



# **REPORT No 8**

## **Observation Mission of the Presidential Election in the Republic of Moldova of 1 (15) November 2020**

### **ELECTION DAY. SECOND ROUND.**

Published on 20 November 2020

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**General findings on the organisation and conduct of the second round of the Presidential elections.** Promo-LEX OM draw the attention on voters' civic activism, who showed up to vote even amidst the pandemic in greater numbers than for the 2016 election. Especially the people who voted in the polling stations abroad stood out, in spite of running out of ballot papers before voting end time in at least six of the polling stations abroad. Promo-LEX OM reiterates the need to implement some (additional) voting mechanism for citizens with the right to vote, staying abroad.

During the election day, the voting process was organised efficiently in the monitored polling stations. At the same time, Election SAIS was occasionally out of order. The electoral process in the transnistrian region was characterised especially by suspicious of vote buying and organised transportation of voters. The vote secrecy was impacted significantly by the high incidence of people taking pictures of their ballot papers. The observation was affected by isolated cases of Promo-LEX observers intimidation by the Police and electoral officials. Overall, votes were counted in a quick, ordered and calm manner.

**Polling stations opening and closing.** According to Article 55 of the Electoral Code, on the election day voting shall take place from 07.00 a.m. to 9.00 p.m. All of PSs monitored by observers were declared open. A deviation longer than 15 minutes from the opening time was reported in one single case. At the same time, the absolute majority of the observed polling stations (98%) were closed at 9.00 p.m.

Promo-LEX OM highlights that at least 34% of all observed PSs are not heated during the cold season of the year. However, the situation improved compared with the first round, when 43% of PSs were not heated.

Besides, at least 178 observed PSs (22%) ignored the rule that during the vote counting, the ballot papers shall be presented to all participants in the counting process by one single member of the bureau. This happened in spite of the fact that only two candidates were on the ballot paper.

**Incidents on the election day.** Once the information reported by STOs from PSs and by mobile teams were processed, a number of 499 incidents were analysed and published in press releases, by 18 more than in the first round.

Promo-LEX OM expresses its concern regarding the 13 cases, at least, of intimidating observers or obstructing the free observation process in polling stations. Note that in at least five cases electoral officials and/or police officers prevented the access of Promo-LEX observers after the latter notified some incidents in the respective polling stations.

We also draw the attention to cases and rumours of awards given to voters (22), flagged in particular at the polling stations set up for voters from the transnistrian region. In the same train of thoughts, PromoLEX OM highlights the (37) cases of organised transportation of voters.

In terms of quantity, the most frequent reported incidents - 108 cases - involve taking a picture of the ballot papers and other violations of secrecy of vote (59), deficiencies in the operation of "Elections" SAIS (61) and non-compliant sealing the ballot boxes (43).

Compared with the first round of presidential elections, we underscore the high number of non-compliances with COVID-19 protection and prevention measures. Recall that Promo-LEX OM flagged this problem to the electoral bodies in the first round of elections.

On the other hand, against the same comparison basis, Promo-LEX OM found a two-fold increase of deficiencies in the operation of "Elections" SAIS, instances of taking picture of the ballot papers and other violations of the secrecy of vote, and problematic situations with voting by mobile ballot box.

**Final vote counting by Promo-LEX OM.** Promo-LEX OM analysed the accuracy of 2,139 Vote Counting Protocols in the presidential election of Moldova of the total of 2,143 protocols. A total of 37 errors were found in 16 protocols on the basis of verification formulae. The number of protocols with errors is lower than in the first round. Moreover, on 15 November 2020 Promo-LEX OM identified the lowest number of protocols with errors since the last presidential elections (2016)

The results of parallel vote counting for the presidential election in the Republic of Moldova do not reveal any significant differences between the preliminary data presented by CEC and final data obtained by Promo-LEX.

## INTRODUCTION

Report no 8 is compiled by Promo-LEX Observation Mission (OM) of the Presidential Election in the Republic of Moldova of 1 (15) November 2020. The report contains the main findings with regards to opening and closing the polling stations, incidents noticed during the second round of the presidential elections, as well as an analysis of parallel vote counting by Promo-LEX OM. The content of this report can be subject to editing.

The report was developed on the basis of findings reported by short-term observers (STO) via SMS. On the election day for the second round of the presidential election of 1 (15) November 2020, as in the first round, Promo-LEX delegated one short-term observer (STO) in each of the 608 polling stations (PSs) selected by Promo-LEX OM from a sample established by a sociological company. Moreover, a static observer was assigned to each of the 42 polling stations where voters from the transnistrian region cast their vote. The electoral process in the polling stations, in their immediate vicinity and the access routes to the polling stations where the voters from the transnistrian region cast their votes, were monitored by 80 mobile teams of observers. In addition, 61 observers were assigned to the polling stations abroad. In addition to the first round, Promo-LEX seconded observers trained in monitoring public assemblies.

All observers involved in the monitoring process were trained during the seminars organized by Promo-LEX Mission. They signed the Code of Conduct<sup>1</sup> of the Promo-LEX Independent National Observer, assuming the commitment to act efficiently, in good faith and in a non-partisan manner. Promo-LEX observers were also trained in protection standards in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. The central team of the Association coordinates the activity of observers.

The OM Observation Report for the election day was developed on the basis of the STO findings, submitted in two special forms: periodic reporting form and incident reporting form. Observers sent their reports via SMS, which were stored on web platform [www.data.promolex.md](http://www.data.promolex.md) for further processing. The accumulated information was analysed by the Central Team and was presented in the form of press releases.

Promo-LEX Mission also manages the public web platform [www.electoral.monitor.md](http://www.electoral.monitor.md), which stored, on the election day, relevant information (including photo/video, with no personal data) from observers' reports. In addition, any individual had the possibility to upload on this platform their alerts about electoral activities.

Promo-LEX OM for Moldova Presidential Election of 1 (15) November 2020 is a project implemented by Promo-LEX Association as part of the Civic Coalition for Free and Fair Elections. Promo-LEX OM is not a political opponent for the election contenders involved in the electoral process, it is not an investigation body and does not assume the express obligation to support its findings by evidence. Nonetheless, the observers' reports are accompanied, as much as possible, by photo and video evidence. These can be made available only to law enforcement bodies on the basis of proper requests and never to election contenders. At the same time, electoral authorities shall deal with the violations, including the alleged ones, presented in this report as prescribed in Article 22 (1)(q) and Article 68 (5) of the Electoral Code, treating them as observers' notifications to be reviewed according to their competence.

