Context, analysis, and recommendations by Łukasz Kondraciuk, Stefanie Schiffer
Russia’s local elections in September 2024, concentrated on the so-called Single Voting Day, were marked by unprecedented restrictions on independent opposition, media, and election observers. To legitimize the elected politicians in the eyes of the Russian voters and international audiences, the Russian Central Election Commission invited multiple representatives of state election commissions to Moscow and St. Petersburg. All of them misused the authority of their institutions to lend legitimacy to these fraudulent elections.
Our research shows that the Kremlin increasingly targets election commissions from the Global South, strategically leveraging their participation to craft an image of broad international approval. By co-opting officials from these nations—often under the guise of technical exchanges or observer invitations—the Kremlin manipulates their credibility to validate undemocratic practices. These tactics undermine the integrity of these institutions and aim to shield Russia’s electoral malpractice from global scrutiny.
EPDE proposes several calls to action to discourage the continued participation of fake observers, to protect the integrity of the institutions they represent in the Russian public, and to hold individuals accountable for undermining democratic processes:
Our report and our fake observers database provide a valuable resource for journalists, researchers, and advocacy groups seeking to understand electoral disinformation tactics, networks of malign influence, and learn more about our recommendations for democratic safeguards.
Get in touch with Lukasz Kondraciuk, Head of Electoral Integrity at EPDE, via email: kondraciuk@european-exchange.org
Georgia’s October 2024 parliamentary elections, which saw the ruling Georgian Dream party secure a fourth term, have sparked widespread domestic and international non-recognition due to credible allegations of systemic electoral fraud. With opposition parties boycotting parliament and protests erupting in Tbilisi and other main cities, the country faces a deepening legitimacy crisis. Observers report sophisticated manipulation tactics that altered the election outcome, undermining the will of a pro-European electorate. The European Parliament has responded by demanding a re-run of the elections under international supervision, EU sanctions against Georgia’s Prime Minister and top officials, and a shift in government policies to align with the country’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations. These developments mark a critical juncture for Georgia’s democratic future.
Mariam Chikhladze is an independent international consultant specializing in democratic elections, civil society development, and parliamentary and political party strengthening. She has extensive experience with USAID’s governance programs in Georgia, managing the parliamentary support portfolios. She has also contributed to UNDP’s key legislative strengthening project. Previously, Mariam worked with the International Republican Institute (IRI) on programs in Georgia and Armenia and on behalf of the Alliance of Democracies Foundation, facilitated the political parties’ pledge for election integrity in the 2020 parliamentary elections in Georgia. Earlier in her career, she managed the grassroots empowerment program of the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) in four regions of Georgia. Mariam Chikhladze holds a Master’s in Public Policy Analysis from the Bush School of Public Service and Government at Texas A&M University, awarded through the Fulbright Graduate Student Program. She also completed the Edmund Muskie Professional Fellowship at the Hudson Institute, in Washington, DC.
The 2024 constitutional referendum and presidential elections conducted in Moldova represented important milestones for the country’s democratic development and consolidating its resilience in front of aggressive outside interference.
In this policy alert, Petru Culeac examines the election outcomes, the key challenges encountered, and the urgent reforms needed to secure the integrity of the 2025 parliamentary elections. With Moldova’s democracy under increasing pressure from socio-economic disparities and hybrid threats, the author also outlines actionable recommendations for the EU to bolster the country’s democratic resilience in a tense regional security climate.
Petru Culeac is the co-founder and Executive Director of the Moldova Development Institute, a newly established organization dedicated to improving the social, political, and economic landscape in Moldova. With over 15 years of experience in Moldova’s non-pro!it sector, Petru has an in-depth understanding of the country’s context and its development agenda as well as extensive organizational management experience. Until 2023, Petru served as Executive Director of Soros Foundation Moldova, a renowned non-pro!it foundation, part of the Open Society Foundations network, recognized as a key civil society actor in the Republic of Moldova. Under Petru’s leadership, the foundation expanded its portfolio and successfully implemented numerous technical assistance projects, including for Moldovan authorities in areas such as anti-corruption, justice reform, elections, and education, as well as emergency response projects at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Previously, Petru worked in areas of democracy promotion, free and fair elections, local development, citizen engagement, and youth activism, successfully cooperating with local and international organizations, such as USAID, Chemonics, East Europe Foundation, and IFC. Petru’s academic background includes degrees in Business Management, and European and International Studies from institutions in Moldova, France, and the United States.
The Vot Corect Coalition published the monitoring report of the December 1 parliamentary elections.
The coalition consists of the Expert Forum, the Center for Civic Resources, Civica, the Center for the Study of Democracy, Radautiul Civic and the Electoral Observatory. Code for Romania ensures the development of the Vote Monitor smartphone application, with which we collect data on election day. In the Republic of Moldova, Vot Corect collaborated with Promo-LEX.
The election was effectively organized and voters’ fundamental rights were generally respected. However, the electoral competition was fundamentally affected by the results of the first round of the presidential elections. The process took place in a context of numerous disinformation or negative campaigns, which had a negative impact on the outcome of the parliamentary elections. The overlap of the elections and the decision of the Constitutional Court to recount the votes from the presidential elections distracted the public from the parliamentary elections and affected public confidence in the electoral process.
The transparency of the electoral process was reduced by the fact that the meetings of the Central Electoral Bureau (BEC) were not public. Its decisions (decizii/hotărâri) were generally published in due time, but, regrettably, the minutes of the meetings remained secret, and their publication was explicitly prohibited. Some of the decisions issued by the BEC, including the one related to the interpretation of the phrase parliamentary party, were contested, including by Vot Correct. The electoral administration generally managed the electoral process effectively.
The number of candidates increased compared to the previous elections. More than 50 lists were rejected by various constituency commissions because the candidates did not follow the administrative procedures or did not ensure the presence of both sexes on the candidate lists, as the law requires. The absence of some of the parties, including currently parliamentary ones, on the ballots in certain constituencies, as a result of the rejection of the candidacies, created confusion among some voters. The number of women on the lists increased compared to the previous elections, but few were placed in eligible positions. Data published by BEC about candidates is limited. The support signature verification process could not be observed, which limits transparency. The collection of signatures in electronic format was limited and only a few parties used this option. The lists of some parties, such as Noua Romania (for the out of country constituency), were rejected due to irregularities regarding the collected signatures. The integrity of the signature collection process remains in question, especially in the context where some competitors did not have any kind of visible signature collection campaign.
