EPDE identified 178 fake observers invited by the Russian authorities, including many Western politicians and elected officials, to give international legitimacy to the “presidential elections.”
On 15-17 March 2024, Russia held “presidential elections”, in which four people allegedly competed for the Russian presidential post, including none from the democratic opposition, which is outlawed in the country in violation of democratic norms and standards.
What makes it even worse and even more detached from democratic standards is that Russia decided not to invite any OSCE (the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) observers to monitor the “elections,” in violation of the Istanbul Document 1999, according to which OSCE participating states committed themselves to invite observers from the ODIHR (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights) and OSCE PA, in addition to other OSCE participating states.
In an attempt to provide a degree of international legitimacy to the “presidential election” held both in Russia and illegally in occupied Ukrainian territories, Moscow invited 1115 “international observers and experts” from 129 countries.
Our analysis of Russian and other media reports, as well as social networks such as Facebook, X/Twitter, and Telegram, allowed us to identify 178 foreign “observers” and “experts” invited by the Russian authorities to give international legitimacy to the 2024 “presidential elections” both in Russia and on Russia-occupied Ukrainian territories.
This list is part of our ongoing research and is not exhaustive. As we continue our work, additional fake observers will be added to our database at fakeobservers.org.
As Hungary takes over the EU’s rotating presidency, most prominent Hungarian election-related organisations: Unhack Democracy, 20k, Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (HCLU), Hungarian Helsinki Committee, Mérték Media Monitor and Political Capital took a look at how Hungarian civil society has been facing up to Orban’s electoral autocracy in light of the recent EP/local elections.
“The Sovereignty Law has had the greatest impact on organisations working directly on or around elections. It has enforced a culture of fear within civil society and the media, diverted already limited resources and attention, stifled cooperation and imposed a level of self-censorship”.
This matters because the country already falls well short of the requirements for free and transparent elections that should be standard within the EU – as Hungary’s most prominent Hungarian election-related organisations including 20k, Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (HCLU), Hungarian Helsinki Committee, Mérték Media Monitor, Political Capital and Unhack Democracy have already concluded
The joint report into the EU parliament and local elections found the dominance of the ruling party in public advertising, media, and social media was striking.
👉 More analysis in the report
EPDE member The Political Accountability Foundation published its final conclusions and recommendations from monitoring the 2023 parliamentary elections.
The report covers key aspects of the electoral process, including:
Priority Recommendations:
The report offers several key recommendations that should be implemented in the coming months.
Download the conclusions and full set of recommendations below (in English). For the entire report (in Polish), follow this link.
The “Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections” campaign, run by EPDE members Belarusian Helsinki Committee and Viasna Human Rights Center, analyzed the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly (ABPA).
Initially, the ABPA was a quasi-civic meeting organized by the executive vertical, practiced every 5 years (usually) before presidential elections to demonstrate “nationwide” support for A. Lukashenka. It was stated that the ABPA is a form of realization by the citizens of Belarus of their right to directly participate in the conduct of government affairs. Against the background of the political crisis that began in 2020 before the presidential elections, and is still ongoing, at the constitutional referendum in 2022 provisions for the ABPA were included in the Constitution. The ABPA was proclaimed “the highest representative body of the people’s government”, while a bicameral parliament (“National Assembly”) was also preserved. Thus, currently in Belarus there are two central bodies of state power of a representative nature, and in the rhetoric of the authorities, the ABPA is still declared either as a form of direct participation of citizens in resolving public issues, or as a model of representative participation (“people’s government”).
Although the ABPA is postulated as the highest representative body of people’s government, the method of its formation is far from democratic representation: in fact, only 15% of the composition is directly elected by the people (president, deputies of the House of Representatives of the National Assembly and the Minsk City Council of Deputies), and another 29% of the ABPA composition is elected indirectly (by local councils elected by the people). The presence of 3 categories of delegates selected to the ABPA according to different procedures, which are not clearly stated in the law, are not transparent and are held behind closed doors in the absence of observers, hinders recognition of the ABPA’s real representational nature and the right to participate in the conduct of public affairs as being exercised by all citizens of Belarus directly or through representation in the ABPA.
Georgia is scheduled to hold much-anticipated parliamentary elections on October 26, 2024. This time around 90 percent of Georgian citizens will vote in polling stations using electronic means: special voter verification equipment will be used to check voter identity; voters will fill in paper ballots and feed the ballot into optical ballot scanners. The author – Tamara Sartania – provides insights into the experience of using voting technologies in Georgia, legal framework, public information campaigns, and opinions of observer organizations.
The new normal that Ukraine has been forced into after Russia’s full-scale invasion on the 24th of February 2022 raises questions for the Ukrainian government, politicians, experts, and society about whether democratic elections are possible in Ukraine while the active phase of the war is ongoing. This also raises questions about the legitimacy of Ukrainian elected authorities when elections are not likely for years to come. In Part I of this series of Ukraine Policy Alerts, the author delves into the legal perspective to explain why conducting elections in Ukraine remains impossible amid the ongoing full-scale war.