This report refers to the international standards developed by UN, OSCE, European Commission for Democracy through Law, European Union and Council of Europe. The preliminary recommendations for public and electoral authorities, election candidates/participants in referendum and other stakeholders are made at the end of this report in order to improve the electoral process.

The Mission is conducted and the report is developed with the financial support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) via the 'Democracy, Transparency and Accountability' Program, the Good Governance Department of Soros Foundation-Moldova under 'Monitoring the Presidential Elections of 1 November 2020' Project, and the Council of Europe under 'Support for civic observation of 2020 Presidential Election in polling stations abroad'. *'Hate speech'*

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<sup>1</sup> [Code of Conduct](#) of Promo-LEX National Independent Observer.

*component is supported by Justice and Human Rights Department of Soros Foundation-Moldova under 'Consolidation of a platform for the development of activism and education in the area of human rights in Moldova – stage IV' Project.*

The opinions set out in the public reports and press releases of Promo-LEX OM are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the donors' view.

## I. POLLING STATIONS OPENING AND CLOSING

According to Article 55 of the Electoral Code, on the election day voting shall take place from 07.00 a.m. to 9.00 p.m. All of PSs monitored by observers were declared open. A deviation longer than 15 minutes from the opening time was reported in one single case. At the same time, the absolute majority of the observed polling stations (98%) were closed at 9.00 p.m.

Promo-LEX OM highlights that at least 34% of all observed PSs are not heated during the cold season of the year. However, the situation improved compared with the first round, when 43% of PSs were not heated.

Besides, at least 178 observed PSs (22%) ignored the rule that during the vote counting, the ballot papers shall be presented to all participants in the counting process by one single member of the bureau. This happened in spite of the fact that only two candidates were on the ballot paper and hence the vote counting procedure was not slowed down by the need to comply with the legal requirements.

### 1.1. Methodological notes

Promo-LEX observers monitored the procedures of opening polling stations, as well as their closure and vote counting in 791 PSs. At the same time, during the election day inclusively, the 80 mobile teams monitored the voting process in a total of 1529 polling stations. In terms of methodology, note that the number of findings by areas could be different, depending on the text messages, received and validated by the central team<sup>2</sup>.

### 1.2. PS opening

All of the monitored polling stations were declared open. With one single exceptions, the PSs were opened at 7:00 a.m. sharp or with insignificant deviations.

Table 1. Polling stations opening (on the basis of 791 PSs)

Period	Between 6:50 a.m. and 6:59 a.m.	At 7:00 a.m.	Between 7:01 a.m. and 7:14 a.m.	After 7:15 a.m.
Number of polling stations open	63 (8%)	695 (88%)	32 (4%)	1

### 1.3. PS accessibility

Promo-LEX OM highlights that over 34% of all observed PSs are not heated during the cold season of the year. However, the situation improved compared with the first round. For this indicator, Promo-LEX observers reported a higher share of heated PSs, raising from 57% in the first round to 66% in the second round.

At least 48% of the monitored polling station were not accessible for persons with physical impairments.

Table 2. Aspects related to PS accessibility

Subject	YES	NO	Total PSs
Is the polling station accessible for persons with physical impairments?	799 (52%)	730 (48%)	1,529
Is the polling station heat?	1 015 (66%)	514 (34%)	1,529
Is the polling station lit sufficiently for the electoral procedures?	783 (99%)	8 (1%)	791

<sup>2</sup> On the election day, the short-term observers sent their observations to the central team via text messages. According to the methodology, each observer had two breaks of up to one hour each.



#### 1.4. PS Closing

Table 3. PS closing the ballot paper counting procedures

Subject	YES	NO	Total PSs
Did the polling station close at 9:00 p.m.?	694 (98%)	17 (2%)	711
Were the special forms for counting the voting results initially developed?	671 (85%)	120 (15%)	791
Did only one PEB member distribute the ballot papers to all participants for tabulation?	613 (78%)	178 (22%)	791
Was the whole process of ballot boxes opening and ballot paper counting shot continuously, without any interruptions?	773 (98%)	18 (2%)	791
In your opinion, were the voting and vote counting procedures conducted in line with the requirements for protection measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19 (wear gloves, face masks/shields, ventilate the rooms, keep the social distance)?	680 (86%)	111 (14%)	791

The absolute majority of the observed polling stations (98%) were closed at 9:00 p.m. At least 17 polling stations (2%) were closed after 9.00 p.m., most of them with an insignificant delay.

We highlight that 178 monitored polling stations (22%) did not comply with the rule that the ballot papers shall be presented to all participants in the counting process by one single member of the bureau. This happened in spite of the fact that only two candidates were on the ballot paper and hence the vote counting procedure wouldn't have been long.

Moreover, 120 PSs (15%) violated the procedure of filling in the special vote counting form.

According to Promo-LEX observers, in 111 PSs (14%) the voting and vote counting procedures were conducted in violation of the requirements for protection measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19.

Promo-LEX OM draws the attention that the same shares were, generally, found in the first round of the election.

## II. INCIDENTS OBSERVED DURING THE ELECTION DAY

Once the information reported by STOs from PSs and by mobile teams were processed, a number of 499 incidents were analysed and published in press releases, by 18 more than in the first round.

Promo-LEX OM expresses its concern regarding the 13 cases, at least, of intimidating observers or obstructing the free observation process in polling stations. Note that in at least five cases electoral officials and/or police officers prevented the access of Promo-LEX observers after the latter notified some incidents in the respective polling stations.

We also draw the attention to cases and rumours of awards given to voters (22), flagged in particular at the polling stations set up for voters from the transnistrian region. In the same train of thoughts, PromoLEX OM highlights the (37) cases of organised transportation of voters.

In terms of quantity, the most frequent reported incidents - 108 cases - involve taking a picture of the ballot papers and other violations of secrecy of vote (59), deficiencies in the operation of "Elections" SAIS (61) and non-compliant sealing the ballot boxes (43).

Compared with the first round of presidential elections, we underscore the high number of non-compliances with COVID-19 protection and prevention measures. Recall that Promo-LEX OM flagged this problem to the electoral bodies in the first round of elections.

On the other hand, against the same comparison basis, Promo-LEX OM found a two-fold increase of deficiencies in the operation of "Elections" SAIS, instances of taking picture of the ballot papers and other violations of the secrecy of vote, and problematic situations with voting by mobile ballot box.

