












SECURITY AUDIT IN 11 HROMADAS: GENERAL RESULTS



Surveyed hromadas


Nº	HROMADA	TYPE OF HROMADA	CURRENT % OF POPULATION	
1	Izium urban hromada	De-occupied	~50%	
2	Pervomaiske village hromada	De-occupied	44%	
3	Olevsk urban hromada	Border	101,7%	
4	Snovsk urban hromada	Border	94%	
5	Kramatorsk urban hromada	In combat zone	<70%	
6	Kherson urban hromada	In combat zone	23%	
7	Novomykolaivka village hromada	In combat zone	88%	
8	Nikopol urban hromada	In combat zone	52%	
9	Velyka Pysarivka village hromada	In combat zone	31%	
10	Kremenchuk urban hromada	Rear area	>90%	
11	Pivdenne urban hromada	Rear area	>90%	

Audit results

- **The audit was conducted under the legal framework of martial law**, which prohibits the holding of elections and referendums. If the legal regime of martial law were lifted, only 3 out of 11 hromadas would receive positive scores in the area of physical security. **The key problems in the field of physical security include shelling of hromadas, a shortage of shelters near the premises of precinct election commissions (PECs), and an underdeveloped emergency alert system.**
- Under the “Socio-Economic Development” section, the audit was passed by the **Olevska, Pivdennivska, Pervomaiska, and Novomykolaivska hromadas**. The key challenges for the functioning of hromadas are **ensuring electricity supply and the operation of schools**. The energy supply situation significantly worsened in October–November 2025 due to Russian attacks. A major barrier to restoring in-person learning is the absence of shelters in schools.
- According to the “Democratic Processes” indicators, the **Kremenchuk and Pivdennivska hromadas** received positive assessments. The key obstacles included the ban on holding peaceful assemblies (5 hromadas), the destruction of electoral infrastructure (4 hromadas), and the limited potential for recruiting members of precinct election commissions (PECs) due to a significant decrease in population (5 hromadas).
- **Hromadas located in the zone of active hostilities and along the border with Russia** (Nikopol, Snovsk, Kramatorsk, Velyka Pysarivka, Novomykolaivka, Kherson) or those de-occupied in 2022 (Izium, Pervomaisk) **demonstrate the poorest results across all thematic sections of the audit. The best overall results are shown by rear-area hromadas: Olevska, Pivdennivska, and Kremenchuk.**

Shelling of hromadas

- **Between July and September 2025, Russia shelled the territory of 10 out of 11 hromadas.** The only exception was the Olevska hromada in Zhytomyr oblast.
- **The intensity of shelling depends heavily on the proximity to the front line.** The most frequent attacks occur in the frontline **Kherson (3,861 shelling incidents), Nikopol (1,220), and Kramatorsk (155)** hromadas. These hromadas also record the highest number of civilian casualties. In the Kherson hromada, 45 civilians were killed; in Nikopol, 11; and in Kramatorsk, 7.
- **In Kherson and Nikopol, Russian forces deliberately use drones to “hunt” civilians.**



Shelters for voters

- **None of the assessed hromadas has 100% availability of shelters within a 500-meter radius of precinct election commissions (PECs).**
- **In rural areas, the situation with shelters is significantly worse than in urban areas,** as in some locations no shelters exist within a radius of 5–10 km.
- In border hromadas such as Velyka Pysarivka (27%) and Snovsk (29%), identifying suitable premises to serve as shelters may become one of the priority tasks for organizing elections.



Air-raid alert notifications


- **In most hromadas, the emergency notification system for the population is underdeveloped.** Only three hromadas – Kramatorsk, Nikopol, and Kremenchuk – have alert systems that fully cover all residents of the hromada. In four hromadas, the air-raid alert system covers about 70% of residents; in three hromadas, less than 70%.
- **Rural settlements are less equipped with alert systems.** To inform residents, hromadas use alternative methods such as vehicles with loudspeakers, the Air Alert app, SMS notifications, and others.
- In the Pivdennivska hromada, there is **a lack of funding to introduce a centralized alert system.** Several hromadas also require modernization of existing systems (including Kramatorsk hromada).
- In the Snovsk and Olevsk hromadas, **the alert system covers only the central settlement.**



Electoral infrastructure

- **The highest level of destruction is observed in hromadas located in the combat zone or those that were de-occupied.** Four hromadas (Nikopol, Iziium, Velyka Pysarivka, and Pervomaiske) have more than 50% of Polling Station Commission (PSC) premises destroyed or damaged.
- **Three hromadas (Nikopol, Velyka Pysarivka, and Kramatorsk) are unable to assess recovery** prospects for damaged polling stations due to ongoing hostilities.
- **Four hromadas lack alternative premises to replace all or part of unusable polling stations (Nikopol – 33, Iziium – 18, Pervomaiske – 9, Snovsk – 2)** because of extensive damage to local infrastructure. Due to security restrictions, there is no information on the condition of polling stations in Kherson urban hromada.
- **There are no destroyed polling stations in Kremenchuk, Pivdenne, Olevsk, and Novomykolaivka hromadas.**

Percentage of available polling premises



Functioning of the State Voter Register (SVR)