In the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the political system has fronted ‘militant democracy,’ compelling authorities to protect Ukraine’s democratic regime and strengthen its defenses. While Part I of the Ukraine Policy Alert “Ukrainian authorities’ legitimacy when elections are impossible” examined the limitations imposed by a full-scale war on the conduct of elections in Ukraine, as well as the legal legitimacy of representative bodies that cannot be re-elected, Part II attempts to answer the question of how to maintain a su!icient level of trust in the authorities in a situation where elections are impossible. Unlike legal legitimacy, political legitimacy is not determined by the Constitution, but by the ever-changing political reality. The latter remains the main problem for the Ukrainian authorities, growing with each passing year without elections.
To legitimize the election process, Russia’s Central Election Commission announced the invitation of a proud number of 1115 “international observers” from 129 countries. EPDE identified around 150 of fake observers and “experts”, among them rather unknown European local politicians and activists representing or affiliated with far-right parties or movements.
The expert election* 2024 observation mission was organized by the Belarusian Helsinki Committee and the Viasna Human Rights Center as part of the “Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections” campaign. The mission collects and analyzes information about the election campaign based on open sources and messages from voters from Belarus.*The term “elections*” in relation to the 2024 election campaign is used with an asterisk by the “Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections” campaign to emphasize the perfunctory nature of this term, since any free and fair election campaign presupposes, first of all, conditions where rights and freedoms are fully realized, which is currently practically absent in Belarus.
The expert election* 2024 observation mission was organized by the Belarusian Helsinki Committee and the Viasna Human Rights Center as part of the “Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections” campaign. The mission collects and analyzes information about the election campaign based on open sources and messages from voters from Belarus.*The term “elections*” in relation to the 2024 election campaign is used with an asterisk by the “Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections” campaign to emphasize the perfunctory nature of this term, since any free and fair election campaign presupposes, first of all, conditions where rights and freedoms are fully realized, which is currently practically absent in Belarus.
The expert election* 2024 observation mission was organized by the Belarusian Helsinki Committee and the Viasna Human Rights Center as part of the “Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections” campaign. The mission collects and analyzes information about the election campaign based on open sources and messages from voters from Belarus.*The term “elections*” in relation to the 2024 election campaign is used with an asterisk by the “Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections” campaign to emphasize the perfunctory nature of this term, since any free and fair election campaign presupposes, first of all, conditions where rights and freedoms are fully realized, which is currently practically absent in Belarus.
EMDS observed that the pre-election campaign lacked genuine competition among political forces, diminishing the political engagement in the country and denying voters a real choice among diverse political perspectives, which is essential for a free and fair election.
As Georgia prepares for its upcoming parliamentary elections on October 26, 2024, significant changes are underway. This election marks a historic shift to a fully proportional electoral system, with all 150 members of parliament set to be elected in a single nationwide constituency under a 5% threshold. A notable feature is the widespread adoption of electronic voting technologies at most polling stations, a first for country-wide elections. However, amidst these advancements, questions linger over the mandate of key members in the election administration, creating a deadlock in the parliamentary process.Independent international consultant Tamara Sartania provides insight into electoral system, election administration, electronic voting technologies, undecided voters and heated rhetoric.
The expert election* 2024 observation mission was organized by the Belarusian Helsinki Committee and the Viasna Human Rights Center as part of the “Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections” campaign. The mission collects and analyzes information about the election campaign based on open sources and messages from voters from Belarus.*The term “elections*” in relation to the 2024 election campaign is used with an asterisk by the “Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections” campaign to emphasize the perfunctory nature of this term, since any free and fair election campaign presupposes, first of all, conditions where rights and freedoms are fully realized, which is currently practically absent in Belarus.
The expert election* 2024 observation mission was organized by the Belarusian Helsinki Committee and the Viasna Human Rights Center as part of the “Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections” campaign. The mission collects and analyzes information about the election campaign based on open sources and messages from voters from Belarus.*The term “elections*” in relation to the 2024 election campaign is used with an asterisk by the “Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections” campaign to emphasize the perfunctory nature of this term, since any free and fair election campaign presupposes, first of all, conditions where rights and freedoms are fully realized, which is currently practically absent in Belarus.
The expert election* 2024 observation mission was organized by the Belarusian Helsinki Committee and the Viasna Human Rights Center as part of the “Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections” campaign. The mission collects and analyzes information about the election campaign based on open sources and messages from voters from Belarus.*The term “elections*” in relation to the 2024 election campaign is used with an asterisk by the “Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections” campaign to emphasize the perfunctory nature of this term, since any free and fair election campaign presupposes, first of all, conditions where rights and freedoms are fully realized, which is currently practically absent in Belarus.
The Ministry of Justice, in collaboration with the Central Electoral Commission of Armenia, has proposed amendments to the electoral code and other legal acts to enhance existing regulations. In the recently published Policy Alert, expert Tigran Mughnetsian sheds light on the draft bill on amendments to the electoral code and provides recommendations for improvements.
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