The overlapping of the two electoral campaigns and the results of the first round of voting significantly limited the visibility of the campaign for the parliamentary elections. This lacked visibility, and the conduct of the presidential elections confiscated the relevance of the debates for the parliamentary ones. Online campaigning continued to be intense and numerous cases where electoral propaganda was not declared as such were identified. The methods of outdoor promotion are very limited, which affects the voters’ right to information, and numerous violations of the legislation regarding the use of the electoral boards have been noted. Numerous actions to continue the electoral campaign were observed on the voting days and before the elections, including by candidates or their supporters with visibility, a fact that affected the integrity of the organization of the election day.
The transparency of campaign financing was reduced by the intermittent publication of data by the Permanent Electoral Authority (AEP), a fact criticized also in the case of the presidential elections. The lack of consistency in the publication of data denotes a lack of institutional transparency and limits the public’s understanding of how the electoral process was financed. Revenues of 250 million lei and expenses of 210 million lei were recorded, most of the funds (40%) being allocated for online promotion services. In addition to the officially declared expenses, indirect promotion through third parties was observed, such as Facebook pages close to parties that define themselves as publications. A small part of the parties’ contributions come from subsidies, i.e. 6.9 million lei, which indicates that they preferred to declare private funds that they can get reimbursed if they get 3% of the votes. It is unclear what the parties spend the subsidies on, which have reached a historic high this year, if they do not invest in political promotion in the middle of the election year. Between August and October, the parties spent 71 million lei on media and propaganda, which represents a third of the total campaign costs for the parliamentary elections. In fact, campaign costs are much higher than those formally declared for a campaign month, and political parties spend high sums of money in the months before the campaign on less transparent rules.
Election days were conducted in an orderly and calm manner, with few incidents reported by observers, and the turnout was 52.50%. The process was assessed positively by Vot Corect observers in almost 97% of the polling stations observed during the opening and voting and almost 95% of the polling stations observed during the vote counting. Observers reported a tense atmosphere during voting in 4.8% of cases and crowding in 15%. The polling station commissions did not understand well where voters can vote according to their domicile and residence in a worrying percentage of approximately 14%. When counting the votes, polling station commission presidents had difficulties filling in the protocols in 19.2% of the observed sections; in 14% the counting took place in a tense atmosphere. In a few cases observers were unjustifiably removed from polling stations, and some polling station commission took the abusive decision to allow observation only during voting and not during the counting of votes. The opening procedure was observed by Vot Corect in 183 precincts, the voting in 737, and the counting of votes in 204. Due to the fact that in some cases the observers did not answer all the questions on the forms, the statistical data do not always refer to the total number of sections observed.
The elections held on November 24 were competitive, and fundamental rights were generally respected. However, scheduling elections over three consecutive weeks failed to adequately separate the presidential elections from the parliamentary ones, leading to mutual influence between the two campaigns and creating significant organizational challenges. While electoral authorities generally managed the technical aspects of the process efficiently, the complexity caused by overlapping electoral periods proved difficult to handle. The electoral legislation lacked coherence in several stages of the process, and the insufficient regulation of certain situations further highlighted the urgent need for an Electoral Code. The results were surprising even for most high-profile political actors expected to reach the second round, as the visibility of candidate Călin Georgescu in the mainstream electoral landscape was very low. His campaign heavily relied on what was considered inauthentic promotion on TikTok and lacked proper funding, raising questions about its credibility.
The transparency of the electoral process was diminished by the Central Electoral Bureau’s decision to hold its meetings behind closed doors. While decisions and rulings were generally published promptly, it is regrettable that the minutes of these meetings remained confidential. Key information was primarily shared with the public through press releases. Several restrictive legal interpretations made by the bureau were contested, including by Vote Correct. In one instance, the Central Electoral Bureaus for the presidential and parliamentary elections interpreted the same legal procedures differently for each election. A restrictive decision by the bureau regarding the extension of voting hours on Saturday and Sunday was overturned in court on Friday—after overseas voting had already begun. This unprecedented situation resulted in voting rules being changed mid-process, further complicating the elections.
The arbitrary rejection of a candidacy by the Constitutional Court, citing reasons seemingly applicable to other candidates who remained in the race, and without allowing the rejected candidate to present her arguments, negatively impacted the inclusiveness of the candidate registration process and set a dangerous precedent. Additionally, public trust in the process was diminished by the widespread perception that this action aimed to favor another candidate with a similar electoral message. Concerns were also raised about the authenticity of signature collections for certain candidates who neither organized visible campaigns to gather these signatures nor appeared to have significant public support. Vote Corect could not observe the verification process for signatures at the Central Electoral Bureau (BEC) because it was not public, reducing transparency.
The overlap of the two electoral campaigns significantly limited the visibility of the parliamentary election campaign. Similarly, the presidential campaign lacked dynamism, with few meaningful debates. Controversies regarding the integrity of several candidates overshadowed discussions about candidates’ policies. Online promotion was heavily used, with unmarked propaganda actions—mainly on TikTok—becoming a notable feature. Public institutions failed to effectively counter campaigns that appeared to breach election and campaign financing laws. A lack of visible street-level campaigning during the official period, contrasted with significant expenditures on promotion outside this timeframe, reduced the effectiveness of campaign messaging and favored ruling parties. Excessively restrictive rules on street advertising (e.g., billboards) were noted, alongside numerous violations of campaign laws. Cases of continued campaigning on the Saturday before and even on election day were reported. Authorities were slow to act in instances where high-profile public figures continued campaigning, though private individuals faced sanctions for social media posts expressing political preferences, raising concerns about voter intimidation and unjustified interventions.
Campaign financing transparency was hindered by the Permanent Electoral Authority’s (AEP) failure to publish updates on candidates’ revenues and expenditures after November 8, without explanation. Data eventually published on November 25 revealed that one candidate, Călin Georgescu, reported neither income nor expenses, which appears implausible and raises questions about the accuracy of the declaration. The AEP was urged to conduct an urgent investigation, and ANCOM was called upon to investigate the TikTok campaign linked to Georgescu in collaboration with the European Commission. The persistent use of public subsidies for media and propaganda gave an advantage to parties benefiting from state funds well before the campaign officially began. Additionally, undeclared campaign financing was identified, including cases of Facebook Ads run by pages affiliated with political parties and indirect promotion of candidates through influencers, podcasts, or artists, with unclear contractual arrangements for these services.
