Performance of electoral competitors. The electoral campaign for the parliamentary elections of 28 September 2025 is apparently more dynamic than the one for the 2021 elections, with 1,487 electoral campaign activities being observed for a similar reporting period, most of them consisting of the distribution of informative materials (71%) and meetings with voters (18%), compared to 1,111 events observed for the previous elections. The most active were PAS (509), Patriotic EB (380), and Alternative EB (251).

Also, 3,214 cases of electoral advertising were documented, mostly printed materials (41%) and visibility objects (30%). In this context, some violations were also identified, such as the placement of materials in prohibited places, the lack of full printing data, or the use of political advertising materials for purposes of electoral campaigning before the actual start of campaign. Most cases of improper use concerned the Patriotic EB, followed by MRM, LOC, PAS, Alternative EB, and CUB.

The Promo-LEX OM recorded 52 cases of abuse of administrative resources, most of which concerned PAS, through the use of public institutions and the involvement of officials in electoral campaigning. Two cases of potential voter corruption (Victory PB and PPN) and the involvement of religious denominations in the campaign, with at least four documented incidents, were also reported.

During the observed period, acts of intimidation were reported: PL candidate Vladimir Meleca was illegally detained in the Transnistrian region, and a conflict occurred in Causeni between the veterans of the war on the Dniester and the Patriotic EB, which required the intervention of the police.

Promo-LEX also monitored the involvement of “third parties”. At least 13 cases were identified, including online networks coordinated by the Russian Federation to promote Ilan Șor and the Victory PB, Facebook pages and YouTube channels that propagate pro-East or pro-EU messages, as well as civic initiatives such as EUROPE 2028.

Financing of the electoral campaign. By 8 September, 21 out of the 23 competitors opened bank accounts and 19 filed financial reports. The declared income totaled about MDL 28.4 million, mostly from donations of individuals (47%) and transfers from the current accounts of parties (37%). The most income was reported by PAS, Alternative EB, Patriotic EB, and PN, which cumulated 78% of the total. The declared expenses amounted to over MDL 21.5 million, with the largest part directed to promotional materials (51%) and advertising (35%).

The civic monitoring of electoral campaign financing revealed discrepancies between official reports and actual expenditures estimated by the Promo-LEX OM, which identified unreported amounts of over MDL 1.3 million in 14 competitors, especially in CUB, MRM, and Patriotic EB.

Hate speech and incitement to discrimination. Between 20 August and 4 September, at least 78 cases of hate speech, incitement to discrimination, or other forms of manifestation of intolerance were identified, which were viewed more than 830 thousand times. About 53% of these (41 cases) were spread through mobile apps. Most often, hate speech was based on criteria of political affiliation, professional activity, opinion, sexual orientation, gender identity, health, sex, or gender.

Further, hate speech with a high level of gravity was identified that took the form of incitement to violence and incitement to discrimination. Dehumanization rhetoric used by various actors was also used during this period. These types of messages justified violence and made people in targeted groups an easier target of physical and verbal attack.

Xenophobic, homophobic, and sexist messages also kept appearing in public and electoral speeches. Hate speech was directed against various social groups such as Muslims, Romanians/Romanian speakers, journalists, men, etc. Politicians, members and/or supporters of political parties, women and LGBT people continue to be targeted by hate speech in greater numbers.

Electoral bodies and public administration. The CEC conducted its activity transparently, having organized 12 meetings and adopted 71 decisions. The number of accredited observers increased compared to the 2024 ballots, with more than 2,100 national and international observers registered. Promo-LEX draws attention to the risk of the appearance of “false observers” and calls for the intervention of the authorities to stop these practices. At the same time, the Promo-LEX OM reminds that access to polling stations is allowed only to observers accredited by the CEC, through qualified organizations.

The CEC confirmed representatives and trusted persons for 16 electoral competitors and extended the certification of electoral officials, having validated over 26,000 people. The number of ballot papers increased by more than 42,000 in electoral districts 1-36, especially in Chisinau and Balti, but decreased fourfold in the Transnistrian region, which, according to the Promo-LEX OM, can limit access to vote and generate large queues.

District electoral councils (DECs) generally worked according to the legislation, but there were cases of limiting observers’ access to electoral information and difficulties in setting up precinct electoral bureaus. The unofficial application of a mechanism for checking the integrity of potential electoral officials was also reported, which requires clarity and transparency.

Legal framework. The suspension of activity of Chisinau Mayor Ion Ceban, candidate for the position of MP, highlighted shortcomings in the application of rules on the separation of public office from electoral campaign. Although he said he had suspended his work, the CEC found the opposite and issued him a warning.

Some town halls have also allocated public halls for meetings with voters without the approval of the local council, raising suspicions of illegal use of public property and discrimination against competitors.