Moldova: Elections and Kremlin’s Shadow

By Lukasz Kondraciuk, Election Integrity and CivicTech Lead at the European Platform for Democratic Elections (EPDE).

Moldova’s October 2024 elections and referendum, characterised by unprecedented Kremlin-sponsored influence attempts, highlighted a climate of profound political and geopolitical divisions in the country representing two drastically competing visions for Moldova’s future. The governing pro-EU Action and Solidarity party (PAS), led by President Maia Sandu, faced opposition from various parties and coalitions advocating for a more geopolitically neutral or even pro-Kremlin stance. PAS and Sandu ran on platforms emphasising closer ties with the EU and the US as well as further anti-corruption measures. The Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM), led by former president Igor Dodon and represented in the elections by Alexandr Stoianoglo, sought neutrality but de facto economic and cultural links with Moscow.

The 2024 elections were pivotal due to certain key issues, including public frustration over persistent economic challenges. Sandu’s decision to hold the Constitutional referendum on whether to include the Moldovan citizens’ wishes for EU membership concurrently with the first round of the Presidential election almost backfired, as the West-based diaspora vote barely saved the positive outcome for the president. Similarly, Maia Sandu’s re-election was far from decisive and, once again, primarily dependent on the diaspora vote.

Ultimately, the vote represented a crucial test of Moldova’s capacity to protect and consolidate democratic institutions and advance European integration aspirations. It also served as a fascinating case study demonstrating not only how Kremlin-sponsored players attempt to hijack democratic institutions to pursue their anti-democratic goals, but also what tools institutions have to defend themselves.

Sandu’s near-failure to secure a strong pro-European mandate in the referendum further underscored the entrenched vulnerabilities in Moldova’s political fabric. The referendum strategy she pursued and linking the pro-EU agenda to her party did not really strengthen public confidence in her policies, but rather exposed dissatisfaction with her domestic policies and the country’s vulnerability to disinformation and malign influence.

The outcome proved that even with strong outside help, empty rhetoric will not move the electorate. While Sandu’s re-election and the referendum outcome were a fillip to her and her party, the country’s pro-EU path still hangs in the balance pending resolution of some serious issues and defects in its internal governance. Furthermore, Sandu faces a considerable challenge in engaging sceptics through genuine dialogue and fostering a pluralistic conversation about integration’s actual costs and benefits.

The Kremlin’s influence in Moldova’s 2024 elections has been thoroughly documented by the country’s authorities, independent observers together with the country’s investigative journalists. Reportedly, tens or possibly hundreds of millions of dollars were transferred from Russia in the months leading up to the election to buy votes from tens of thousands of Moldovan citizens. These efforts specifically targeted vulnerable groups, including rural voters and Russian-speaking citizens in Transnistria — areas that are less accessible to Moldovan law enforcement, exploiting existing socio-economic disparities and weak institutional oversight from the authorities. Additionally, the polarised media environment provided more channels for Russian influence.

International and domestic election observers were essential in assessing Moldova’s 2024 elections and recommending the authorities improve specific electoral processes. Missions from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations (ENEMO), the International Republican Institute (IRI), the National Democratic Institute (NDI) as well as domestic observers monitored the referendum and presidential votes, noting improved legal frameworks, generally transparent procedures and the efficient work of electoral administration bodies. However, observers acknowledged the challenges posed by Kremlin-sponsored voter corruption networks, media bias and polarisation.

In sum, Moldova’s October 2024 elections showed the fragility and resilience of its democratic institutions. The country faces deep sociopolitical divides and aggressive external interference. To ensure that democratic gains are consolidated and not eroded in future, the country will need to confront long-stalled governance problems, consolidate electoral integrity and constructively debate with sceptics.

Hybrid tactics in Georgian elections and the EU impasse

By Adam Busuleanu, Senior Program Officer at the European Platform for Democratic Elections (EPDE).

Prime Minister Kobakhidze’s announcement on November 28 to reject accession negotiations with the EU, which Brussels had frozen five months earlier, sparked new protests across Georgia. They mark another wave of demonstrations following mass protests in early 2023 when the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party proposed a Russian-style ‘foreign agents’ law, which had already led to the dismantling of civil society in Russia.

With 80% of Georgians in favour of EU membership, today’s events bring to mind the 2013 protests in Ukraine, triggered by the rejection of EU integration by a government allied to Moscow. The parallels also apply to Belarus, where violent repression followed the disputed 2020 elections.

The October 26 parliamentary elections, widely criticised by both domestic and international observers as deeply flawed, expose a calculated and multifaceted hybrid strategy by the Georgian Dream government, based on a mix of legal manipulation, disinformation, technological misuse, coercion, intimidation together with outright voter bribery.

The Russian-style ‘foreign agents’ law sought to undermine citizens’ ability to oversee the vote by discrediting and paralysing monitoring organisations. Changes to election laws aimed to tighten government control over electoral administration. A disinformation campaign used conspiracy theories and fears of a Russian war against Ukraine. Meanwhile, coercion activity targeted more than 320,000 public sector employees—around 9% of the electorate—including those in education, pressuring them to support the ruling party in exchange for retaining social benefits.

Using privileged access to public data, the government identified and targeted vulnerable groups, including nearly 700,000 citizens—18% of the population—living below the poverty line. The elderly, disabled, ill, educationally disadvantaged and national minorities faced voter bribery efforts.

New voting technologies, initially introduced to enhance transparency, were weaponised for electoral fraud through the misuse of voter ID data and non-transparent ballot scanning. Cameras installed by GD in polling stations, ‘coordinators call centres’ and unidentified individuals near polling stations fostered an atmosphere of surveillance and intimidation.

Despite extensive mobilisation by citizen observers, including ISFED, GYLA and MyVote, they were unable to prevent fraud in such a manipulated environment. All major complaints filed by the opposition, election monitors and the president were dismissed.

The OSCE’s International Election Observation Mission (IEOM) has so far failed to assess properly the impact of electoral manipulations on the final results. The European Parliament’s resolution later criticised the limitations of the IEOM’s observation methodology and called for a re-run of the election, highlighting the growing discord among European institutions. To make matters worse, French senator Pascal Allizard, leader of the OSCE short-term observation mission, issued a controversial letter to the Georgian Foreign Minister during the ongoing protests, aligning with narratives of “fake observers” flagged by the European Platform for Democratic Elections (EPDE) network. This disunity among European actors, alongside the failure to implement promised initiatives such as the EU’s technical mission, has eroded trust and deepened disillusionment with Western support among Georgian civil society.

Europe and its transatlantic allies must move beyond symbolic gestures. They need to unite in demanding an end to violence against the opposition, civil society and the media. Furthermore, they must not only urge the government to release political prisoners, but also launch investigations into election fraud and political persecutions. They should also support calls for a re-run of the elections and boost support for civil society and independent media. In the long term, they must offer deeper political, social and economic ties to a democratic Georgia.