Election days proceeded in an orderly and generally calm atmosphere, with voter turnout at 52.55%. Vot Corect observers positively evaluated the process in 97% of polling stations during opening and voting, and in 95% during the vote count. However, observers reported crowding in 22% of polling stations visited, tension in 4%, and the presence of unauthorized individuals in 5%. Although intentional falsification of results was observed in only two cases during the vote count, the process took place in a tense atmosphere in 14% of observed polling stations, and polling station presidents encountered difficulties completing protocols in 11% of cases. Numerous calls to the election day call center revealed that some voters in Bucharest were improperly denied the right to vote in the local referendum due to residency restrictions.
Following election day, Expert Forum filed a complaint requesting that the AEP investigate the campaign financing of Călin Georgescu and provide citizens with the necessary information to do the same. Shortly after, the website www.expertforum.ro suffered DDoS (distributed denial-of-service) attacks, a serious incident that raised additional concerns.
The general conditions and the actual procedure of the formation of territorial election commissions (TECs), which are an important mechanism of the electoral process, demonstrate the state dirigisme of all electoral processes with the imitation of the active participation of civil society, which gives the current executive power full control over the formed commissions.
The formation of territorial election commissions takes place in the conditions when among the two main actors of civil society – political parties and other public associations – there are no organizations that could show independent initiative. The “labor collectives” inherited from the Soviet times are not political subjects, and the electoral processes on their behalf are organized by administrative methods. Citizens, who have the right to participate in the formation of territorial election commissions, are intimidated by the general atmosphere of terror; those who have been active in previous election cycles are subjected to preventive repression.
The possibilities of public control, independent observation of the process of formation of the territorial election commissions are not only reduced to zero, but they are persecuted activity.
In favor of the administrative-command management of the whole process is also the general rush: 1,725 people were allegedly nominated by parties, public associations, labor collectives and citizens in just one week in the number necessary to form virtually all commissions with the maximum number of members.
At the same time, the informing of citizens about the possibility of nomination, as in the previous campaign of 2024, was minimal, which allows us to conclude that the authorities were not interested in the active participation of voters in the formation of territorial election commissions and predetermined decisions on their composition.
Only minimal information is available to the public, both about the opportunities for nomination to the territorial election commissions and about the meetings of the bodies forming the commissions, as well as their results: the process of holding meetings remained non-transparent and non-competitive. The lists of names of members of the commissions have still not been published.
The four largest public associations (BRSM, Belaya Rus, Union of Women, Union of Veterans, Fund for Peace), which have legislatively established special relations with the state since 2023, and the trade unions, which are members of the FPB, remain the main source of the clerks, ensuring the conduct of elections* at the level of territorial election commissions (in addition to four political parties remaining after re-registration, all of which support the course of the current government). The percentage of “acceptability” of candidates from these pro-government parties and public associations imitating civil society, which together make up 63% of the composition of all commissions, tends to 100%.
Thus, given the general atmosphere of intimidation, the lack of effective information and the extremely tight deadlines, it can be said that active citizens did not really have the opportunity to nominate their representatives to the TECs. The goal of the TEC formation phase was rather the opposite: to conduct it as quickly and quietly as possible.
The expert elections*2025 monitoring mission was organized by the Belarusian Helsinki Committee and the Viasna Human Rights Center as part of the “Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections” campaign. The mission collects and analyzes information about the election campaign based on open sources and messages from voters from Belarus.
The October 26, 2024, parliamentary election in Georgia displayed multiple, well-documented irregularities identified by three independent domestic election observation missions—ISFED, MyVote, and GYLA—whose combined 3,500+ observers reported widespread, systematic violations that cast serious doubt on the election’s legitimacy. The observer coalition published a detailed analysis of their findings, which reveal a consistent pattern of manipulation that suggests the election was rigged to favor the ruling party.
Our latest report reveals how representatives from both democratic and autocratic states helped Aliyev’s regime create an image of international and domestic legitimacy around Azerbaijan’s fraudulent 2024 snap parliamentary election.
On September 1, 2024, the New Azerbaijan Party, led by President Ilham Aliyev, claimed a narrow victory in Azerbaijan’s snap parliamentary election. Although voting day itself was peaceful, the election process was far from democratic. Civil society and independent journalists faced harassment, forced emigration, and arrests throughout the campaign, while both international and domestic observers reported widespread electoral manipulation.
To create the illusion of credible international oversight, the Aliyev regime invited several hundred international observers to the election. Fewer than half of these observers met international standards for election monitoring. The others, despite clear evidence of widespread electoral manipulation, publicly endorsed the election as meeting “high standards,” lending unwarranted legitimacy to a fraudulent practice.
Key findings:
– 107 fake observers identified: Our report lists 107 individuals, including elected or appointed representatives from democratic countries who falsely validated the electoral process
– Election Commissioners as fake observers: We observed an unprecedented increase in involving election administration members in fraudulent observation efforts. We identified officials from Central Election Commissions (CEC) from ten internationally recognized states lending legitimacy to Azerbaijan’s sham elections.
– Trend of Collusion with Autocrats: This troubling trend of CEC representatives as “fake observers” extends beyond Azerbaijan. Our preliminary findings indicate similar patterns in Russia’s 2024 “Single Voting Day” (report forthcoming), highlighting an urgent need to rework the code of conduct of election commissions worldwide to prevent the discrediting of the institutions they represent.
In the context of fake observers coming to legitimize elections in Azerbaijan, EPDE proposes several calls to action to discourage the participation of fake observers, increase transparency, and hold individuals and organizations accountable for undermining democratic processes and discrediting the integrity of the democratic institutions and democratic governments they represent:
1. EPDE calls on international organizations, political parties, and media outlets to regularly check EPDE’s list of fake observers at fakeobservers.org. Our database aims to deter participation by those who, for whatever reason or gain – blackmail, financial, or pure naivety – legitimize undemocratic elections.
2. EPDE calls on key democratic institutions, such as the European Union, U.S. Congress, or the Council of Europe, to publicly denounce and condemn participation in fake observation missions as harmful to global democratic standards. EPDE calls on democratic governments and international organizations to strengthen the diplomatic and political pressure on Azerbaijan to ensure they only invite credible and impartial election observers from organizations complying with international standards of election observation, such as OSCE/ ODIHR, OSCE PA, or the PACE.
3. The EU and other democratic countries should impose targeted sanctions or legal measures against third-country nationals participating in fake observation missions. Such measures could include travel bans, asset freezes, or bans on representing their countries in bilateral and multilateral engagements. This includes exclusion from conferences, academic exchanges, and any form of international cooperation based in the EU or other democratic na- tions.
4. EPDE encourages media outlets globally to raise awareness and educate citizens about the dangers of fake election observation and the role certain individuals play in legitimizing fraudulent elections abroad to reduce their credibility and discourage others from par- ticipating.