- **The operation of the Register in terms of interaction with voters has not been restored in any of the hromadas.**
- **All three departments responsible for maintaining the State Voter Register in the Kherson hromada** are not operating due to ongoing hostilities. Periodic updates of voters' personal data are not taking place at all in the Kherson hromada, and in the Kramatorsk hromada they occur only partially – the Kramatorsk City Court and the Department of Labor and Social Protection are not submitting information for inclusion in the State Voter Register system.
- Six SVR offices (Kramatorsk, Novomykolaivka, Pervomaiske, Nikopol, Kremenchuk, Velyka Pysarivka) are understaffed.
- Two offices (Kramatorsk and Izium) operate in premises that do not meet requirements.
- **The SVR offices in Snovsk, Olevsk, and Pivdenne hromadas have no issues with premises or staffing.**

Number of doctors and emergency medical response time

- **In most hromadas, ambulance response times are within the standard (up to 20 minutes) or acceptably close to it;** the exception is Velyka Pysarivka hromada, where the response time is 49 minutes, which is critical.
- **The level of staffing with medical personnel is generally within 70–85%,** which allows for maintaining a basic level of medical services.
- **The most serious staffing shortages are in Kherson hromada (38%), Kramatorsk hromada (40%),** and Velyka Pysarivka hromada (60%). However, this staffing level — especially in Kherson — still allows for the provision of essential medical care, given the population decline compared to February 2022.
- **For some hromadas, data on ambulance arrival time are unavailable,** which complicates a full assessment of access to medical services (Snovsk and Izium).



Key trends in the work of the National Police

- **Despite the war, in most hromadas the police respond to incidents in a timely manner.** In 7 out of 11 hromadas, response times are within the recommended peacetime standards (7–10 minutes in urban areas and 20–40 minutes in rural areas). These include Snovsk, Olevsk, Pivdenne, Pervomaiske, Novomykolaivka, Kremenchuk, and Izium hromadas.
- **At the same time, in hromadas that are regularly subjected to intense shelling, police response becomes longer (Kherson hromada) or is not recorded at all (Kramatorsk and Velyka Pysarivka hromadas) due to the high level of danger.** No data are available for Nikopol hromada.
- **Staffing levels of police units operating in the hromadas range from approximately 70% to 93%.** At the same time, district police departments in hromadas that suffer more frequent attacks and face greater security threats generally have lower staffing levels than those operating in safer conditions. For example, police staffing in the Kramatorsk hromada is 77.7%, in the Kherson hromada — 78%, and in the Izium hromada — 85%.



Key trends in emergency response

- In 8 out of 11 hromadas, the State Emergency Service (SES) arrival time meets the standard (up to 25 minutes): Snovsk, Olevsk, Pivdenne, Pervomaiske, Kremenchuk, Izium, Kherson, and Kramatorsk hromadas.
- **In some areas located in the combat zone, arrival times depend on the current security situation and may vary significantly.** This is the case, for example, in Velyka Pysarivka hromada.
- For Nikopol and Novomykolaivka hromadas, data are unavailable, **which prevents an assessment of the operational effectiveness of SES units.**



Access to justice

- **None of the 11 hromadas has been left without access to justice:** courts continue to operate and take all possible measures to ensure citizens' right to judicial protection. Justice in the Nikopol and Kherson hromadas is administered under conditions of regular and intensive shelling.
- **In three hromadas (Kramatorsk, Izium, Velyka Pysarivka), territorial jurisdiction has been transferred to courts in other oblasts,** which has reduced the accessibility of justice for residents.
- **Court buildings in three hromadas (Pervomaisk, Nikopol, Novomykolaivka) have been damaged as a result of the war.**
- **Courts serving seven hromadas face staffing shortages.** The most critical situation is in the Olevsk and Nikopol hromadas, where staffing levels are around 40%.



Contamination by explosive ordnance

- Two hromadas are partially located in border zones where the risk of landmines remains — Snovsk (border with Russia) and Olevsk (border with Belarus). The Velyka Pysarivka, Kherson, and Nikopol hromadas are within 20 km of the de facto line of contact, where area surveys are prohibited and impossible due to the high frequency of shelling.
The Pivdenne hromada has a coastal zone where the threat of mines persists.
- The largest contaminated areas are in **Pervomaisk (9%)** and **Izium (7%)**. Mines are also recorded in five other hromadas: Novomykolaivka, Snovsk, Olevsk, Kramatorsk, and Pivdenne. There is no mine contamination in the Kremenchuk hromada. No data are available for the other hromadas.
- In **eight hromadas**, movement remains dangerous. Civilian casualties from explosions have been recorded (5 cases in the Kherson hromada, 1 in Izium).



Priority steps

- **A security audit should become a mandatory tool for assessing the preparedness of physical and social infrastructure in de-occupied hromadas and in hromadas that were located in active combat zones.**
- **The identified problems may be resolved before the start of the electoral process**, provided there are sufficient investments and enough time to achieve the stated objectives. This applies to the restoration of electoral infrastructure, energy facilities, continuation of demining activities, and more.
- There is a need to **develop a legislative framework to define territories where holding safe and democratic elections is not possible.**
- It is **necessary to abandon a formalistic approach** based on defining an arbitrary geographical 50- or 100-kilometer zone where elections are presumed to be impossible to conduct safely.
- At the national level, pilot programs on security audits should be introduced, which may be carried out in the format of **interagency cooperation among different authorities.**



Hromada security audit:
general results



**Hromada security
assessment:** 2nd wave



Hromada security audit:
methodology and
mplementation mechanisms