent reforms needed to secure the integrity of the 2025 parliamentary elections. With Moldova’s democracy under increasing pressure from socio-economic disparities and hybrid threats, the author also outlines actionable recommendations for the EU to bolster the country’s democratic resilience in a tense regional security climate.
Petru Culeac is the co-founder and Executive Director of the Moldova Development Institute, a newly established organization dedicated to improving the social, political, and economic landscape in Moldova. With over 15 years of experience in Moldova’s non-pro!it sector, Petru has an in-depth understanding of the country’s context and its development agenda as well as extensive organizational management experience. Until 2023, Petru served as Executive Director of Soros Foundation Moldova, a renowned non-pro!it foundation, part of the Open Society Foundations network, recognized as a key civil society actor in the Republic of Moldova. Under Petru’s leadership, the foundation expanded its portfolio and successfully implemented numerous technical assistance projects, including for Moldovan authorities in areas such as anti-corruption, justice reform, elections, and education, as well as emergency response projects at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Previously, Petru worked in areas of democracy promotion, free and fair elections, local development, citizen engagement, and youth activism, successfully cooperating with local and international organizations, such as USAID, Chemonics, East Europe Foundation, and IFC. Petru’s academic background includes degrees in Business Management, and European and International Studies from institutions in Moldova, France, and the United States.
The Vot Corect Coalition published the monitoring report of the December 1 parliamentary elections.
The coalition consists of the Expert Forum, the Center for Civic Resources, Civica, the Center for the Study of Democracy, Radautiul Civic and the Electoral Observatory. Code for Romania ensures the development of the Vote Monitor smartphone application, with which we collect data on election day. In the Republic of Moldova, Vot Corect collaborated with Promo-LEX.
The election was effectively organized and voters’ fundamental rights were generally respected. However, the electoral competition was fundamentally affected by the results of the first round of the presidential elections. The process took place in a context of numerous disinformation or negative campaigns, which had a negative impact on the outcome of the parliamentary elections. The overlap of the elections and the decision of the Constitutional Court to recount the votes from the presidential elections distracted the public from the parliamentary elections and affected public confidence in the electoral process.
The transparency of the electoral process was reduced by the fact that the meetings of the Central Electoral Bureau (BEC) were not public. Its decisions (decizii/hotărâri) were generally published in due time, but, regrettably, the minutes of the meetings remained secret, and their publication was explicitly prohibited. Some of the decisions issued by the BEC, including the one related to the interpretation of the phrase parliamentary party, were contested, including by Vot Correct. The electoral administration generally managed the electoral process effectively.
The number of candidates increased compared to the previous elections. More than 50 lists were rejected by various constituency commissions because the candidates did not follow the administrative procedures or did not ensure the presence of both sexes on the candidate lists, as the law requires. The absence of some of the parties, including currently parliamentary ones, on the ballots in certain constituencies, as a result of the rejection of the candidacies, created confusion among some voters. The number of women on the lists increased compared to the previous elections, but few were placed in eligible positions. Data published by BEC about candidates is limited. The support signature verification process could not be observed, which limits transparency. The collection of signatures in electronic format was limited and only a few parties used this option. The lists of some parties, such as Noua Romania (for the out of country constituency), were rejected due to irregularities regarding the collected signatures. The integrity of the signature collection process remains in question, especially in the context where some competitors did not have any kind of visible signature collection campaign.
The overlapping of the two electoral campaigns and the results of the first round of voting significantly limited the visibility of the campaign for the parliamentary elections. This lacked visibility, and the conduct of the presidential elections confiscated the relevance of the debates for the parliamentary ones. Online campaigning continued to be intense and numerous cases where electoral propaganda was not declared as such were identified. The methods of outdoor promotion are very limited, which affects the voters’ right to information, and numerous violations of the legislation regarding the use of the electoral boards have been noted. Numerous actions to continue the electoral campaign were observed on the voting days and before the elections, including by candidates or their supporters with visibility, a fact that affected the integrity of the organization of the election day.
The transparency of campaign financing was reduced by the intermittent publication of data by the Permanent Electoral Authority (AEP), a fact criticized also in the case of the presidential elections. The lack of consistency in the publication of data denotes a lack of institutional transparency and limits the public’s understanding of how the electoral process was financed. Revenues of 250 million lei and expenses of 210 million lei were recorded, most of the funds (40%) being allocated for online promotion services. In addition to the officially declared expenses, indirect promotion through third parties was observed, such as Facebook pages close to parties that define themselves as publications. A small part of the parties’ contributions come from subsidies, i.e. 6.9 million lei, which indicates that they preferred to declare private funds that they can get reimbursed if they get 3% of the votes. It is unclear what the parties spend the subsidies on, which have reached a historic high this year, if they do not invest in political promotion in the middle of the election year. Between August and October, the parties spent 71 million lei on media and propaganda, which represents a third of the total campaign costs for the parliamentary elections. In fact, campaign costs are much higher than those formally declared for a campaign month, and political parties spend high sums of money in the months before the campaign on less transparent rules.