5. EPDE urges election monitoring bodies and domestic election commissions globally to adopt stricter transparency measures. These should include publishing a complete, detailed list of all observers, their affiliations, and their observation experience to simplify the identification and discreditation of election observers.
6. Additionally, EPDE calls on institutions and national and regional parliaments to establish and implement laws and clear ethical guidelines for individuals, particularly elected officials, participating in election observation missions. These guidelines should emphasize impartiality and non-alignment with authoritarian regimes. EPDE stresses that violating these guidelines should lead to exclusion from future international democratic election observation missions.
7. Finally, EPDE calls on democratic countries and institutions to introduce career and financial disincentives for individuals participating in these activities, such as barring them from holding positions in publicly funded democratic organizations, NGOs, or international bodies.
Our report and our fake observers database provide a valuable resource for journalists, researchers, and advocacy groups seeking to understand electoral disinformation tactics, networks of malign influence, and learn more about our recommendations for democratic safeguards.
Get in touch with Lukasz Kondraciuk, Head of Electoral Integrity at EPDE, via email: kondraciuk@european-exchange.org
The next, seventh, presidential elections* in Belarus have been scheduled by the House of Representatives for January 26, 2025, amid a deep human rights crisis caused by repression following peaceful protests against fraud in the 2020 presidential elections. This repression persists and even intensifies to this day: the authorities continue to arbitrarily persecute candidates, members of campaign teams and initiative groups, observers, activists and simply concerned citizens who have supported the nomination of independent candidates with their signatures. The discriminatory rhetoric of the authorities, who have declared people who do not share pro-government narratives as “enemies”, persists and intensifies.
By suddenly calling elections* six months before the expected date and leaving 95 days for the entire procedure, the authorities once again instrumentalized electoral procedures, adjusting the election date to political objectives, thereby violating electoral legislation from the point of view of equality of opportunity for candidates and the principle of election predictability stipulated by international electoral standards.
Conducting a free and open election campaign is impossible in a situation of ongoing political terror: the list of political prisoners is updated weekly and there are consistently more than 1,300 people in it. The information space has been entirely purged; nearly all independent media outlets have been forced out of the country, and the distribution of their materials from abroad is severely hindered by politically motivated misuse of anti-extremist legislation. The “state ideology” serves the cult of authoritarian rule of A. Lukashenka. There is no recognition of the importance of political pluralism in the public field.
The incredible pressure on civil society organizations, especially human rights organizations, and their widespread liquidation exclude civilian control over the conduct of elections. There is no independent civilian monitoring of the elections within the country; at the moment, only the politically biased international election observers are invited.
In such conditions, it can be ascertained that it is impossible for citizens to exercise their electoral rights freely.
The expert elections*2025 monitoring mission was organized by the Belarusian Helsinki Committee and the Viasna Human Rights Center as part of the “Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections” campaign. The mission collects and analyzes information about the election campaign based on open sources and messages from voters from Belarus.
On November 3, 2024, the day of the Presidential Elections (second round of elections) the Promo-LEX Observation Mission (OM) deployed short-term observers (STOs) to 614 polling stations, selected based on a sample provided by a sociological firm. Furthermore, a static observer was assigned to each of the 30 polling stations designated for voters from the Transnistrian region.
Particular attention was given to polling stations abroad, with 90 static observers deployed to monitor these locations.
In addition to the static observers, the Promo-LEX Observation Mission deployed 89 mobile teams to monitor the electoral process in polling stations not covered by the sample. These mobile teams also assessed accessibility to the polling stations, including those where voters from the Transnistrian region cast their ballots.
After processing all alert reports submitted by observers, the Promo-LEX Observation Mission identified a total of 791 incidents during the election day.
As Georgia gears up for its parliamentary elections on October 26, 2024, opposition parties are consolidating their efforts into coalitions with the objective of displacing the ruling party. These coalitions are fueled by concerns that the current government is jeopardizing the nation’s European Union integration by enacting anti-democratic laws and promoting anti-Western sentiments.
This election presents a pivotal chance for the opposition leading to the formation of four significant electoral alliances. They are framing the elections as a referendum on the critical choice between aligning with Europe or falling under Russian influence.
In light of the “Georgian Dream” government’s controversial adoption of the Transparency of Foreign Influence Law, which has faced widespread public and international backlash, the opposition has united around the imperative to protect Georgia’s European path. President Salome Zurabishvili has introduced the “Georgian Charter,” a comprehensive reform agenda aimed at accelerating EU integration, binding signatory parties to implement democratic reforms within a year of the elections.
While there is broad agreement on the reform agenda, analysts remain cautious about the opposition’s genuine commitment due to their history of fragmentation. Each coalition/Party – Unity Coalition, Coalition for Change, Coalition Strong Georgia, and For Georgia – brings distinct strengths and challenges, with varying strategies for EU alignment and democratic reforms.
Ultimately, these elections will serve as a critical litmus test for the opposition’s ability to forge a successful governing coalition and fulfill their mandate for EU integration, potentially reshaping Georgia’s political landscape and its future direction toward Europe.
Mariam Chikhladze is an independent international consultant specializing in democratic elections, civil society development, and parliamentary and political party strengthening. She has extensive experience with USAID’s governance programs in Georgia, managing the parliamentary support portfolios. She has also contributed to UNDP’s key legislative strengthening project. Previously, Mariam worked with the International Republican Institute (IRI) on programs in Georgia and Armenia and on behalf of the Alliance of Democracies Foundation, facilitated the political parties’ pledge for election integrity in the 2020 parliamentary elections in Georgia. Earlier in her career, she managed the grassroots empowerment program of the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) in four regions of Georgia. Mariam Chikhladze holds a Master’s in Public Policy Analysis from the Bush School of Public Service and Government at Texas A&M University, awarded through the Fulbright Graduate Student Program. She also completed the Edmund Muskie Professional Fellowship at the Hudson Institute, in Washington, DC.
On August 20, 2024, Georgian Dream (GD), the ruling party of Georgia, announced an anti-democratic, anti-liberal agenda for the upcoming October 26 elections. The party aims to secure a constitutional majority to pursue four key initiatives: banning political opposition, cracking down on “gay propaganda,” revising the governance system, and enhancing the Georgian Orthodox Church’s role in the constitution.
GD plans to outlaw major opposition parties accusing them of destabilizing the government. This message seems intended to intensify political polarization in Georgian society. Additionally, GD has adopted alarmingly anti-liberal legislation to restrict LGBTQ+ freedoms and rights and is pushing for constitutional amendment to enshrine so-called “traditional family values”.
