This article is a translation of the original Ukrainian article from Civil Network OPORA.

The right to stand for election is part of the guarantees provided for in Article 3 of the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights . The European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly stressed that States have a wide margin of appreciation in establishing electoral rules, but such restrictions cannot reduce the right to an illusion. Any requirements for candidates must have a legitimate aim and be proportionate.

One such requirement in national legislation is the residency requirement – ​​a requirement for a person to reside in the territory of the state for a certain period of time before election day (voting). In Ukraine, this requirement is enshrined at the constitutional level for national elections. Candidates for people’s deputies are required to reside in Ukraine for the past five years, and for candidates for the presidency for the past ten years. The residency requirement does not apply to local elections. 

The Election Code establishes that a person is considered to be residing in Ukraine if his/her single trip abroad for private matters did not exceed 90 days, and the total period of stay outside Ukraine in each annual period during the corresponding five- or ten-year period did not exceed 183 days. At the same time, the current election legislation provides for certain exceptions, in particular for staying abroad on a business trip, for study or treatment. That is, Ukrainian legislation combines the formal requirement of long-term residence with certain exceptions, designed primarily for peacetime conditions. However, forced displacement as a result of armed aggression is not provided for among the legislative exceptions.

The issue of the proportionality of the length of the residency requirement has repeatedly been the subject of international assessments. The OSCE/ODIHR Final Reports on the 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections noted that the five- and ten-year residency requirements are overly restrictive and do not fully comply with Ukraine’s international obligations and good electoral practice. The OSCE/ODIHR experts also refer to paragraph 15 of the UN Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 25 on article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, according to which the right to stand for election should not be limited by unreasonable or discriminatory requirements, in particular those relating to residence.

Furthermore, the Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice on Electoral Matters states that a residency requirement may only be established for participation in local or regional elections, and the required length of residence should not exceed six months. Thus, the Ukrainian model with five-year and ten-year terms for national elections appears to be one of the longest in European practice.

In this context, the practice of the European Court of Human Rights on the application of the residence requirement is of particular importance. It shows that even a formally legitimate norm cannot be applied automatically, without assessing the specific circumstances and the principle of proportionality. Thus, in the case of “Melnychenko v. Ukraine”, the ECHR recognized that the residence requirement as such is permissible, but emphasized the need to take into account the specific situation of the candidate. The Court also noted that Ukrainian legislation does not clearly distinguish between “permanent” and “legal” residence, and cannot be applied formally without assessing the circumstances. The decisive argument was the applicant’s well-founded fears for his own safety, which were also confirmed by the refugee status obtained in the USA (for more details, see OPORA’s material “ECHR Standards on the Right to Run for Office: Lustration of Candidates and the Residence Qualification”). 

Thus, the Court’s approach demonstrates that even if the residence requirement is legitimate, its application should not ignore the forced nature of a person’s stay abroad. In times of war, this becomes particularly important. The full-scale aggression of the Russian Federation has caused an unprecedented wave of forced migration. According to various estimates, from 5 to almost 9 million Ukrainian citizens have left abroad since February 24, 2022. Most of them are women and children who have received temporary protection in EU countries.

Therefore, the issue of the residency requirement for the first post-war elections is not only a technical detail of electoral legislation, but also a test of Ukrainian democracy’s compliance with human rights standards and the principle of non-discrimination.

Developments of the parliamentary working group on the residency requirement: approaches and possible consequences

At the end of December 2025, the parliament established a Working Group to prepare legislative proposals for elections in a special or post-war period. Within its framework, seven thematic subgroups were formed, one of which is working on the problems of election administration, including the issue of residency requirements for candidates in national elections. The subgroup participants have developed several approaches to its regulation.

The first approach is reflected in the wording proposed by the Central Election Commission of Ukraine in the resolution of January 7, 2026 No. 1 “On proposals for legislative regulation of the features of the organization and conduct of national elections after the termination or abolition of martial law in Ukraine” . It provides that a person’s stay for any reason on legal grounds outside Ukraine during martial law is not considered a violation of the residency requirement. In the absence of an agreed position on other approaches, this option was taken as the basis for further developments as a working model. At the same time, discussions at the level of the parliamentary subcommittee, which took place back in 2024, showed that such a construction currently does not have support in the Verkhovna Rada (read more in OPORA’s material “Parliamentary subcommittee rejected both bills on combating sexism in electoral processes”). 

The second approach is to reject any special exceptions. Its proponents proceed from the fact that the law cannot change or expand the content of the constitutional requirement of residence in Ukraine. According to this logic, even forced stay abroad during the war cannot be regarded as an exception to the residency requirement. This approach emphasizes the formal certainty of the constitutional norm, but at the same time generates significant consequences for the exercise of passive voting rights.

The third position is a compromise model proposed by the Civic Network OPORA. It is based on the need to take into account the forced nature of citizens’ stay abroad in connection with the armed aggression of the Russian Federation. We are talking about millions of people, mainly women with children, who legally left the country after February 24, 2022. OPORA proposes to “exclude” from the residency requirement only stay abroad caused by the war and carried out in compliance with the legislation (in particular, regarding mobilization, military registration, and rules for crossing the state border), with the introduction of a mandatory declaration of the candidate and verification of relevant circumstances by state bodies. This model attempts to combine constitutional requirements with the principle of proportionality and the realities of wartime. More detailed proposals are set out in OPORA’s material “What to do with the right to run for Ukrainians abroad?”.