### 2.1. Methodological notes

On the day of the second round of the presidential elections, incidents were reported by the following categories of Promo-LEX observers:

- 608 static observers in polling stations on the territory of the Republic of Moldova, in the established sociological sample;
- observers in 80 mobile teams that covers the territory of the country, including the territorial administrative units where polling stations were set up for voters from the transnistrian region;
- 42 static observers in polling stations for transnistrian region
- 61 static observers in polling stations abroad.

A total of 574 cases were reported, of which 499 were classified as incidents by the central team. Promo-LEX OM finds a slight increase (by 18 cases) in the number of incidents reported by observers for the second round of the presidential elections.

Total cases reported by observers		Total incidents processed by the Central Team and included in public reports		Total cases reported that were not classified as incidents	
First Round	Second Round	First Round	Second Round	First Round	Second Round
521	574	481	499	40	75

## 2.2. Overview of incidents

Table 4. Incidents on the election day (first and second rounds)

No.	INCIDENT CATEGORY	NUMBER		Difference
		First Round	Second Round	
1.	Intimidating observers or preventing the free observation at the polling station	10	13	+3
2.	Ballot boxes were not sealed according to the legal procedures/tearing/damage or absence of seals on ballot boxes	23	43	+20
3.	Unjustified presence of unauthorised persons inside or within 100 m from the polling station	25	28	+3
4.	Presence of advertising materials, electoral billboards and posters in the vicinity of the polling station (within the area of 100 m from the PS)	34	9	-25
5.	Interrupted video recording of electoral procedures for polling station opening or procedures of ballot papers counting	22	24	+2
6.	Electioneering or black PR within the radius of 100 m and/or near the polling station to influence the voters	14	19	+5
7.	Rumors, attempts or even situations of in-kind or cash rewards offered to voters within the are of 100 m from the polling station in order to influence them	14	22	+8
8.	Organised voter transportation (by buses, passenger vans or other vehicles that wouldn't normally be around)	50	37	-13
9.	Failure to observe COVID-19 protection and prevention measures	75	35	-40
10.	Deficient operation of Elections SAIS (suspended functionalities; situations where Elections SAIS showed that the voter had voted, although the latter claimed he had not)	35	61	+26
11.	Errors in the lists of voters	29	15	-14
12.	Taking pictures of the ballot papers, other violations of the secret ballot (submission of ID card on the basis of which the voter had already voted, inappropriate laying out of booths because of which one could see who other voters cast their vote for etc.)	59	108	+49
13.	Unjustified group voting (2 or more people were in the voting booths at the same time)	11	10	-1
14.	Unjustified termination/suspension of voting at the polling station	12	7	-5
15.	Electricity outages	8	11	+3
16.	Preventing the access of voters and organised transport to polling stations set up for the transnistrian region	6	3	-3
17.	Problematic aspects related to vote counting	15	5	-10
18.	Problematic aspects related to voting by mobile ballot box	3	21	+18
19.	Refusal to give the vote counting protocols or intimidating the observers while issuing the VCP	6	0	-6
20.	Acts of violence or bullying against voters or other persons	0	9	+9
21.	Others	30	19	-11
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>481</b>	<b>499</b>	<b>+18</b>

Promo-LEX OM found cases of observer intimidation, including by police officers and electoral officials, in the second round of the elections as well.

Note also the rumours of voter bribing and cases of cash awards offered to voters from the transnistrian region upon presenting documents confirming the vote, reported by observers on 15 November 2020. The comparative analysis reveals a higher number of alleged voter bribing at the second round of the election, though only 2 candidates remained to compete.

Compared with the first round of the election, on 15 November 2020 the number of deficiencies in the operation of "Elections" SAIS doubled. The same significant growth trend was reported with regards to incidents involving taking pictures of ballot papers or other violations of secrecy of vote.

In addition, we find the failure to settle the issue with insufficient seals for ballot boxes, moreover the number of such incidents increased compared to 1 November 2020.

Moreover, Table 4 reveals a higher number of problematic situations of requests to vote at the place of stay submitted by unauthorised persons. Most of the identified issues involve submission of requests to vote at the place of stay by unauthorised persons. Another flagged deficiency involves the failure to apply the mechanism of voting by mobile ballot box for voters hospitalized in COVID-19 departments. Remind that in its Reports No 6 and 7, Promo-LEX OM warned the electoral bodies on the need to comply with the regulatory requirements on receipt of requests to vote at the place of stay. The high number of incidents involving organised transportation of voters remained unchanged. If compared with the first round, the number of vehicles involved was higher in the second round of the presidential elections. Like on 1 November, on 15 November 2020 most of the cases were reported in connection with the polling stations opened for voters from the transnistrian region.

On the other hand, the number of incidents related to non-compliance with COVID-19 protection and prevention measures, quality of lists of voters, and presence of advertising materials within the area of 100 m from the polling station decreased in the second round.

### 2.3. Incident description

#### 2.3.1. Preventing the free observation process at the polling station or intimidating observers

*Article 68(5) of the Electoral Code states that CEC-accredited observers may monitor the electoral process across the whole country and in all polling stations, whereas DEC-accredited observers – only within the area of the constituency. Accredited observers shall have the right to assist at all electoral operations, all meetings of the electoral bodies, including on the election day, without intervening in the electoral process or in other electoral operations, and inform the chairperson of the electoral body about the noticed irregularities.*

According to reports submitted by Promo-LEX OM observers, there were at least **13 cases** where observers were restricted or prohibited from freely monitoring the processes in the polling station. We draw attention on cases of observer intimidation, in particular by PEB members, and isolated attempts to take the observer out of the polling station, claiming that they had to go to the police and testify.

The Mission hence reiterates its availability to cooperate with law enforcement agencies and underlines that will respond only to the legal requests that will be received on the Mission's address and will provide the needed legal aid to all observers that will be summoned lawfully by law enforcement agencies. In this context, the Mission urges law enforcement agencies to avoid any situations that could be regarded as selective justice and attempts to intimidate or silence Promo-LEX observers.

