Ukraine | Foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) with politics and elections: signs, examples, and implications for Ukraine

Foreign interference is based on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states, and elections — as a means of legitimizing authority — are at the core of these “internal affairs.” There is no single definition, but the approaches of the European Commission, the European Parliament, the DHS, and the legislation of the United States, Australia, Canada, and the OECD share common features: interference may be carried out by a state directly or through intermediaries, and the method of operation is characterized by secrecy and deception. Differences concern the object of interference and whether illegality is a mandatory characteristic. It is advisable to divide the object of interference into a general one — state sovereignty — and a specific one — a particular sphere of social relations (for example, elections).

Conclusions

Forms of interference should be distinguished from the spheres in which they occur: elections are a specific object, while FIMI, foreign financial interference (FFI), and cyber interference are forms, each of which employs its own methods and specific actions.

This approach eliminates the confusion characteristic of the OECD’s classification of channels, where interference in elections is singled out separately, even though it is carried out using the same instruments. Funding is a cross-cutting indicator of interference: in a broad sense, it refers to the provision of any form of interference; in a narrow sense, it refers to the transfer of foreign funds into the accounts of parties or candidates.

Coercion cannot be considered a mandatory element of interference. The formula established by the International Court of Justice in the case “Nicaragua v. United States of America,” according to which coercion constitutes the “very essence” of unlawful interference, does not stand the test of time. Information manipulation leaves the recipient formally free, while its impact on sovereignty may be even greater than that of threats or violence. For FIMI, the absence of coercion is rather typical, although the two may coexist. Illegality is equally optional: the EEAS defines FIMI as a “mostly non-illegal” model of behavior, placing this phenomenon in a “gray area” of legal restrictions. Unlike FIMI, financial interference is usually explicitly prohibited.

The key distinction between interference and legitimate foreign influence is transparency. Foreign influence encompasses diplomacy, lobbying, public communications, and the like, and is a legitimate aspect of international relations provided that the recipient understands the source and nature of the influence (who is exerting it, with whose funds, and in whose interests). Interference, on the other hand, is covert or deceptive and may — though not necessarily — be accompanied by coercion or illegal activities. Transparency in legitimate influence is ensured by specialized tools such as the UK’s Foreign Influence Registration Scheme or the EU Transparency Register.

Attribution to a specific state is not required to classify an act as foreign interference. This is confirmed by both practice (65% of the 540 incidents documented by the EEAS remained unattributed, and 90.5% of the mapped channels are covert resources), and by legislation: the UK National Security Act employs a “foreign state condition” that can be met without identifying a specific state, while the Australian Criminal Code Act allows for an individual’s activities not necessarily to relate to a specific entity. At the same time, technical attribution sufficient for use in analysis should be distinguished from legal attribution, for which the standards of proof are significantly higher. Since the disruptive effect of an individual message does not depend on its origin, manipulation methods should be countered regardless of the presence of a foreign element. At the same time, an analysis of the indicators pointing to such interference (foreign actor, control, interest, funding, intermediaries) is necessary to identify coordinated campaigns and select appropriate response measures.

The line between FIMI and freedom of expression remains the most challenging practical issue. Freedom of expression extends to ideas that may shock, offend, or disturb, regardless of the truthfulness of the content, and combating “disinformation” does not fall within the legitimate aims of restriction under Art. 10 of the Convention; therefore, it is necessary to demonstrate the threat that FIMI poses to other values — primarily national security or the rights of others. The ECHR’s decision in the case of “Bradshaw and Others v. The United Kingdom” merely opens the judicial debate, as the Court recognized the state’s positive obligations to counter interference, though less stringent than those under Articles 2–4 of the Convention, granted broad discretion in the choice of measures, confirmed the difficulty of proving a causal link between an information campaign and the outcome of a vote, and cautioned against impulsive reactions bordering on censorship. Therefore, clear criteria and serious grounds are required to exclude conduct from the protection of freedom of expression; in their absence, the dissemination of information must be presumed lawful.

The concept of FIMI is not synonymous with disinformation: it is narrower, as it concerns only the manipulation of information by foreign actors, and broader, as it does not require proof that the disseminated information is false. What is decisive is not the content, but deceptive or manipulative behavior, the most obvious example of which is coordinated inauthentic behavior (CIB). The following should be considered mandatory characteristics of FIMI: 1) manipulative (deceptive or covert) behavior, which may relate to the authenticity of actions, goals, intentions, or funding; 2) coordination, indicating premeditated behavior, intent, and purpose; 3) a foreign link — a connection to a foreign state or its proxy. While not mandatory, the following are useful for identification: coercion, illegal activity, violations of platform policies and media standards, deceptive content, funding, and advocacy for the interests of a specific state.

The set of characteristics that must be proven depends on the chosen response: for the application of legal liability mechanisms — the existence of the elements of an offense; for the application of sanctions or similar mechanisms — a threat to national security or non-compliance with legal requirements; for retaliation — identification; for content bans by platforms or media outlets — violations of policies, codes of ethics, or standards; for reactive soft-power measures (fact-checking, debunking information, disclosing facts such as funding sources, etc.) — individual indicators are sufficient (e.g., deceptive behavior or foreign funding); for proactive (preventive) soft power measures (raising awareness, media literacy, information dissemination, and education, etc.) — none are required, as they are designed to prevent threats.

Alongside the ABCDE methodology (actors, behavior, content, degree, and impact), the “subject-object-method-content” approach is universal and commonly used in legal analysis. The transnational nature of FIMI requires a unified taxonomy (the most applicable today is DISARM, which, however, can be further modified for FIMI operations) and a common data format (e.g., STIX), integrated into guidelines and training programs.

Manipulation of actors and assets is evolving from the creation of fake accounts (sockpuppets) to the acquisition or hacking of real ones, which allows for bypassing platform verifications and exploiting the audience’s trust, as well as the impersonation of individuals, media outlets, and institutions — ranging from domain cloning to the generation of voices and images using AI. A separate level of organization involves paid influence networks with hired staff and performance metrics, the bribery of influencers and politicians, and the creation of “controlled” media and fake civil society organizations. The development of AI has made these methods cheaper, while proving the existence of funding remains the most effective indicator, as it confirms both coordination and a “foreign” element.

Content manipulation encompasses a wide range of phenomena — from completely fabricated materials and forged official documents to “cheap fakes,” deepfake videos, synthesized audio, and robocalls. Equally significant are manipulations involving promotion: flooding, hashtag hijacking, artificially inflating engagement, circumventing algorithms, as well as countering opponents through mass complaints and a flood of commenters. Hence the key conclusion: verifying the truthfulness of content is not enough; effective identification of FIMI requires analysis of behavior and the infrastructure used for dissemination.

For Ukraine, the following risks associated with such FIMI operations may be relevant: delegitimizing election results and specific stages of the process; discrediting government bodies, particularly election administrators; discrediting observers, along with pseudo-monitoring and the depletion of monitoring missions’ resources; discrediting parties and candidates; attacks on voters (polarization, bribery, intimidation). A distinctive feature of the Ukrainian situation is that the country ranks among the top in terms of documented FIMI incidents (112 out of 540 in the 2026 EEAS report) even in the absence of electoral processes. Therefore, with the start of the post-war electoral cycle, we should expect not only new methods but, above all, an escalation of tried-and-tested ones — with increased focus on security narratives and the electoral rights of specific groups (military personnel, IDPs, and citizens abroad).

(October 23, 2026)
Ukraine

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