Note: the chosen settlement model will have long-term consequences for the exercise of the passive right to vote. In the absence of a special exception for persons who were forcibly abroad during martial law, the residency requirement will be applied in a general manner.

This means that a person who has been abroad, for example, since the end of February 2022 and returned to Ukraine, say, in the second half of 2026, will again have to live continuously on the territory of Ukraine for the period established by the Constitution. For participation in the elections of people’s deputies, it is 5 years, which actually postpones the possibility of running until at least 2032. For participation in the presidential elections, the period is 10 years, which will mean the potential possibility of running no earlier than 2037.

Another example is also illustrative. Many citizens of Ukraine were abroad for a relatively short period – from February-March to October-November 2022, that is, during the greatest threat and encirclement of Kyiv. These people returned to Ukraine immediately after the relative stabilization of the security situation and the de-occupation of part of the state’s territory. However, even in this case, the formal application of the residency requirement will mean an interruption of the period of residence. That is, a person who was abroad for a little more than 183 days in 2022 will be able to run for parliament only in 2028, and for the position of President – ​​in 2033.

As we can see, the current structure does not distinguish between the duration and specifics of stay abroad: short-term forced departure during active hostilities is legally equated with long-term residence outside Ukraine. This indicates the potential disproportionate nature of the restriction, especially given that a significant portion of those who were abroad continued to maintain close ties with the state and returned after the security risks decreased.

The absence of a special regulation could lead to a long-term restriction of the passive suffrage of a significant part of citizens, even if they return immediately after the end of martial law. Given the scale of forced migration, these are not isolated cases, but potentially systemic effects on the structure of political competition and representation in the post-war years.

The voice of Ukrainians abroad: results of OPORA facilitated dialogues

A separate important element of the discussion was the results of structured dialogues that the OPORA Civic Network conducted with Ukrainian communities in Lithuania, the United Kingdom, Germany, Poland, and Italy.

These consultations demonstrated that forcibly displaced Ukrainians do not perceive themselves merely as recipients of temporary protection. They increasingly position themselves as active participants in Ukraine’s reconstruction, democratic development, and European integration.

Participants in the dialogues positively assess the tools of digital democracy in Ukraine – electronic petitions, open appeals, other mechanisms of remote participation. Many note their accessibility and effectiveness compared to the mechanisms of public participation in the host countries. At the same time, Ukrainians abroad express a request for more institutionalized forms of interaction – advisory mechanisms, parliamentary consultations, thematic expert platforms. There is a clear demand for systemic channels of communication between the state and citizens living abroad.

Separately, respondents emphasize their willingness to share professional expertise gained in EU countries, in particular in the areas of public administration, governance reforms, and harmonization of legislation with EU law. The diaspora should be considered not only as an electorate, but also as a strategic resource for the reconstruction and integration of Ukraine into the European Union.

Despite the high level of civic engagement of Ukrainians abroad, current legislation creates barriers to their full political participation. The requirement of five years of residence for candidates for deputies and ten years for candidates for President, not including forced displacement, could lead to the deprivation of millions of citizens of their passive voting rights in the first post-war elections. This will disproportionately affect women, who constitute the majority among those under temporary protection abroad.

Conclusions

The issue of residency requirements for post-war elections is a complex and sensitive one. It lies at the intersection of constitutional norms, international standards, political expediency, and public expectations. It is not just a technical change to the electoral law, but also a determination of what kind of Ukrainian democracy will be after the war – inclusive or restrictive.

Any decision should be the result of a broad expert, parliamentary and public discussion. It should take into account the standards of the ECHR, the scale of forced migration and the principle of equality of citizens before the law.

Depriving millions of people of their passive voting rights for years could have long-term consequences for the political system and trust in the state. At the same time, completely ignoring the legitimate purpose of the residency requirement also creates the risks of forming representative bodies from people whose connection to Ukraine has been minimized or lost.

However, Ukrainians abroad have demonstrated their involvement, professional ability and willingness to be part of the political life of the state. The task of the legislator is to find a solution that will not break this connection, but on the contrary, strengthen it. That is why work on legislation for the first post-war elections should continue in the format of an open and inclusive discussion – with the involvement of constitutionalists, international experts, representatives of the parliament, the CEC and civil society. Only a balanced solution, adopted on the basis of dialogue, will allow combining the protection of the constitutional order with respect for the fundamental right of every citizen to be elected.

Related OPORA materials:

Parliamentary subcommittee rejects both bills on combating sexism in electoral processes

Conclusion on the compliance with the principle of equal suffrage of procedures that establish a different order of exercising electoral rights for certain categories of voters

ECHR standards on the right to stand for election: candidate lustration and residency requirements

What to do about the right to run for office for Ukrainians abroad?

The material was created within the framework of the project “Promoting Democratic Integrity and Governance in Ukraine”, implemented by the Civic Network OPORA with the support of the EU. Its content is the sole responsibility of the Civic Network OPORA and does not necessarily reflect the position of the European Union.