<b>Number of cases</b>	<b>Description</b>
<b>Preventing the free observation process</b>	
<b>7 cases</b>	<b>Prohibition to make pictures and video recordings (4 cases):</b> PS 1/116 (including prohibition to walk within the PS), PS 1/196, PS 16/1, PS 18/61. <b>Refusal to offer information on the participation rate (2 cases):</b> PS 2/42, PS 27/54. <b>Restricted access due to COVID-19 protection measures (1 case):</b> Psychoneurological hospital of Brinzeni v., Edinet.
<b>Observer Intimidation</b>	
<b>6 cases</b>	<b>By PEB members (2 cases):</b> PS 1/87, PS 16/1. <b>By police staff (3 cases):</b> PS 6/4, PS 6/26, PS 27/25. <b>By the observer accredited by an election contender (1 case):</b> PS 1/218

**2.3.2. Ballot boxes were not sealed according to the legal procedures/tearing/damage or absence of seals on ballot boxes**

According to Article 60(1) of the Electoral Code, on the election day at 07.00 am, the PEB Chairperson, in the presence of no less than half of the members of the bureau, shall check the ballot boxes and seal them. According to points 26 and 27 of CEC Guidelines on Enabling the Polling Station Infrastructure, the ballot boxes shall be secured through sealing. The stationary ballot boxes shall be sealed by means of 4 collar-type self-locking seals, and the mobile ballot boxes - by 1 (one) seals.

Promo-LEX OM observers found **43 cases** of non-compliance with the procedures of ballot boxes sealing, most of the times due to the insufficient number of seals received, namely:

Ballot boxes were not sealed according to the legal procedures								
EC	Case No:	PS	CE	Case No:	PS	EC	Case No:	PS
1	11	3; 9; 19; 98; 100; 154; 197; 221; 268; 411; 443;	27	3	1; 2; 54	35	1	8
6	9	2; 5; 14; 18; 24; 26; 30; 35; 40	30	1	30	36	1	4
10	2	3; 4	32	2	15; 22	37	2	22; 38
13	3	24; 25; 27	33	4	2; 3; 6; 8			
18	2	22; 61	34	2	35; 36			

**2.3.3. Presence of advertising materials, electoral billboards and posters in the area of the polling station (within 100 meters from the PS)**

According to Article 60(7), the responsibility for maintaining order on election day in the polling place and territory adjacent to it within an area of 100 meters shall be assigned to the chairperson of the precinct electoral bureau. The decisions made in this regard shall be mandatory for all.

Promo-LEX observers found **9 cases** of advertising materials, electoral billboards and posters within the area of the polling station (within the area of 100 m from the PS), by 74% fewer than in the first round of elections.

Presence of advertising materials, electoral billboards and posters within the area of the polling station		
Beneficiary	Polling stations	PS No
Maia Sandu (PAS)	PS 01/276, PS 4/34; PS 29/9; PS 30/001; PS 31/001; PS 32/030	6
Igor Dodon (IC)	PS 32/001, PS 29/9	2
Renato Usatii (PN)	PS 18/39	1

**2.3.4. Unjustified presence of unauthorised persons inside or within 100 m from the polling station**

According to Article 60(8) of the Electoral Code, the following have the right to attend the work of electoral bodies: members/representatives of hierarchically higher electoral bodies; representatives of election contenders within the electoral bodies; national/international observers accredited by relevant bodies and their interpreters, if needed; media representatives. According to Article 60(7) of the Electoral Code the responsibility for maintaining order on election day in the polling place and territory adjacent to it within a radius of 100 meters shall be assigned to the chairperson of the precinct electoral bureau, and their decisions are binding for everyone.

Promo-LEX observers found at least **28 cases** of unauthorised persons staying inside the PS or within the area of 100 m from the polling station longer than allowed by law.

<b>Unjustified presence of unauthorised persons inside the polling station or within 100 m from the polling station</b>	
<i>Number of cases</i>	<i>Polling stations</i>
<b>9 cases</b>	<b>Involving representatives of political parties or election contenders:</b> <b>PSRM (4 cases)</b> – PS 6/2; PS 6/3; PS 18/63; PS 36/8. <b>PP PDA (2 cases)</b> - PS 37/4; PS 37/5. <b>IC Igor Dodon (2 cases)</b> - PS 7/27; PS 18/15. <b>Unidentified (1 case)</b> - PS 7/11.
<b>2 cases</b>	<b>Involving persons holding public dignity positions (district presidents), members of PSRM</b> - PSs 37/24; 37/25.
<b>2 cases</b>	<b>Unjustified presence of persons who work in the same building where the polling station is located:</b> PS 1/216, PS 1/218
<b>2 cases</b>	<b>Unjustified presence of MIA employees:</b> PSs 7/63, 18/23.
<b>1 case</b>	<b>Presence of mobile social store Merisor:</b> PS 25/37.
<b>12 cases</b>	<b>Unjustified presence of some unidentified persons:</b> PS 1/96; PS 1/232; PS 7/48; PS 11/17; PS 11/24; PS 15/5; PS 18/2 (2 cases); PS 18/16; PS 25/12; PS 33/16; PS 37/3.

### **2.3.5. Rumors, attempts or even situations of in-kind or cash rewards offered to voters**

According to Article 41(5)-(6) of the Electoral Code, election contenders shall not offer voters money or distribute goods free of charge, including from humanitarian aid or other charity acts, except for symbolic gifts, representing electoral or political advertising, produced with funds declared on the 'Electoral Fund' account, carrying the symbols of the election contender and with a market value not exceeding two conventional units.

Promo-LEX OM observers found **20 cases** of in-kind or cash rewards offered to voters and **2 cases** of cash rewards offered to drivers who transported voters.

<b>Rumors, attempts or even situations of in-kind or cash rewards offered to voters</b>	
<i>Number of cases</i>	<i>Description</i>
<b>20 cases</b>	<b>By representatives of contender Igor Dodon (11 cases):</b> - <b>Cash rewards (6 cases):</b> PS 15/5 (MDL 400); PS 24/28; PS 31/21 (MDL 400); PS 37/19 (MDL 700); PS 37/26 (USD 40); PS 37/31 (MDL 200). - <b>In-kind rewards (4 cases):</b> PS 9/7 (“voucher” worth MDL 200 to buy alcoholic beverages); Causeni, Hagimus (200 transnistrian rubles) - 2 cases; PS 11/15 (transport and health check-up services). <b>Unknown awards (1 case):</b> PS 1/213.
	<b>By unidentified election candidates (9 cases):</b> - <b>Cash rewards (6 cases):</b> Transnistrian region, Bender mun. (MDL 400), PS 1/325; PS 15/3; PS 37/26 (MDL 400); PS 37/29; PS 37/37 (MDL 800). - <b>In-kind rewards (1 case):</b> PS 37/3 (bags with unknown content). - <b>Unknown awards (2 cases):</b> PS 15/5, PS 37/37.
<b>Rumors, attempts or even situations of in-kind or cash rewards offered to drivers for voter transportation</b>	
<b>2 cases</b>	<b>By unidentified election candidates</b> - <b>Cash rewards:</b> PS 15/10 (100 MDL/ trip). <b>By representatives of contender Igor Dodon:</b> - <b>Cash rewards:</b> PS 37/ 26 (USD 10).