Election days were conducted in an orderly and calm manner, with few incidents reported by observers, and the turnout was 52.50%. The process was assessed positively by Vot Corect observers in almost 97% of the polling stations observed during the opening and voting and almost 95% of the polling stations observed during the vote counting. Observers reported a tense atmosphere during voting in 4.8% of cases and crowding in 15%. The polling station commissions did not understand well where voters can vote according to their domicile and residence in a worrying percentage of approximately 14%. When counting the votes, polling station commission presidents had difficulties filling in the protocols in 19.2% of the observed sections; in 14% the counting took place in a tense atmosphere. In a few cases observers were unjustifiably removed from polling stations, and some polling station commission took the abusive decision to allow observation only during voting and not during the counting of votes. The opening procedure was observed by Vot Corect in 183 precincts, the voting in 737, and the counting of votes in 204. Due to the fact that in some cases the observers did not answer all the questions on the forms, the statistical data do not always refer to the total number of sections observed.
The elections held on November 24 were competitive, and fundamental rights were generally respected. However, scheduling elections over three consecutive weeks failed to adequately separate the presidential elections from the parliamentary ones, leading to mutual influence between the two campaigns and creating significant organizational challenges. While electoral authorities generally managed the technical aspects of the process efficiently, the complexity caused by overlapping electoral periods proved difficult to handle. The electoral legislation lacked coherence in several stages of the process, and the insufficient regulation of certain situations further highlighted the urgent need for an Electoral Code. The results were surprising even for most high-profile political actors expected to reach the second round, as the visibility of candidate Călin Georgescu in the mainstream electoral landscape was very low. His campaign heavily relied on what was considered inauthentic promotion on TikTok and lacked proper funding, raising questions about its credibility.
The transparency of the electoral process was diminished by the Central Electoral Bureau’s decision to hold its meetings behind closed doors. While decisions and rulings were generally published promptly, it is regrettable that the minutes of these meetings remained confidential. Key information was primarily shared with the public through press releases. Several restrictive legal interpretations made by the bureau were contested, including by Vote Correct. In one instance, the Central Electoral Bureaus for the presidential and parliamentary elections interpreted the same legal procedures differently for each election. A restrictive decision by the bureau regarding the extension of voting hours on Saturday and Sunday was overturned in court on Friday—after overseas voting had already begun. This unprecedented situation resulted in voting rules being changed mid-process, further complicating the elections.
The arbitrary rejection of a candidacy by the Constitutional Court, citing reasons seemingly applicable to other candidates who remained in the race, and without allowing the rejected candidate to present her arguments, negatively impacted the inclusiveness of the candidate registration process and set a dangerous precedent. Additionally, public trust in the process was diminished by the widespread perception that this action aimed to favor another candidate with a similar electoral message. Concerns were also raised about the authenticity of signature collections for certain candidates who neither organized visible campaigns to gather these signatures nor appeared to have significant public support. Vote Corect could not observe the verification process for signatures at the Central Electoral Bureau (BEC) because it was not public, reducing transparency.
The overlap of the two electoral campaigns significantly limited the visibility of the parliamentary election campaign. Similarly, the presidential campaign lacked dynamism, with few meaningful debates. Controversies regarding the integrity of several candidates overshadowed discussions about candidates’ policies. Online promotion was heavily used, with unmarked propaganda actions—mainly on TikTok—becoming a notable feature. Public institutions failed to effectively counter campaigns that appeared to breach election and campaign financing laws. A lack of visible street-level campaigning during the official period, contrasted with significant expenditures on promotion outside this timeframe, reduced the effectiveness of campaign messaging and favored ruling parties. Excessively restrictive rules on street advertising (e.g., billboards) were noted, alongside numerous violations of campaign laws. Cases of continued campaigning on the Saturday before and even on election day were reported. Authorities were slow to act in instances where high-profile public figures continued campaigning, though private individuals faced sanctions for social media posts expressing political preferences, raising concerns about voter intimidation and unjustified interventions.
Campaign financing transparency was hindered by the Permanent Electoral Authority’s (AEP) failure to publish updates on candidates’ revenues and expenditures after November 8, without explanation. Data eventually published on November 25 revealed that one candidate, Călin Georgescu, reported neither income nor expenses, which appears implausible and raises questions about the accuracy of the declaration. The AEP was urged to conduct an urgent investigation, and ANCOM was called upon to investigate the TikTok campaign linked to Georgescu in collaboration with the European Commission. The persistent use of public subsidies for media and propaganda gave an advantage to parties benefiting from state funds well before the campaign officially began. Additionally, undeclared campaign financing was identified, including cases of Facebook Ads run by pages affiliated with political parties and indirect promotion of candidates through influencers, podcasts, or artists, with unclear contractual arrangements for these services.
Election days proceeded in an orderly and generally calm atmosphere, with voter turnout at 52.55%. Vot Corect observers positively evaluated the process in 97% of polling stations during opening and voting, and in 95% during the vote count. However, observers reported crowding in 22% of polling stations visited, tension in 4%, and the presence of unauthorized individuals in 5%. Although intentional falsification of results was observed in only two cases during the vote count, the process took place in a tense atmosphere in 14% of observed polling stations, and polling station presidents encountered difficulties completing protocols in 11% of cases. Numerous calls to the election day call center revealed that some voters in Bucharest were improperly denied the right to vote in the local referendum due to residency restrictions.
Following election day, Expert Forum filed a complaint requesting that the AEP investigate the campaign financing of Călin Georgescu and provide citizens with the necessary information to do the same. Shortly after, the website www.expertforum.ro suffered DDoS (distributed denial-of-service) attacks, a serious incident that raised additional concerns.
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