The party also proposes revising the governance system to address hypothetical scenarios of territorial restoration, a proposal that appears politically unfeasible and aimed at stoking nationalist sentiments. Furthermore, GD seeks to elevate the Orthodox Church’s constitutional status, but this proposal has met resistance from the Church, due to concerns about losing power.
GD’s campaign frames the election as a choice between stability and chaos, traditional values and moral decay, and sovereignty versus external dependence. GD’s campaign rhetoric deepens polarization domestically, alienates Georgia’s allies, and undermines the country’s progress on its path to EU integration.
Mariam Chikhladze is an independent international consultant specializing in democratic elections, civil society development, and parliamentary and political party strengthening. She has extensive experience with USAID’s governance programs in Georgia, managing the parliamentary support portfolios. She has also contributed to UNDP’s key legislative strengthening project. Previously, Mariam worked with the International Republican Institute (IRI) on programs in Georgia and Armenia and on behalf of the Alliance of Democracies Foundation, facilitated the political parties’ pledge for election integrity in the 2020 parliamentary elections in Georgia. Earlier in her career, she managed the grassroots empowerment program of the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) in four regions of Georgia. Mariam Chikhladze holds a Master’s in Public Policy Analysis from the Bush School of Public Service and Government at Texas A&M University, awarded through the Fulbright Graduate Student Program. She also completed the Edmund Muskie Professional Fellowship at the Hudson Institute, in Washington, DC.
On October 20, 2024, the day of the Presidential Elections and the Republican Constitutional Referendum, the Promo-LEX Observation Mission (OM) deployed short-term observers (STOs) to 614 polling stations, selected based on a sample provided by a sociological firm. Furthermore, a static observer was assigned to each of the 30 polling stations designated for voters from the Transnistrian region.
Particular attention was given to polling stations abroad, with 91 static observers deployed to monitor these locations.
In addition to the static observers, the Promo-LEX Observation Mission deployed 89 mobile teams to monitor the electoral process in polling stations not covered by the sample. These mobile teams also assessed accessibility to the polling stations, including those where voters from the Transnistrian region cast their ballots.
After processing all alert reports submitted by observers, the Promo-LEX Observation Mission identified a total of 778 incidents during the election day.
Promo-LEX Association presented today the fourth report of the Observation Mission (OM) of the Presidential Elections and the Republican Constitutional Referendum from 20 October, covering the findings in the period 1 October – 15 October. The report mainly reflects the last two weeks of the electoral campaign, the legal framework relevant to the electoral process, the performance of electoral competitors, as well as the work of electoral bodies in preparation for the 20 October elections.
Legal framework. In the observation process, OM noted concerns regarding the application of legal rules on passive and active electoral corruption. However, based on the announcement by the authorities of more than 100 minutes reports on passive electoral bribery, OM finds that there is no information on the initiation of criminal proceedings, including for electoral corruption. Promo-LEX recommends that the prosecution body takes all the necessary steps to eradicate the phenomenon of electoral corruption as a whole and not only in part.
Promo-LEX has also laid down several legal arguments showing that the electoral activity of PB Victorie (Victory) cannot be disguised under paid service and volunteer contracts, as allegedly claimed.
Performance of electoral competitors. During the monitored period, Promo-LEX observers identified 1,799 activities carried out by candidates and referendum participants, with a significant number of events organized by PAS and Maia Sandu (615 activities), while other candidates – Alexandr Stoianoglo (PSRM) and Renato Usatii (PN) – reported 329 and 223 activities, respectively. Electoral campaigning activities included distribution of information materials, meetings with voters and electoral debates.
As regards electoral advertising, Promo-LEX reported 5,073 cases of various forms of advertising, the most common being printed materials (30%) and sponsored advertising (24%).
As for the activities carried out by PR/PB Victorie (Victory), it should be recalled that only PR is registered as a referendum participant. However, it was found that the organizers of the electoral events belong to all the component parties of PB Victorie (Victory), and the promotional materials used (bags, t-shirts, LED billboards with the inscription ‘Victorie’) come mainly from PB Victorie (Victory). Thus, the electoral promotion of the referendum is de facto carried out by the same bloc whose registration was refused by the CEC.
Misuse of administrative resources was found in 114 cases, most of them related to the Action and Solidarity Party (PAS) and Maia Sandu (105 cases). Several public officials were involved in the campaign activities, in particular by the Action and Solidarity Party (PAS). Prime Minister Dorin Recean held meetings with voters, where he discussed European integration projects and encouraged support for Maia Sandu. Several ministers were also involved in the electoral campaign, distributing promotional materials in support of Maia Sandu and the ‚YES’ option in the referendum.
Also, cases of using state institutions to accumulate electoral capital, involvement of civil servants in electoral activities during working hours, as well as crediting candidates for public works carried out with public funds were observed.
Involvement of religious denominations in electoral campaigns. Promo-LEX reported 5 other cases in which members of religious denominations were involved in electoral campaigning activities, supporting candidates and using the image of religious buildings in electoral promotional materials. As a reminder, church involvement in electoral processes is forbidden.
Activities with potential for corruption. During the monitored period a number of activities was identified, including the offering of money and goods to influence voting. In several cases PB Victorie (Victory) is involved, which organized events announcing certain benefits for Moldovan citizens living in Russia, as well as electoral meetings with rewards. Victoria Furtună has also been involved in cases of coordinated electoral meetings, which raise suspicions that voters were paid to participate in them.
Electoral competitors’ revenues and expenditures: Between 20 September and 13 October, the total revenues reported by the 11 presidential competitors amounted to approximately 27.8 million MDL, which came mostly from donations from individuals and transfers from party accounts. As for expenditures, they amounted to about 24.7 million MDL, most of which were spent on advertising and promotional materials.
Expenditures estimated by Promo-LEX. The civic monitoring of electoral campaign financing was conducted from 20 September to 13 October 2024 by estimating the expenditures of electoral competitors and comparing them with the amounts declared to the Central Electoral Commission (CEC). Estimates for unreported expenditures include rewards for volunteers and campaigners, promotional materials, social media advertising and event organization. In the presidential elections, unreported expenditures amounted to at least 4,066,387 MDL, the majority of which were related to promotional materials (81%). For the referendum, unreported expenditures of 4,675,512 MDL were estimated, with a similar focus on promotional materials (64%) and social media advertising (16%).
Hate speech and incitement to discrimination. Between 23 September and 6 October 2024, 23 cases of hate speech were identified, 19 of them in an electoral context. These occurred predominantly via mobile apps and at public events, most often based on criteria such as ‘sexual orientation/gender identity’ and ‚health’.