### 2.3.6. Electioneering on the election day

According to Article 52(10) of the Electoral Code, on the election day no electioneering is allowed in the polling station or at the entry of the polling station.

Promo-LEX OM observers reported at least **19 cases** that can be qualified as electioneering or black PR inside or at the entry of the polling station to influence voters, by 5 cases more than during the first round of presidential elections on 1 November 2020. Thus, 1 case involved PPS representatives, 7 cases - Igor Dodon, 2 cases - Maia Sandu (PAS). As for other 9 cases of electioneering inside the PS, 7 cases involved voters, 2 cases - unidentified.

Electioneering at the entry of or inside the polling station		
Electioneerer	Polling stations	No of cases
Maia Sandu (PAS)	PS 1/371, PS 1/218	2
Igor Dodon (IC)	PS 1/87; PS 1/96; PS 06/002; PS 6/4; PS 9/35; PS 06/004; PS 23/004	7
PPS	PS 25/14	1
Voter	PS 1/91; PS 1/115; PS 1/116; PS 1/ 349; PS 1/371; PS 32/21; PS 32/15	7
Unidentified	PS 1/241, in the vicinity of PS 37/34	2

### 2.3.7. Organised voter transportation (by buses, passenger vans or other vehicles that wouldn't normally be around)

CEC Decision No 4390 of 20.10.2020 prohibits, during the voting period, the movement of any vehicle with a capacity higher than 8 persons that is not registered as a regular public transport vehicle according to the law of the Republic of Moldova.

Promo-LEX OM observers identified at least **26 PSs**, respectively **about 37 instances** that can be interpreted as organised transportation of voters. As many as 21 of cases (about 57% of the total) are related to the PSs established for the transnistrian region. Besides, in terms of the number of vehicles used (at least 101 cars, 6 passenger vans, 3 buses), the PS from Constituency 37 stands out of the other polling stations in the country.

Organised transportation of voters (by buses, passenger vans or other vehicles that wouldn't normally be around)			
Constituency	No of cases	Number of PS	Number of vehicles used
1 Chisinau	1	PS 104	1 car
1 Romania	1	PS 413	1 passenger van
9 Calarasi	5	PSs 14, 35, 44	5 cars, 2 passenger vans
10 Causeni	2	PS 32	4 cars
11 Cimislia	2	PS 26	1 car, 1 passenger van
12 Criuleni	1	PS 8	4 cars
15 Dubasari	1	PS 6	1 car, 1 passenger van
18 Floresti	1	PS 26	1 car
27 Riscani	1	PS 25	1 car
36 ATU Gagauzia	1	PS 8	1 car
37 Transnistrian region	21	PSs 3, 13, 17, 18, 19, 26, 28, 29, 31, 33, 37, 38, 39, 42	At least 81 personal cars, 2 passenger vans, 3 buses

### 2.3.8. Obstructing the voters' access

According to Article 7 of the Electoral Code, no one has the right to exert any pressure on a voter to make him/her vote or not, nor to prevent him/her from expressing his/her will. And according to Article 75(1) of the Electoral Code, individuals and legal entities that prevent people from freely exercising their electoral rights, hinder the activity of electoral bodies shall bear liability in line with the current law.

Promo-LEX OM observers identified at least **3 cases** of preventing the free access of voters from the transnistrian region to the territory controlled by constitutional authorities of the Republic of Moldova or conflicts involving these voters.

Preventing the access of organised transport to polling stations set up for the transnistrian region	
Description	No of cases
transnistrian region - Rezina, Varnita, Sanatauca.	3

### 2.3.9. Unjustified termination/suspension of voting at the polling station

According to Article 56 (1) of the Electoral Code, during the time allotted for voting the polling place may not be closed nor may voting be terminated, with the exception of cases of mass disorders, natural disasters, or other unforeseen circumstances which make conducting the elections impossible or dangerous for the voters.

Promo-LEX OM observers identified **7 PSSs**, where the voting process was suspended unreasonably for periods ranging from 5 to 15 minutes, or was stopped before 9:00 p.m. due to running out of ballot papers.

Number of PSSs	Description
<b>Unjustified suspension of voting process</b>	
<b>4 PSS</b>	<b>In order to disinfect the polling station (2 cases):</b> PS 1/58 (15 min.); PS 1/92 (10 min.). <b>Due to lack of internet connection (1 case):</b> PS 19/26 (10 min.) <b>Due to electricity outages (1 case):</b> PS 7/19 (5 min.)
<b>Unjustified termination of voting</b>	
<b>3 PSSs</b>	<b>Due to running out of ballot papers:</b> PS 1/340 (25 min.); PS 1/348 (1h 40 min.); PS 1/349 (3h 6 min.)

### 2.3.10. Deficient operation of "Elections" SAIS

Point 61 of the Regulation on the Activity of PEB – the member of the PEB shall hand the voter the ballot paper only after the voter was looked up in the Elections SAIS and after it was determined that the voter meets all the participation requirements which shall enable him/her to vote in that particular polling station.

Promo-LEX observers found **61 problematic situations** when "Elections" SAIS had technical issues (stopped operating, lost Internet connection), as well as issues related to content (mismatches between data in the voter's ID documents and data in "Elections" SAIS, the information system showed that the voter had voted, though the latter had not, issues related to assigning voters to polling stations).

Deficiencies in the operation of Elections SAIS		
Deficiency type	Polling stations	No of cases



<b>Technical deficiencies</b>	PS 1/7; PS 1/34; PS 1/38; PS 1/98; PS 1/105; PS 1/107; PS 1/198; PS 1/274; PS 1/298; PS 1/325; PS 1/339 (2 cases), PS 1/346 (2 cases); PS 1/346; PS 1/353; PS 1/369; PS 1/379; PS 1/406; PS 1/409; PS 1/410 ; PS 1/443; PS 4/3; PS 4/20; PS 6/11; PS 10/2; PS 10/5; PS 10/7; PS 10/36; PS 10/42; PS 11/26; PS 12/28; PS 12/37; PS 25/40; PS 27/25; PS 32/10; PS 32/29; PS 32/31; PS 37/6.	38
<b>Content-related deficiencies</b>	PS 1/105; PS 1/114; PS 1/301; PS 1/339 ; PS 1/340; PS 1/ 342 (2 cases); PS 1/371; PS 1/398; PS 1/433; PS 1/443; PS 11/4; PS 11/26; PS 12/23; PS 18/26 (4 cases); PS 35/3; PS 32/15; PS 36/6; PS 36/18; PS 37/11.	23

### 2.3.11. Errors in the lists of voters

The lists of voters drafted based on the State Register of Voters are lists containing the name of all citizens having the right to vote, who are domiciled or reside on the territory of a polling station. A voter may only be included on one single list of voters and in one single polling station.

