1. Introduction and Key Findings

To provide a comprehensive overview of the parliamentary election of October 26, 2024, it is important to assess the entire electoral process, which includes a detailed analysis of the pre-election period, election day, and the post-election period, and to draw conclusions based on these grounds.

The results of the October 26 parliamentary election, regardless of the outcome, cannot be seen as truly reflecting the preferences of Georgian voters. Although ISFED’s PVT results verification is consistent with the results announced by the CEC, the PVT results verification cannot be used as a measure of the validity of the electoral process because fundamental flaws in pre-election and election day processes impacted voters’ ability to express their free choice.

Violations revealed during the pre-election period, namely voter pressure, intimidation, confiscation of identity cards, collection/processing of personal data, and voter bribery, significantly damaged trust in the election. On election day, ISFED documented serious violations, such as ballot stuffing of ballot papers, multiple voting, unprecedented levels of voter bribery, expulsion of observers from polling stations, as well as instances of mobilizing voters outside polling stations, collecting their personal data, and controlling their voting intentions.  According to ISFED’s assessment, given the combination of these violations, the results cannot reflect the will of the voters. As a result, ISFED will not release precise PVT estimates. ISFED continues to monitor and analyze the evolution of electoral processes.

2. Pre-election Period

During the pre-election campaign, the ruling party held a significant advantage due to the state resources at its disposal. Several electorally motivated social, economic, and infrastructural programs and projects were initiated, and employees of budgetary organizations actively participated in the ruling party’s campaign events. The pre-election environment was damaged by numerous instances of personal data collection/processing from voters and the alleged confiscation of citizens’ identity cards, which represents an attempt to pressure voters and hinder their ability to express their will. Additionally, during the pre-election period, the online publication “Batumelebi” published an article revealing how “Georgian Dream” compiles dossiers on voters using personal data unlawfully obtained from various state agencies. The ruling party’s collection and processing of large volumes of personal data further confirms the existence of a large-scale scheme of voter bribery and pressure, as outlined in a study co-authored by ISFED in July 2022. The lack of response from relevant investigative agencies further exacerbates this problem. 

The parliamentary election was preceded by a number of changes in the electoral legislation, the most problematic of which was the worsening of the rule for the Central Election Commission’s composition, whereby the quorum required for making decisions in the Central Election Commission was reduced from a qualified majority to a simple majority, and changes in the terms for the allocation of functions among members of Precinct Election Commissions. The aforementioned changes negatively affected the quality of independence of the election administration and the election processes.

Prior to the election, Russian information operations in political processes, which were directed against democratic actors and processes, were significantly intensified.

During the pre-election period, enabling voters residing abroad to exercise their voting rights was a significant issue, which persisted on election day. According to ISFED’s assessment, the problems and tendencies observed in the pre-election period were directly linked to the violations seen on election day.

3. Election Day 

ISFED monitored the election day proceedings across the entire country (excluding the Russian-occupied territories). ISFED’s election observation mission consists of around 1,000 observers deployed inside of polling stations, 235 observers deployed outside of polling stations, and 45 observers at polling stations abroad, as well as 73 observers deployed at District Election Commissions (DECs) and 85 mobile groups. On election day, the organization’s central office had data collection/verification and analysis (32 operators) and incident/complaints centers (23 lawyers).

Numerous problematic incidents and violations were observed across the country during the voting process. 9% of polling stations did not uphold the secrecy of the vote. Additionally, issues related to the inking procedure were detected at 9% of the polling stations. Cases where observers’ rights were restricted, along with intimidation, verbal and physical violence, and their expulsion from polling stations, were reported. In several polling stations, incidents of mass ballot stuffing in ballot boxes and multiple voting were also recorded.

ISFED identified cases of voter tracking at the outside perimeter of 31% of polling stations. The organization recorded instances of verbal and physical confrontations or threats at the outside perimeter of 11% of polling stations. Voter transportation was detected at 19% of polling stations. Alleged voter bribery was observed at the outside perimeter of 13% of polling stations. ISFED received information regarding the processes occurring outside the polling stations from 91% of polling stations included in the selection. 

A full English translation of ISFED’s statement is available on this page