The Observation Mission is financially supported by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the European Union and the German Marshall Fund of the USA, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the International Organization of Francophonie, and Soros Foundation Moldova. The Observation Mission is carried out under the aegis of the Civic Coalition for Free and Fair Elections.
On October 20, 2024, Moldova will not only hold its presidential elections and a Constitutional Referendum but will also face a critical test of its resilience against hybrid threats. With the Kremlin opposing Moldova’s EU accession goals, the election period is vulnerable to disinformation, propaganda, and covert provocations.
In this second Moldova Policy Alert, Petru Culeac examines the challenges posed by foreign interference, including the impact of Russian-funded media, and explores how recent legislative and institutional reforms aim to safeguard Moldova’s democratic integrity.
Petru Culeac is the co-founder and Executive Director of the Moldova Development Institute, a newly established organization dedicated to improving the social, political, and economic landscape in Moldova. With over 15 years of experience in Moldova’s non-pro!it sector, Petru has an in-depth understanding of the country’s context and its development agenda as well as extensive organizational management experience. Until 2023, Petru served as Executive Director of Soros Foundation Moldova, a renowned non-pro!it foundation, part of the Open Society Foundations network, recognized as a key civil society actor in the Republic of Moldova. Under Petru’s leadership, the foundation expanded its portfolio and successfully implemented numerous technical assistance projects, including for Moldovan authorities in areas such as anti-corruption, justice reform, elections, and education, as well as emergency response projects at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Previously, Petru worked in areas of democracy promotion, free and fair elections, local development, citizen engagement, and youth activism, successfully cooperating with local and international organizations, such as USAID, Chemonics, East Europe Foundation, and IFC. Petru’s academic background includes degrees in Business Management, and European and International Studies from institutions in Moldova, France, and the United States.
Introduction
The next parliamentary elections in Georgia will be held on October 26, 2024. For the first time in the country’s history, Georgian citizens will elect the highest representative body through a proportional electoral system, which will play a decisive role in the composition of the government, along with the election of the President of Georgia. The change in the electoral system, which has the potential to fundamentally affect the development of the party and the political system in general, has already led to significant changes in party politics and is likely to influence voter behavior as well. At the same time, the main political unions consider the upcoming elections to be crucial for the country’s future.
According to Georgian legislation, the official pre-election period began 60 days before the election day, on August 27. The International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (hereinafter “ISFED”) commenced its monitoring of pre-election processes across the country, in 73 electoral districts, earlier on June 1, 2024. On June 25, the organization published a pre-election environment assessment document[1], and on September 4, it provided a summary of its monitoring findings covering the period from June 1 to August 27. [2]
This monitoring report includes the results of the pre-election period from August 27 to September 30, in addition to a separate event that started developing before August 27 and continued during the monitoring period, and/or the further development of fact(s) identified within the monitoring period. The report reviews several elements of the election administration’s work, the electoral registration process of political parties, the representation of women in registered party lists, the progress of the pre-election campaign, the media environment, electoral disputes, and other key trends identified during the reporting period.
Within the framework of ISFED’s observation mission, during the pre-election campaign, from August 27 to September 30, 2024, the following main tendencies were revealed:
During the reporting period, according to the CEC, 60 complaints were submitted to the election administration, along with 8 lawsuits filed in court. Of these, 53 complaints and 4 lawsuits were submitted by election candidates, while 7 complaints and 4 lawsuits were submitted by monitoring organizations. Among the reviewed cases, 1 lawsuit remains unreviewed, 2 complaints are still under consideration, and the rest were dismissed. ISFED submitted complaints to the Central Election Commission and relevant District Election Commissions concerning six violations of campaign rules and improper use of administrative resources during the pre-election period. Of these, five complaints were dismissed, and one is still under consideration.
The full report is currently in the process of being translated into English. This page will be updated with the complete English-language version as soon as it becomes available.
Promo-LEX Association released today the third report from the Observation Mission (OM) regarding the presidential elections and the constitutional republican referendum scheduled for 20 October. This report includes insights gathered between 18 September and 1 October. The report mainly highlights the commencement of the electoral campaign, the legal framework pertinent to this process, the performance of the electoral competitors, and the efforts of the electoral bodies in preparation for the elections on 20 October.
Legal Framework. Promo-LEX OM highlights the lack of a clear legal framework concerning the consolidation of elections, the unique aspects of running electoral campaigns for two simultaneous elections, and the participation of unregistered entities in the campaign for one of these elections. As a result, independent candidates in the presidential elections and initiative groups find themselves at a disadvantage, as the legislation does not provide them with the same rights as political parties or electoral blocs that are registered as competitors in both elections.
Furthermore, while legal regulations have been established to penalize the involvement of religious denominations in the electoral campaign, instances of electoral agitation by their representatives have also been noted in this election. In 2016, the Constitutional Court made it clear that the participation of religious denominations in elections constitutes a violation of the Constitution.
Promo-LEX OM advises representatives of religious denominations to refrain from participating in electoral agitation activities. Additionally, the Police should thoroughly investigate and penalize instances of involvement by religious denominations in such activities.
Electoral Bodies and Public Administration During the monitoring period, the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) made 106 decisions and accredited a total of 527 observers, including 425 national and 102 international observers. At the local level, the district electoral councils (DECs) operated effectively, although there were a few exceptions. Changes to the nominal composition of members were made in three DECs, and several instances of intimidation directed at DEC officials were reported.
A specific issue arose within DEC no. 38, which was responsible for only two of the five electoral bureaus for polling stations established by CEC in the Russian Federation. Note that CEC is the sole authority that can determine the number of polling stations set up abroad in coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Promo-LEX OM emphasizes that MFA and DEC no. 38 must adhere to legal requirements and CEC decisions to ensure timely organization of elections abroad.
Electoral Litigation. The section on electoral litigation outlines the complaints lodged with the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) and district electoral councils (DECs) concerning legal violations, including the misuse of administrative resources, donations, the involvement of minors in the campaign, and inappropriate electoral agitation. CEC adhered to the established deadlines for addressing these complaints.
A total of eight lawsuits were filed in court, addressing issues such as the exclusion of political parties from the list of eligible candidates, the establishment of polling stations, and refusals to register individuals as trusted representatives. These cases were adjudicated by the courts within a timeframe of 2 to 10 days, although the legal deadline was exceeded in two instances.