Promo-LEX OM observers reported at least **15 deficiencies** in lists of voters, such as: *inconsistent addresses (4 cases); deceased voters (1 cases), signatures for other people (6 cases) and strangers registered at voters' domicile address (4 cases).*

<b>Errors in the lists of voters</b>		
<b>Deficiency type</b>	<b>Polling stations</b>	<b>No of cases</b>
<b>Inconsistent addresses</b>	PS 1/261, PS 1/297, PS 18/29 PS 18/55.	4
<b>Signatures for other people</b>	PS 1/87, PS 1/218; PS 11/24; PS 11/26; PS 34/5; PS 36/19	6
<b>Strangers registered at voters' domicile address</b>	PS 1/117 (2 cases); PS 1/246; PS 1/291.	4
<b>Deceased voters</b>	PS 1/228.	1

### 2.3.12. Taking pictures of the ballot papers, other ways of violating the secret of vote

According to point 68 of the Regulation on the activity of precinct electoral bureaus, it is prohibited to take pictures of the ballot paper with the vote cast. According to point 19 of the Guidelines on PS Infrastructure, to ensure the secret of voting, booths shall be placed with the open part to the wall, at a distance of 1 m. at most.

Promo-LEX OM observers reported at least **108 cases** of voters taking pictures of their ballot papers and violation of the secrecy of vote, by positioning wrongly the voting booth or revealing purposefully who the voter voted for, by 49 cases (45%) more compared with the first round of the elections on 1 November 2020.

Taking pictures of the ballot papers, other violations of secret of vote	
Number of cases	Polling stations
54 cases	<b>PEB members stepped in to solve the incident when voters took pictures of their ballot papers, in the following PSs:</b> 01/076; 06/004; 07/027; 09/046; 1/11; 1/29; 1/41; 1/56; 1/74; 1/91; 1/92 <sup>3</sup> ; 1/100 <sup>2</sup> ; 1/154; 1/305; 1/ 137; 1/142; 1/154; 1/170 <sup>2</sup> ; 1/179 <sup>2</sup> ; 1/192; 1/241; 1/305; 8/8; 8/39; 9/39; 11/24 <sup>3</sup> ; 13/5; 15/003; 18/004; 18/020; 18/035; 23/031 <sup>2</sup> ; 25/081; 32/29; 33/1; 34/002; 34/2; 35/3; 35/35; 36/7; 36/8; 36/9; 37/9; 37/11; 37/21 <sup>2</sup>
18 cases	<b>PEB members did not step in to solve the incident when voters took pictures of their ballot papers, in the following PSs:</b> 1/91; 1/100 <sup>3</sup> ; 1/130; 1/194; 1/195; 1/216 ; 2/42; 4/25; 12/9; 12/38; 15/012; 20/014; 25/012 <sup>2</sup> ; 33/2; 37/14
32 cases	<b>Lack of data about the following PSs:</b> 1/261; 1/340 <sup>2</sup> ; 1/348; 1/353 <sup>6</sup> ; 1/368; 1/369 <sup>9</sup> ; 1/377; 1/397 <sup>2</sup> ; 1/402 <sup>5</sup> ; 1/406; 1/420 <sup>3</sup>
4 cases	<b>In the following PSs, voting booths were positioned in a way that did not allow ensuring the secret of vote:</b> 01/276; 06/037; 32/007; 32/19

### 2.3.13. Unjustified group voting (2 or more people were in the voting booths at the same time)

Articles 5 and 6 of the Electoral Code stipulate the universal principles underpinning democratic elections, specifically **direct and secret vote**, i.e. a voter shall vote personally, in secret, thus excluding any possibility to influence voters. Voting on behalf of other individuals is prohibited. The voter who is not able to fill the ballot in by himself/herself has the right to invite into the booth another person, except for PEB members , representatives of election contenders/participants in the referendum and other accredited individuals entitled to attend the electoral procedures.

During the second round of the presidential elections, Promo-LEX OM observers reported at least **10 cases** that can be qualified as violation of direct and secret voting or unjustified group voting.

Unjustified group voting		
Total number of cases - 11		
PS where PEB members stepped in - 2	PS where PEB members did not react - 6	Data are missing - 2
PSs 32/3, 33/028.	PSs 1/87; 1/277; 10/41; 11/15; 12/11; 1/402	1/100, 1/350

### 2.3.14. Electricity outages

According to point 1 of the Decision on additional duties for some central public authorities, local public authorities, as well as other institutions related to proper organisation of the elections of the President of the Republic of Moldova on 1 November 2020, dated 25 August, electricity suppliers shall deliver, **with no interruptions**, electricity to the premises of electoral councils and precinct electoral bureaus, according to coverage areas.

Promo-LEX OM observers reported at least **11 cases** of electricity outages during the election day.

Electricity outages	
Number of cases	Polling stations
1	PSs 13/25; 15/002; 18/058; 22/006;
2	PSs 26/8, 37/38.
3	37/35

### 2.3.15. Problematic aspects related to vote counting

As reported by observers, at the second round of the presidential elections, electoral bureaus carried out the vote counting in violation of Article 61 of the Electoral Code. Thus, Promo-LEX OM observers found at least **5 cases** when the vote counting procedure was not complied with, by 10 cases fewer compared with the first round of the presidential elections on 1 November 2020.

Problematic aspects related to vote counting		
Issues	Polling stations	Number of cases
Cancellation of unused ballot papers before the voting end time	PS 7/8	1
The unused ballot papers were not tied and sealed separately	PS 27/3	1
The "Voted" seals were not removed and sealed before starting the ballot paper counting	PS 1/406	1
Non-transparent vote counting	PS 37/3	1
Others	PS 25/45	1

### 2.3.16. Interrupted video recording of electoral procedures for polling station opening or procedures of ballot papers counting, other incidents related to video recording of electoral processes

According to point 11 of the Regulation on the operation of the Video Recording System in PSs, the video recording system shall be turned on only during the election day:

- video recording shall start when beginning the preparatory electoral procedures for polling station opening and shall end when the polling station opens;
- video recording shall start at the moment of closing the polling station and shall end after completing the vote counting and tabulation by members of precinct electoral bureau.

Promo-LEX OM observers reported at least **24 incidents** related to video recording of polling station opening procedures or ballot papers counting procedures.

Interrupted video recording polling station opening or ballot papers counting, other incidents related to video recording of electoral processes	
Number of cases	Polling stations
5	<b>The electoral procedures for polling station opening were recorded partially/not recorded:</b> PS 1/100; PS 1/192; PS 1/340; PS 36/40; PS 37/11.
5	<b>Vote counting process was recorded partially/not recorded:</b> PS 1/100; PS 1/180; PS 1/192; PS 32/15; PS 37/3.
11	<b>Video recording of the voting process:</b> PS 6/16; PS 6/37; PS 6/40; PS 11/2; PS 20/2; PS 27/7; PS 27/10; PS 27/15; PS 27/25; PS 27/46; PS 34/12.

<b>3</b>	<b><i>Incorrect positioning of the video camera, in violation of the law:</i></b> PS 1/51, PS 27/3, PS 32/21.
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### **2.3.17. Problematic aspects related to voting by mobile ballot box**

According to Article 60(6) of the Electoral Code, when the chairperson of the precinct electoral bureau authorises a **mobile ballot box** to leave the polling station, he/she shall announce this fact as well as the list of voters that requested to vote at place of residence beforehand to the member representing the contestants and the individuals accredited to observe electoral procedures.

According to points 8-10, 13 of the Guidelines on Voting by Mobile Ballot Box, the number of mobile ballot boxes shall be established in a decision of the precinct electoral bureau. If a large number of such requests are received on the election day, the bureau chairperson has the right to authorise the mobile ballot box to leave the polling station at any hour after the polling station opens. Members of the electoral bureau, who left with the mobile ballot box, shall return to the polling station before 9.00 p.m. After voting at the place of stay, the unused ballot papers shall be returned to the precinct electoral bureau, which shall be recorded in the electoral office's report.

Promo-LEX OM observers reported at least **21 incidents** related to voting by mobile ballot box.

Problematic aspects related to voting by mobile ballot box
PS 1/142 (2 cases); PS 1/190; PS 1/193; PS 1/197; PS 1/213 (2 cases); PS 1/223; PS 1/224; PS 1/225 (2 cases); PS 1/291; PS 6/2; PS 9/8; PS 15/5; PS 15/14; PS 16/1; PS 18/55; PS 32/33; PS 33/3; PS 36/24.

### **2.3.18. Failure to observe COVID-19 protection and prevention measures**

During the second round of the presidential elections on 15 November 2020, Promo-LEX OM found a 47% decrease in the number of cases involving non-compliance with the main rules for COVID-19 prevention. Thus, Promo-LEX OM observers reported at least **35 cases** of non-compliance with the rules established by CEC its Guidelines on COVID-19 prevention measures during the election period.

Failure to comply with COVID-19 protection and prevention measures		
<i>Violations</i>	<i>Polling stations</i>	<i>Number of cases</i>
<b>Failure to measure the body temperature, there was no register</b>	PS 1/402; PS 1/405; PS 06/033; PS 18/016; PS 31/006; PS 31/019; PS 31/025	<b>7</b>
<b>Failure to make sure that face masks and shields are worn</b>	PS 06/016; PS 06/018; PS 06/040; PS 6/14; PS 10/41; PS 18/023; PS 18/026; PS 18/061; PS 18/063; PS 37/20; PS 37/21	<b>11</b>
<b>Failure to keep the social distance</b>	PS 01/208; PS 1/197; PS 1/203; PS 1/291; PS 1/292; PS 1/298; PS 10/49; PS 06/016; PS 18/013; PS 18/064; PS 32/029; PS 32/3; PS 32/21; PS 32/33	<b>15</b>
<b>Other rules against Covid-19</b>	PS 01/285, PS 12/027	<b>2</b>

### **2.3.19. Acts of violence or bullying against voters or other persons**

Promo-LEX OM observers reported at least **9 cases** of acts of violence against or intimidation of voters or other persons.

<b>Acts of violence or bullying against voters or other persons</b>		
<i>Violations</i>	<i>Polling stations</i>	<i>No of cases</i>
<b>Acts of violence against / intimidation of voters</b>	PS 1/101; PS 1 /266; PS 37/6.	3
<b>Acts of violence against / intimidation of electoral bodies members</b>	PS 1/196, PS 1/199; PS 1/266; PS 1/353; PS 13/24; PS 33/27.	6

### **2.3.20. Other**

The 19 incidents in “Other” category include (see the full list in Annex 1): limited access to TV and Internet in Moldtelecom network, lack of a voting booth for persons with disabilities, inappropriate behaviour of voters, attempted repeated voting, failure of the PS electoral bureau to comply with the law, etc.

### III. RESULTS OF FINAL VOTE COUNTING BY PROMO-LEX

*Promo-LEX OM analysed the accuracy of 2,139 Vote Counting Protocols in the presidential election of Moldova of the total of 2,143 protocols. A total of 37 errors were found in 16 protocols on the basis of verification formulae. The number of protocols with errors is lower than in the first round. Moreover, on 15 November 2020 Promo-LEX OM identified the lowest number of protocols with errors since the last presidential elections (2016)*

*The results of parallel vote counting for the presidential election in the Republic of Moldova do not reveal any significant differences between the preliminary data presented by CEC and final data obtained by Promo-LEX.*

#### 3.1. Accuracy of the vote counting protocols (VCP)

In the context of monitoring the presidential election in the Republic of Moldova on 1 November 2020, Promo-LEX OM analysed the accuracy of 2,139 Vote Counting Protocols (of the total of 2,145 protocols prepared). Of them, 791 were received on paper by the static observers and the mobile teams that attended the polling stations closing and ballot papers counting procedures. Other 1,348 copies of the protocols were received as a picture by long-term observers in DEC, once PEB received the protocols concerned.

A total of 37 errors were found in 16 protocols on the basis of verification formulae (see Annex 2).