Designation and Registration of Electoral Competitors After verifying signatures, 11 candidates were registered, of whom five were independent, five supported by parties, and one by an electoral bloc. Igor Munteanu was rejected due to the lack of valid signatures. Overall, 14% of the signatures were invalidated, a lower percentage compared to the previous election. Compared to the 2020 presidential election, the total number of candidates increased, and the proportion of female candidates reached 36%.
In the constitutional referendum, 15 participants were registered, most supporting the “YES” option. Three requests for registration as a participant were rejected on procedural grounds.
Performance of Electoral Competitors In the first ten days of the campaign, Promo-LEX observed at least 792 promotional activities by electoral competitors and for the constitutional referendum. Most of these activities were organized by PAS and Maia Sandu, followed by Alexandr Stoianoglo (PSRM) and Renato Usatîi. Chisinau hosted the highest number of events, accounting for 16%, followed by Balti and other regions. RP/PB Victory organized electoral meetings through private channels and encouraged anti-referendum and anti-EU protests by compensating participants.
Electoral advertising was identified in at least 1,404 instances, with the predominant formats being visibility materials and printed informational brochures. PAS and Maia Sandu led in the use of electoral advertising as well. Additionally, 32 instances of administrative resource abuse were reported, primarily targeting PAS and Maia Sandu (PAS). Other issues included the organized transportation of voters to electoral events, the involvement of religious groups, and acts of voter bribery.
During the monitoring period, reports emerged of goods and food being offered in exchange for voter attendance at electoral events, specifically targeting PB Victory.
Allegations of intimidation against competitors were also noted. Two representatives from PCRM were apprehended while handing out flyers advocating for the “NO” option in the referendum, which were confiscated without adequate explanations. Additionally, candidate Irina Vlah was denied access to a campaign venue by law enforcement officials.
Election and Campaign Financing. The candidates for presidential elections reported a total revenue of nearly 13 million lei during 20 and 30 September 2024, with the majority coming from political party funds. Maia Sandu, Alexandr Stoianoglo, and Renato Usatîi accounted for 89% of the total revenues reported. For the referendum, only PAS disclosed revenues, which were sourced from state budget allocations and donations.
Total reported expenditures surpassed 8.3 million lei, with 90% attributed to three candidates: Maia Sandu, Renato Usatîi, and Alexandr Stoianoglo. The largest expenses were mainly for promotional materials, as well as the production and airing of advertising spots. For the referendum, PAS reported expenditures exceeding 1.2 million lei, primarily for promotional materials and the organization of electoral activities.
Civic monitoring conducted by Promo-LEX identified inconsistencies between the estimated and declared expenses of electoral competitors. Observers calculated costs for various activities, including volunteer compensation, promotional materials, and online advertising, based on minimum market prices.
In the presidential campaign, undeclared expenses were estimated to exceed 2.2 million lei, with the majority (88%) allocated to promotional materials. Additionally, discrepancies were noted regarding the compensation of agitators, event organization, and transportation. Candidates with the highest undeclared expenses were Alexandr Stoianoglo (PSRM), Vasile Tarlev (FMP), and Irina Vlah (IC).
In the context of the constitutional referendum, undeclared expenses reached over 1.1 million lei. These expenses primarily targeted promotional materials (50%), social media advertising (23%), and other related costs. The participants in the referendum for whom these expenses were assessed included RP/PB Victory, PCRM, PAS, and MAN.
Hate Speech and Incitement to Discrimination. Between 9 and 22 September 2024, at least 14 instances of hate speech were documented, with the majority occurring in political and electoral contexts. Among these, six cases were directly linked to the elections, garnering over 134,000 views and 368 shares. Discriminatory incidents were also noted, including negative associations made between politicians and mental health issues, as well as sexist and homophobic messages.
The Observation Mission is financially supported by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the European Union, the German Marshall Fund of the United States, the Government of the United Kingdom, the International Organization of La Francophonie, and the Soros Foundation Moldova. This mission is conducted under the auspices of the Civic Coalition for Free and Fair Elections.
Parliamentary elections in Georgia are scheduled for October 26, 2024. In accordance with the legislation of Georgia, the official pre-election period began 60 days before the election day – August 27; however, the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (hereinafter ISFED) began monitoring the pre-election processes across the entire country, inclusive of 73 electoral districts, earlier on June 1, 2024. On June 25, ISFED published a document assessing the pre-election environment.
This report covers monitoring results of election processes from June 1 to the start of the official pre-election period August 27. It reviews the current political context, various aspects of the election administration, the registration process for political parties, the progression of the unofficial campaign period, the media environment, and other key trends observed during the pre-election period.
The Promo-LEX Observation Mission for the Presidential Elections and the Republican Constitutional Referendum released today its second monitoring report covering the period 20 August – 17 September.
The report mainly reflects the process of nominating and registering electoral competitors, the legal framework relevant to this process, the performance of electoral competitors, as well as the work of electoral bodies in preparation for the presidential elections and the referendum on October 20.
Legal framework. The Observation Mission (OM) report highlighted an important aspect related to the participation of the incumbent President in the 20 October election. The Constitutional Court had previously emphasized that the President must be apolitical, and the nomination of Maia Sandu by PAS raised questions about her neutrality. Given the impossibility of suspending the incumbent President from office for the period of the electoral campaign, Promo-LEX OM recommends that the President should refrain from participating in official public events that could be perceived as electoral campaigning activities and should minimize the use of administrative resources during the electoral campaign.
Promo-LEX OM also raised concerns over the refusal of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) to register some initiative groups, citing reasons such as political affiliation of candidates. Although CEC claims that political independence is a prerequisite for running as an independent candidate, the legislation does not expressly regulate such a ground for refusing registration of initiative groups. Promo-LEX recommends clarifying these issues in order to ensure transparency and predictability of the electoral process.
Electoral bodies. The electoral councils were set up within the deadline provided for by the legislation. For the majority of councils (95%), 11 members were appointed. The gender equality is uneven, with the majority of members being women (71%). According to the findings, only 17 out of 37 councils are accessible to people from vulnerable groups. Moreover, three councils (ECEC no. 36 ATUG, no. 37 – for localities on the left bank of the Dniester and no. 38 – for polling stations constituted abroad) did not have adequate premises for carrying out their activities one week after their establishment.
In total, 2,221 polling stations were set up for the autumn election, including 30 polling stations for voters from the left bank of the Dniester and 234 polling stations for voters from abroad set up by CEC in accordance with the provisions of the Electoral Code. Promo-LEX OM observers found that most polling stations (81%) were located in houses of culture and educational institutions, including pre-schools.