*Table 5. Type and number of errors found*

ERROR TYPE	NUMBER
D == F+H	5
E == C-D	2
I == C+J	9
H == G1+G2	7
F == D-H	5
J == I-C	9

The accuracy was checked by examining the formulae in the body of the protocol: **d=f+h; e=c-d; f=d-h; h=g1+g2+gn; i=c+j; j=i-c.**

*The formula **d=f+h** was applied incorrectly in 5 protocols. In these cases it was not proved that the number of ballot papers taken out of the boxes coincides with the total number of invalidated and valid ballot papers. There can be doubts regarding the accuracy of valid vote tabulation, thus – regarding the results obtained by the candidates.*

*The formula **e=c-d** was applied incorrectly in 2 protocols. Thus, in these PS the number of signatures on the lists of voters does not match the number of ballot papers in the ballot boxes.*

*The formula **i=c+j** could not be applied correctly in 9 protocols. The same situation was found with regards to formula **j=i-c**. Thus, either the unused and cancelled ballots or the signatures in the lists of voters were not counted correctly. Actually, we found that “unused and cancelled” can mislead PEB members and can put them in two different categories.*

*The formula **h=g1+g2+gn** was applied incorrectly in 7 protocols. We draw special attention to this formula: the summed up votes for candidates does not match the total number of valid votes cast in the analysed protocols. The correctness of the votes of election candidates is hence questioned.*

The formula  $f=d-h$  is meant to check the number of invalidated ballots by deducting the valid ones from the total number of ballot papers. This verification formula was applied incorrectly in 5 protocols. The conclusions regarding the verification of the formula  $d=f+h$  are valid.

As a matter of comparison, Promo-LEX OM underscores that PEBs issued fewer the number of erroneous protocols than in the first round. Retrospectively, on 15 November 2020 Promo-LEX OM identified the lowest number of protocols with errors.

Table 6. Number of Vote Counting Protocol with errors (in comparative terms)

	Presidential Election 2016, round II	Parliamentary Election 2019 <sup>3</sup>	General Local Elections 2019	Presidential Election 2020, round I	Presidential Election 2020, round II
<b>Protocols with errors</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>142</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>16</b>

### 3.2. Comparative analysis of the data on parallel vote counting performed by Promo-LEX OM and data communicated by CEC

Promo-LEX computed the total vote counting results on the basis of 2,139 vote counting protocols, and CEC calculated the preliminary results on the basis of all 2,143 protocols drafted and submitted via “Elections” SAIS.

For final tabulation, Promo-LEX OM received both protocols on paper (791 copies) from the observers present in the polling stations, as well as protocols as a picture (1,348 copies), obtained by long-term observers from DEC.

We also draw the attention that Promo-LEX preliminary results were estimated for the national level on the basis of the protocols obtained from the sample of 608 PSs.

Table 7. Parallel vote counting results

No	Candidate name	Party	CEC, preliminary	Promo-LEX, preliminary, sample	CEC, Final		Promo-LEX, Final, 2139 PSs		Difference CEC, final/Promo-LEX, final (%)
1	Maia Sandu	PAS	57.72%	52.9%	57.72%	943,006	57.83%	943,626	-0.11%
2	Igor Dodon	IC	42.28%	47.1%	42.28%	690,615	42.22%	688,919	+0.06%

<sup>3</sup>National consistency

## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

para. – paragraph

LPA – Local Public Authorities

Art. – Article

PEB – Precinct Electoral Bureau

BE Unirea – UNIREA Electoral Bloc

twp. – township

CEC – Central Election Commission

DEC – level-two District Constituency Council

IC – independent candidate

let. – Letter

OM – Observation Mission

mun. – Municipality

No – number

t. – town

OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

OSCE/ODIHR – OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

LTO – Long Term Observer

STO – Short-Term Observer

PAS – Action and Solidarity Political Party

p. – Item

PN – Our Party

PSRM – Socialist Party of the Republic of Moldova

v. – village

PS – polling station

ATU – Administrative Territorial Unit

USAID – United States Agency for International Development

ATUG – Autonomous Territorial Unit Gagauzia



## ANNEXES

### Annex 1. Other incidents

Other		
No of cases	Description	Number of PS
1	Limited access to TV and Internet in Moldtelecom network	Chisinau mun., Balti mun., Nisporeni, Anenii Noi, Criuleni, Stefan Voda, Causeni, Straseni
1	Lack of a voting booth for persons with disabilities	PS 33/032
2	Voters' inappropriate behaviour	PS 1/031, PS 1/095
2	Contacting voters by phone to invite them to vote and/or ask about their participation in the election	Chisinau mun., PS 01/001
2	(Attempted) repeated voting	PS 1/340, PS 35/9
2	Inappropriate performance of PEB members or of persons authorised to attend the voting operations	PS 11/45, PS 18/002
9	Failure of the electoral bureau of the PS to comply with the law (issuance of ballot papers, non-compliance with vote annulment procedure, procedures on the election day)	PS 1/152, PS 1/195, PS 1/213, PS 1/348, PS 1/382, PS 06/021, PS 06/002, PS 14/2, PS 32/10
<b>Total 19 cases</b>		

**Annex 2. Description of categories of errors in protocols by polling stations**

No	C/PS	Constituency/Settlement	Error number	No
1	10-046	Causeni - TOCUZ	2	I == C+J J == I-C
2	01-038	Chisinau - BOTANICA	3	D == F+H F == D-H H == G1+G2
3	01-060	Chisinau - BOTANICA	1	H == G1+G2
4	01-130	Chisinau - CENTER	2	I == C+J J == I-C
5	13-006	Donduseni - BRICENI	3	E == C-D I == C+J J == I-C
6	13-013	Donduseni - FRASIN	1	H == G1+G2
7	13-015	Donduseni - HORODISTE	2	D == F+H F == D-H
8	17-066	Falesti - RAUTEL	2	I == C+J J == I-C
9	19-010	Glodeni - BALATINA	2	I == C+J J == I-C
10	22-004	Leova - LEOVA	5	D == F+H I == C+J F == D-H J == I-C H == G1+G2
11	23-012	Nisporeni - BOLDURESTI	1	H == G1+G2
12	25-068	Orhei - SELISTE	2	I == C+J J == I-C
13	28-026	Singerei - CIUCUIENI	4	D == F+H E == C-D F == D-H H == G1+G2
14	31-012	Soldanesti - COTIUJENII MARI	1	H == G1+G2
15	34-043	Telenesti - VASIENI	4	D == F+H I == C+J F == D-H

				J == I-C
16	36-019	ATU Gagauzia - CEADIR LUNGA	2	I == C+J J == I-C