The organisation of polling stations abroad was carried out according to a legal framework established by the Electoral Code and CEC regulations. The main criterion for establishing polling stations is voter turnout in the last three elections, with other complementary criteria such as pre-registration and information provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A novelty in the electoral legislation for diaspora voting is the introduction of postal voting, with 1,994 citizens registered for this type of voting. CEC approved three polling stations for postal voting.
Promo-LEX has noted some differences between its estimates for the distribution of polling stations abroad and those established by CEC, in particular for Italy and the UK.
As regards the organisation of polling stations for the left bank of the Dniester, even if the number of polling stations has been reduced from 41 (2021) to 30, we believe that access to voting will generally not be affected. One issue remains the freedom to vote, as previous observation experience has shown that one of the main challenges is to counter and sanction organized transportation of voters, as well as possible cases of corruption.
Electoral disputes. During the observation period, Promo-LEX noted that at least eight complaints were submitted to the CEC, most of which were declared inadmissible. A number of complaints concerned allegations of use of administrative resources, electoral campaigning and others. Promo-LEX warns that it is necessary that the resolution of complaints should be carried out within the deadline stipulated by the Electoral Code (3 days, with the possibility of extension by 2 days) and that the complainants should be informed about the remedies available.
During the monitored period, four complaints were filed in court against CEC decisions. Three of them were rejected and in one case the court obliged CEC to issue a reasoned decision.
Nomination and registration of electoral competitors. Between 21-31 August 2024, the Central Electoral Commission received 23 applications for the registration of initiative groups (IGs) in support of 19 presidential candidates, of which 13 were accepted. Three applications were rejected and two did not receive the required number of votes.
Out of the 13 IGs to which subscription lists were issued, 9 candidates submitted their subscription lists and registration files to the CEC, out of which 4 were registered as electoral competitors. CEC received 14 applications for registration as participants in the Constitutional Referendum, registering 10 participants, out of which 8 chose YES and 2 NO.
Performance of electoral competitors. Promo-LEX observed that 12 out of 13 registered IGs carried out 475 activities to collect signatures in support of presidential candidates, with the highest activity in the case of Ion Chicu (PDCM), Renato Usatii (NP (OP)) and Maia Sandu (PAS) – who cumulatively carried out 71% of the total observed activities. No signature collection activities were observed for IG Victoria Furtună (IC).
The activities took place predominantly in Chisinau, but also in other cities (Balti, Dondușeni, Ialoveni, Causeni), and the collection period ranged from 3 to 24 days. Promo-LEX observers found that in the case of at least three candidates, signatures were collected by unauthorized persons.
In the context of the constitutional referendum, the electoral campaign seems to have started ahead of schedule, in violation of the legal provisions, with multiple promotional activities with electoral overtones, including sponsored postings and distribution of information materials. Moreover, violations were identified, such as the lack of complete information on advertising materials.
Misuse of administrative resources. Promo-LEX identified 13 cases of misuse of administrative resources by various political groups and local authorities. Among them, PAS was targeted in 8 cases related to signature collection and EU promotion, BE Împreună (EB Together) and BP Victorie (PB Victory) were involved in using educational resources and organising events serving political purposes, as well as presenting donations as being made by the party. PDCM and LPA were also cited for misuse of administrative resources in the process of collecting signatures and promoting political speeches, respectively.
Activities with voter corruption potential. During the monitored period, activities with voter corruption potential involving PB Victory and PVM (Party for Moldova’s Future) were observed. PB Victory distributed school bags and school supplies to students from socially vulnerable families and provided wheelchairs to some individuals, with reported cases of promises of money against signatures. The PVM was also involved in collecting signatures through unauthorized persons who were allegedly paid for these services.
Election and electoral campaign financing. Most of the IGs have appointed treasurers and reported the opening of the „Electoral Fund” accounts, with the exception of IGs Alexandru Arseni (IC) and Alexandr Stoianoglo (PSRM). Some IGs encountered difficulties in opening accounts thus affecting their activity. In terms of financial reporting, most of the IGs submitted information on financing, albeit with some errors, meeting deadlines. However, irregularities were found in the reporting of expenses. 12 out of 13 registered IGs reported revenues totalling 2,009,727 MDL, of which 292,076 MDL – from material donations (15% of total declared revenues).
For the signature collection activities carried out by 11 IGs, Promo-LEX estimated unreported expenses of at least 580,321 MDL. The highest unreported expenses were in the case of IG Irina Vlah (IC) – 43%, followed by IG Maia Sandu (PAS) – 23%. The most frequent unreported expenses were for promotional materials (52%).
Hate speech. Between 20 August and 8 September 2024, at least 40 cases of hate speech and other expressions of intolerance were identified. Most cases were spread via social media (19 cases) and mobile apps (10 cases). Most often, hate speech was based on political affiliation (12 cases), sexual orientation/gender identity (8 cases) and sex/gender (6 cases).
All 40 cases of hate speech had over 3 million views and more than 23 thousand shares.
The Observation Mission is financially supported by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the European Union and the German Marshall Fund of the USA, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the International Organization of Francophonie, and Soros Foundation Moldova. The Observation Mission is carried out under the aegis of the Civic Coalition for Free and Fair Elections.
The National Electoral Commission (Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza, NEC) has made a significant decision, rejecting the Law and Justice (PiS) party’s electoral report due to unlawful campaign spending amounting to PLN 3.6 million during the 2023 elections. This decision has led to the withdrawal of over PLN 10 million in grants and subventions, roughly one-third of what the party would have received. In response, PiS plans to appeal to the Supreme Court, although the legitimacy of the court’s chamber hearing the case is undermined by the CJEU jurisprudence due to concerns about the rule of law and its independence. Meanwhile, the NEC continues to audit PiS’s financial reports, with the party potentially losing all state subventions if violations are confirmed.
Krzysztof Izdebski is a legal and political expert specializing in public administration, access to public information, and the impact of technology on democracy. He is a Member of the Board at the Stefan Batory Foundation, co-leads the Open Spending EU Coalition, and is a member of the OECD network for innovative civic participation. A recognized authority on corruption prevention and government transparency, Krzysztof has authored numerous publications on these topics. In 2020, he was named one of Poland’s 50 most influential lawyers by Dziennik Gazeta Prawna.
Subscribe to our
newsletter
Sign up for our monthly newsletter
and receive the latest EPDE news
Sign up for our monthly newsletter and receive the latest EPDE news
Subscribe to our
newsletter
Sign up for our monthly newsletter
and receive the latest EPDE news
Subscribe to our
newsletter
Sign up for our monthly newsletter and receive the latest EPDE news